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Abstract 
 
 
 
The literature on terrorism and political violence covers in depth the reasons why 
some national minorities, such as the Irish, Basques and Tamils, have adopted violent 
methods as a means of achieving their political goals, but the study of why similar 
groups (such as the Scots and Welsh) remained non-violent, has been largely 
neglected. In isolation it is difficult to adequately assess the key variables behind why 
something did not happen, but when compared to a similar violent case, this form of 
academic exercise can be greatly beneficial. This thesis demonstrates what we can 
learn from studying ‘negative cases’ - nationalist movements that abstain from 
political violence - particularly with regards to how the state should respond to 
minimise the likelihood of violent activity, as well as the interplay of societal factors 
in the initiation of violent revolt.  
 
This is achieved by considering the cases of Wales, England and Scotland, the latter 
of which recently underwent a referendum on independence from the United 
Kingdom (accomplished without the use of political violence) and comparing them 
with the national movement in Ireland, looking at both violent and non-violent 
manifestations of nationalism in both territories. I argue no single factor can 
determine whether or not a national movement will adopt violent methods, but that 
key to this outcome is the way in which national identity is constructed. Additionally, 
I suggest that states can decrease the likelihood that nationalist movements will turn to 
violence by ensuring non-violent means of political mobilisation are perceived as 
legitimate and viable alternatives, and that the absence of precipitating factors (such 
as an overly aggressive state response or an existing precedent for violent revolt) will 
further reduce the risk.  
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1. Introduction 
 
On the 14th of July 1966, Gwynfor Evans became the first Westminster 
Parliamentarian for the Welsh nationalist party, Plaid Cymru (The Party of Wales), 
when he won the seat of Carmarthen, in South-West Wales, from the Labour Party in 
a by-election. It was reported that Evans’ triumph was greeted with “wild scenes”1 
and Evans himself described the victory as “an historic day for Wales and the Welsh 
nation”, claiming that “for the first time Wales will have a direct voice at Westminster 
and I intend to make that voice heard”.2 His defeated opponent, Gwilym Prys-Davies 
did not view it as an historic triumph, remarking “it has been a protest vote and not a 
positive one… Carmarthen will return to Labour at the next general election”.3 
Although Evans lost Carmarthen in 1970, as Prys-Davies predicted, the victory was 
just the start for Plaid Cymru - it was a political breakthrough, an emergence onto the 
national scene. More generally it was evidence that many in Wales felt that Welsh 
issues were not being adequately addressed by the pan-British parties: the Labour 
Party, the Conservatives and the Liberals, and were turning to nationalism for a 
solution. 
 
On the 2nd of November 1967, Winnie Ewing won a by-election in Hamilton for the 
Scottish National Party (SNP) defeating the incumbent Labour Party. In similarly 
jubilant scenes, it was reported that “fireworks flared through the dismally wet 
night… hundreds of young nationalists stood outside the counting hall in pouring rain, 
cheering, singing, playing the bagpipes and chanting ‘we want Winnie’”.4 She was not 
the first Scottish nationalist Member of Parliament,5 but the scale of her triumph 
(overturning a Labour majority of 16,576) meant that her triumph was the most 
remarkable moment in the history of the SNP up to that point. This result, following 
on from Plaid Cymru’s triumph the previous year, was “a clear warning that Scotland 
and Wales are increasingly impatient about Westminster’s total failure to solve their 
																																																								
1 Dennis Johnson, “Plaid Cymru wins Carmarthen from Labour”, The Guardian, 15 July 1966.  
2 ibid. 
3 “Welsh Party Win First Seat”, The Times, 15 July 1996.  
4 “Fireworks Night is Early”, The Times, 3 November 1967.  
5  That honour belongs to Dr Robert McIntyre who won a by-election in Motherwell in 1945, but only 
held his seat for a few months before losing it in the General Election later that year.  
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special problems”.6 Her supporters were convinced that Ewing would be an influential 
presence at Westminster, claiming she “would put a bomb under Parliament”.7  
 
On the 12th of August 1969, rioting broke out in the Bogside area of 
Londonderry/Derry, Northern Ireland. There had been sectarian tensions in the 
province for at least a year, as Catholic civil rights campaigners had clashed with the 
state, and with mobs of Protestants, over the perceived unequal distribution of social 
services and employment opportunities in favour of the Protestant community. This 
outbreak of violence occurred in the wake of a Protestant march through the 
(overwhelming Catholic) Bogside area of the city, and the police were forced to use 
tear gas and an armoured car in an attempt to clear the streets of rioters and hastily 
erected barricades.8 A day later the situation escalated as “widespread fighting and 
instances of burning and looting were reported” from others parts of Northern 
Ireland.9 The Times reported that gangs of youths armed with “home-made petrol 
bombs” were targeting police stations, as women and children fled across the border 
into the Republic in search of refuge.10 For those on the British mainland it was 
inconceivable that the pictures in the newspapers and on television of rioters clashing 
with police came from another part of the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister of the 
Republic of Ireland urged the United Nations to intervene in the crisis, and the leaders 
of Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom were in constant contact as the situation 
unfolded.11 The rioting lasted until the 17th of August, but by that time the devolved 
government of Northern Ireland had lost control of the province.12  
 
These three events in three different parts of the United Kingdom represent a snapshot 
of the political situation in these countries in the late-1960s. Common to these events 
is the demonstration of public displeasure at the existing political structure - in Wales 
and Scotland at the Westminster government, and in Northern Ireland at the Stormont 																																																								
6 Robert Brown, “’History made’ in Scotland”, The Guardian, 3 November 1967. 
7 “Fireworks night is early”, The Times, 3 November 1967.  
8 Harold Jackson, “Police in Derry use tear gas and armour”, The Guardian, 13 August 1969.  
9 “Shooting in Ulster as rioting spread”, The Times, 14 August 1969.  
10 “Children turn their milk bottles into petrol bombs”, The Times, 14 August 1969.  
11 ibid.  
12  J Bowyer Bell describes the events of August 1969 (100-115) and the gradual decreasing 
effectiveness of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) as a “police state running out of police”. (J 
Bowyer Bell, The Irish Troubles: A Generation of Violence 1967-1992 (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 
1993), 103.  
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devolved assembly, established after the partition of Ireland, and the subsequent 
creation of Northern Ireland, in 1921. These three events are also symbolic of what 
was to follow for these countries. In Scotland and Wales, political nationalism had 
emerged as a serious political force and both the SNP and Plaid Cymru were able to 
make further gains in Westminster in the 1970s, and by the end of that decade the 
people of Scotland and Wales were asked to vote on the devolution of political power 
to national assemblies in Edinburgh and Cardiff. What followed in Northern Ireland 
was a sustained period of inter-communal violence (commonly referred to as ‘The 
Troubles’) between the nationalist (almost entirely Catholic) population of Northern 
Ireland, who favoured re-unification with the Republic of Ireland and the unionist 
(almost entirely Protestant) population who favoured Northern Ireland remaining in 
the United Kingdom. The third party to this conflict was the British Army, whose 
deployment to keep the peace in Northern Ireland had drawn them into the fighting.  
 
Roughly thirty years after these events, on the 11th of September 1997, the Scottish 
electorate voted to support the establishment of a devolved parliament by an 
overwhelming majority. Exactly one week later, Wales followed suit, although the 
margin of victory was very narrow.13 Thirty years after their first political successes, 
the SNP and Plaid Cymru could point to tangible evidence of their political progress. 
On the 22nd of May 1998, voters in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland 
were asked to vote on the Belfast Agreement (more commonly referred to as the Good 
Friday Agreement) a set of accords between the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland that made provisions for the governance of Northern 
Ireland. More importantly, this agreement was a crucial step in the process of bringing 
peace to Northern Ireland, and ending the inter-communal violence that had torn the 
province apart for thirty years. The devolution referenda of 1997 created devolved 
assemblies for Scotland and Wales, but no provision was made for the most populous 
nation of the United Kingdom, England. Somewhat ironically, these votes coincided 
																																																								
13 Wyn Jones and Lewis report that the overall majority in support was overall majority was “only 
6,721 votes out of a potential electorate of 2,218,850” (Richard Wyn Jones & Bethan Lewis, “The 
Welsh Devolution Referendum”, Politics 19 (1999), 37).  
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with an awakening of English national consciousness14 and the first flickers of an 
English nationalism.  
 
These series of events, thirty years apart, chart the different paths taken by nationalist 
movements in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. In Northern Ireland, members of 
the Republican movement, most notably the Provisional IRA,15 had taken up arms in 
defence of their community and to force the British to leave Northern Ireland for 
good. They may not have had universal support amongst Northern Ireland’s Catholics, 
but no solution to the political impasse in Northern Ireland could have been achieved 
without their involvement. In Scotland and Wales, political violence was largely 
absent from the nationalist campaigns. Groups such as the Tartan Army and the 
Scottish National Liberation Army (SNLA), the Free Wales Army (FWA) and 
Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru (MAC - Movement for the Defence of Wales) mounted 
violent campaigns, but these groups were far less active, had far fewer members, had 
far less popular support and were, resultantly, far less important than the Provisional 
IRA was in Northern Ireland. Why was this the case? Why was political violence a 
feature of the nationalist movement in Northern Ireland, but not in Scotland, Wales, or 
even in England?  
 
The relative absence of Scottish, Welsh or English nationalist political violence is 
even more surprising when it is considered that these political movements have much 
in common. They emanate from broadly similar cultures, and fight for broadly similar 
political means: the decentralisation of power from the British state to the national 
level. There are deep historical connections between these countries (most notably 
membership of the British Empire), and migration across the British Isles has been 
on-going for millennia. Additionally, their political opponents were establishment 
political parties that adopted similar messages on the benefits of Union. That said, 
there are undoubtedly differences between the groups. They seek different territorial 
																																																								
14 This has been attributed to England’s hosting of the 1996 European Championships and the 
outpouring of emotion following the death of Diana, Princess of Wales (for example, by Arthur 
Aughey, The Politics of Englishness (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007). 
15 For future reference I will use the acronym IRA to refer to the actions of the original post-1916 IRA, 
and will refer to the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA when discussing the post-1969 events in 
Northern Ireland.  
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ends,16 and there are differences in the way in which membership of the national 
group is conceived, as I go onto discuss. Yet these differences should not take away 
from the fact that these three political movements are in many ways alike. How then 
can we explain the wildly divergent paths nationalism has taken in these countries? 
How can we reconcile the use of political violence by those in Northern Ireland 
against the comparative absence of political violence by Scottish, Welsh and English 
nationalists? These questions have yet to be considered in the academic literature, and 
so this thesis will address this discrepancy and explain why political violence has not 
been a significant feature of the national movements in Scotland, Wales and England.  
 
Perhaps another significant question is - why should we, as researchers, be interested 
in this phenomenon? More crudely, why should we care? I will show that these cases 
can inform a variety of academic debates. My central focus, the study of terrorism and 
political violence can learn from contrasting violent and non-violent cases.17 By doing 
so, it should be possible to isolate enabling factors and societal conditions of violent 
action within a nationalist context, adding to the debate on the ‘root causes’ of 
terrorism initiated in contributions by authors such as Martha Crenshaw,18 and in 
edited volumes by Tore Bjørgo19 and Louise Richardson.20 Additionally the study of 
nationalism can also benefit from identifying the correlating factors between the 
emergence and make-up of a national movement and the adoption of violent methods 
by these movements. I believe that this case will clearly illustrate that nationalism is 
not an inherently violent political phenomenon, building on the evidence presented by 
authors such as David Laitin21 and Siniša Malešević.22 Finally, I believe that this 
study will be of interest to students of non-violent political protest, as I discuss the 
potential benefits of non-violent protest if it is perceived to be viable, building on 
																																																								
16 Those in Northern Ireland seek reunification with the Republic of Ireland. The Scottish nationalists 
argue for the creation of an independent Scottish state; and until as recently as 2011, Plaid Cymru had 
not formally committed to pursuing Welsh independence. 
17 As I discuss in my literature review, this is an endeavor already undertaken by a number of authors. 
18 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism”, Comparative Politics, 13:4 (1981): 379-399. 
19 Tore Bjørgo, Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward (London: Routledge, 
2005). 
20 Louise Richardson, The Roots of Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2006).  
21 David Laitin, Nations, States and Violence (Oxford: University Press, 2007). 
22 Siniša Malešević, “Is Nationalism Intrinsically Violent?”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 19 (2013):  
12-37. 
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existing academic literature from Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan23 and Adam 
Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash.24 
 
The central contention of this thesis is that political violence was largely absent from 
these nationalist campaigns due to the interaction of a variety of social and political 
factors in Scotland, Wales and England. The first of these was the successful 
integration of these peoples into a pan-British identity in the centuries before the rise 
of nationalist movements in these countries through shared religion, economic 
prosperity and civil institutions. I also argue that the viability of non-violent 
alternatives to the minority nationalist movements in these countries eliminated the 
need, in the eyes of the vast majority of these populations, for physical force to be 
used to obtain nationalist progress. The result of these, and other secondary factors, 
was that Scotland, Wales and England lacked the communal polarisation on the 
national question present in Ireland: thus the societal conditions were inhospitable to 
militant nationalists, who were unable to gain popular support for their groups, or 
their actions. Popular support, we are told, is the lifeblood of any covert subversive 
group.25 Without it, militants find themselves financially and logistically constrained, 
and constantly on the run to avoid detection, without a consenting community to 
shelter them. It was this lack of popular support that inhibited the growth of militant 
nationalism in Scotland, Wales and England.  
 
 
Research Project and Parameters 
 
Understanding why something did not happen is not a straightforward endeavour. 
Some have questioned why anyone would attempt this - Niall Ferguson, in Virtual 
History, asks this very question - “why concern ourselves with what didn’t happen? 
Just as there is no use crying over spilt milk, runs the argument, so there is no use in 
																																																								
23 Erica Chenoweth & Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of 
Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
24 Adam Roberts & Timothy Garton Ash, Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-
violent Action from Gandhi to Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).  
25 Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Threat (London: John 
Murray, 2006), 31; Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism [Revised Edition] (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2006), 225.  
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wondering how the spillage might have been averted”.26 There is a branch of 
historical enquiry that studies how events could have differed had a notable event or 
innovation not occurred, described as counterfactual history.27 Ferguson tells us that 
two forms of counterfactual history exist. The first kind is “essentially [a] product of 
the imagination”.28 Works of literary fiction frequently employ alternative narratives 
to consider how different things could be - for example, Ferguson cites the novel 
Fatherland by Robert Harris, set in a Europe shaped by a Nazi victory in the Second 
World War.29 Hollywood has also played on the public’s fascination with alternative 
narratives - films such as It’s a Wonderful Life,30 Sliding Doors,31 Back to the Future32 
and Run Lola Run33 all employ the examination of an alternative future to demonstrate 
how subtle changes in the present can produce a vastly different sequence of events.  
 
The second type of counterfactual history “designed to test hypotheses by 
(supposedly) empirical means, which eschew imagination in favour of computation”34 
is more relevant to my work here. Some historians have scorned this kind of 
endeavour: Michael Oakeshott claimed that counterfactual history is “pure myth, an 
extravagance of the imagination”,35 and in his work on the growth of counterfactual 
history, Richard J. Evans argues the vast majority of counterfactual history is “of little 
real use in the serious study of the past”.36 However, this form of research has gained 
in popularity in the last two decades - a direct result, Evans postulates, of the 
																																																								
26 Niall Ferguson, Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals (London: Penguin, 2011), 2.  
27 Ferguson’s edited volume Virtual History and Richard J. Evans’ Altered Pasts both examine the 
emergence of counterfactual history and its potential benefits. The authors in Virtual History consider a 
variety of plausible alternative narratives involving the First and Second World Wars, the Irish Home 
Rule Bill and the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Evans is less convinced of the merits of this form 
of speculation, suggesting that the historian considering the folly of Napoleon or Hitler would not make 
the same mistakes they did as they operated with the benefit of hindsight, and suggests that it becomes 
an exercise in ‘wishful thinking’. (Ferguson, Virtual History; Richard J. Evans, Altered Pasts: 
Counterfactuals in History (London: Little Brown, 2014)). 
28 Ferguson, Virtual History, 18. 
29 Robert Harris, Fatherland (London: Hutchinson, 1992). 
30 Frances Goodrich, Albert Hackett, Frank Capra, It’s a Wonderful Life, directed by Frank Capra 
(1946, New York: Liberty Films, 2009), DVD.  
31 Peter Howitt, Sliding Doors, directed by Peter Howitt (1998, Los Angeles, CA: Paramount Pictures, 
2010), DVD. 
32 Robert Zemeckis & Bob Gale, Back to the Future, directed by Robert Zemeckis (1985, Los Angeles, 
CA: Universal Pictures, 2005), DVD.  
33 Tom Tykwer, Run Lola Run (Lola Rennt), directed by Tom Tykwer (1998, Los Angeles, CA: Sony 
Pictures, 2000), DVD. 
34 Ferguson, Virtual History, 18. 
35 In Ferguson, Virtual History, 7. 
36 Evans, Altered Pasts, 176. 
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econometrical use of history to measure the impact of certain decisions.37 An example 
employed by both Evans and Ferguson is R.W. Fogel’s study of railways and 
American economic growth, and how economic development might have differed 
without the expansion of the railroad network.38 By carrying out this form of 
counterfactual history, we can identify the contribution an individual element made to 
a system and analyse the benefit (or cost) that followed.  
 
I will adopt a similar approach; although it is not possible to be entirely certain why a 
certain chain of events did not transpire, I believe it is possible to identify the 
existence of certain conditions that can help to explain why political violence was a 
marginal feature of the nationalist movements in Scotland, Wales and England. To do 
so, I consider the historical development of the Scottish, Welsh and English nations to 
explain the form that the national movement took in these three countries. Therefore, I 
will provide detailed narratives in each of these cases to demonstrate clearly which 
historical developments are important and the role they play. Central to my argument 
will be the construction of national identity and its direct relation to the form the 
national movement took. Issues of language, and religion dating back centuries to the 
creation of the United Kingdom through political unions, and the split in Christianity 
caused by the Protestant Reformation, are thus crucial to why twentieth century 
political movements operated in the manner that they did.  
 
Following this, I compare these three cases with the case of Ireland - looking at the 
development of the national movement in the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
Imperial Ireland and the impact that this had on the Republican causes in both pre-
partition Ireland and post-partition Northern Ireland. By comparing these cases I 
identify key differences, and having done so I discuss the potential impact their 
presence, or absence, had in Scotland, Wales and England. I do not believe that any 
individual factor can explain why these national movements took such divergent paths 
- instead I contend that a combination of societal factors can account for the differing 
levels of political violence throughout the United Kingdom.  
 
																																																								
37 ibid., 37.  
38 Evans, Altered Pasts, 37; Ferguson, Virtual History, 17.  
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Before continuing, it is necessary to clarify some of the parameters of this research, 
allowing me to move forward with clearly defined boundaries. Firstly, this will not be 
a historical account of the activities of militant nationalists in the United Kingdom, as 
these (to some extent) already exist.39 Whilst their activities will be considered, the 
central aim of this work will be the analysis of their emergence, behaviour, and 
decline, and why there was not further militancy.  
 
It is also beneficial to establish chronological parameters. As I have said it is 
important to examine the factors in the development of Scotland, Wales, England and 
Ireland as nations, and the expressions of national identity that followed. However, I 
do not intend to delve this far back into history in my search for evidence of the use of 
nationalist political violence, and instead my focus will be on political violence in the 
twentieth century onwards for two primary reasons. Firstly, the modern political 
nationalist movements in these countries emerge in the 1920s: in Wales, Plaid Cymru 
emerges in 192540 and the National Party of Scotland emerges in 1928, before 
becoming the Scottish National Party in 1934.41 Neither of these parties was able to 
achieve any sort of meaningful electoral success until the late 1960s, so it is legitimate 
to argue that political nationalism on the mainland United Kingdom is a feature of the 
latter half of the twentieth century, thus we should not expect to find nationalist 
political violence before this period. 
 
The second reason for limiting this research to the twentieth & twenty-first century is 
that political violence (in the modern sense of the expression) is not encountered in 
the United Kingdom until the late nineteenth century, and even then it is limited.42 
The majority of terrorist activity recorded in the United Kingdom occurs in the 
twentieth century, and in the case of Scotland and Wales, only a handful of acts that 
could be termed political violence occurs before 1960, as I demonstrate in Chapters 2 
and 3. In short, the history of political violence in Scotland and Wales is limited to a 
brief period in the late twentieth century and therefore it is most appropriate to focus 
																																																								
39 See works mentioned in the literature review section.  
40 John Davies, A History of Wales [Revised Edition] (London: Penguin, 2007), 531. 
41 Peter Lynch, SNP: The History of the Scottish National Party (Cardiff: Welsh Academic Press, 
2002). 
42 The nineteenth-century terroristic actions of Irish Republican groups are discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 5. 
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from the start of the twentieth century up to the present day in order to take modern 
developments into account.  
 
I believe that the present political environment is the perfect time to undertake this 
study for a number of reasons: chief among them the impact that the referendum on 
Scottish independence in 2014 has had on increasing interest on nationalism in 
Scotland, and enlivening the debate on the constitutional future of the United 
Kingdom. As a result of this, Scotland has, as a country, been involved in a period of 
intense political discourse about its past and its future with which academics, 
journalists, politicians and other cultural figures have engaged.43 Additionally, nearly 
two decades after the successful referenda on Welsh and Scottish devolution in 1997, 
the introduction of devolved authorities in 1999, now is an ideal time to examine the 
impact that this important constitutional change has had on national movements in 
Scotland and Wales, as well as the subsequent effect that it has had in England. In 
Scotland, the victory of the SNP in 2007 Scottish Parliamentary elections gave the 
party the chance to govern, on a national level, for the first time and Scots have seen 
government policy diverge from the path taken south of the border on issues such as 
health and education, providing clear examples of the impact of devolution.   
 
In Wales, further powers were devolved to the Welsh Assembly in the wake of a 
successful referendum in March 2011, bringing it closer in line to the Scottish 
Parliament in terms of powers. Considering the narrow margins by which Welsh 
devolution proceeded in the first case,44 the fact that more than 60% of Welsh voters 
supported further devolution indicates that support for home rule has risen. 45 
Although Plaid Cymru have not had the chance to govern independently as the SNP 
have, they have formed part of a coalition government with the Labour Party in Wales 
in June 2007, offering the party similar experience of governing on a national level.  																																																								
43 Works such as Blossom by pro-nationalist Scottish journalist Lesley Riddoch looked forward, and 
examined how Scotland could change in the event of independence, whereas other works such as Acts 
of Union and Disunion, by Linda Colley, looked back to understand how the United Kingdom had 
reached this important juncture (Lesley Riddoch, Blossom: What Scotland Needs to Flourish 
(Edinburgh: Luath Press, 2013); Linda Colley, Acts of Union and Disunion: What has held the UK 
together and what is dividing it? (London: Profile Books, 2014). 
44 “only 6,721 votes out of a potential electorate of 2,218,850” (Wyn Jones & Lewis, “The Welsh 
Devolution Referendum”, 37).  
45 Roger Scully & Richard Wyn Jones, “The Public Legitimacy of the National Assembly for Wales.”, 
Journal of Legislative Studies (forthcoming) (2015).  
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The establishment of devolved assemblies for Scotland and Wales had the effect of 
increasing the political saliency of English national identity and has raised questions 
about the constitutional and political arrangements of the United Kingdom. Most 
notably, devolution created the West Lothian Question, an anomaly of the devolved 
systems that allows Scottish and Welsh MPs to vote on issues that have no direct 
impact on their constituency, as the issues in question are directly controlled by the 
devolved government. Additionally, it has been claimed by media personalities and 
politicians that Scotland is subsidised by the English taxpayer and this has led to 
demands for the Barnett Formula to be reconsidered.46  
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the timing is ideal because the violent 
activities of the groups in question have been substantially reduced. In Northern 
Ireland, the peace process has mostly eradicated violence on both sides of the divide - 
although dissident Republican groups do remain active.47 In the case of Wales, the 
most sustained period of political violence came to an end with the arrest of leading 
militant figures in 1969. Arson attacks on English-owned holiday cottages in Wales 
did continue until the early 1990s, but no nationalist violence has been recorded for 
more than two decades, the last incidence being in 1992.48 In Scotland, however, the 
picture is a little less clear. The period of heaviest activity was the early 1980s, but 
sporadic acts of political violence linked to the SNLA have occurred as recently as 
2009.49 Whilst the activities of the SNLA may not be at an end, the frequency of their 
attacks is significantly reduced from their high point in the early 1980s. Therefore in 
all three cases we have the benefit of hindsight, allowing for a more complete and 
objective picture of the growth, relative success, and decline of political violence in 
																																																								
46 The Barnett formula (named for Joel Barnett who devised it) is a mechanism used by the Treasury to 
calculate how much tax revenue should be provided to the devolved governments in Scotland and 
Wales. It has been used since the first referendum on Scottish and Welsh devolution in 1979, but there 
have been suggestions that it financially benefits the Scots (see, for example Simon Heffer, “What sort 
of democracy treats losers like they're winners?”, The Telegraph, 10 May 2011; Richard Littlejohn, 
“Stop the referendum - I am declaring myself independent”, Daily Mail, 9 September 2014).  
47 For more on dissident Republicanism see John F. Morrison, The Origins and Rise of Dissident Irish 
Republicanism: the role and impact of organisational splits (London: Bloomsbury, 2013); Martyn 
Frampton, Legion of the Rearguard: Dissident Irish Republicanism (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 
2011); John Horgan, Divided we stand: the strategy and psychology of Ireland’s dissident terrorists 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Max Taylor & P. M. Currie, Dissident Irish Republicanism 
(London: Continuum, 2011).  
48 John Humphries, Freedom Fighters: Wales’s Forgotten War, 1963-1993 (Cardiff: University of 
Wales Press, 2008), 230. 
49 “Scottish separatist group leader Adam Busby to be extradited”, BBC News, 31 July 2013. 
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these three countries. As a result of these factors, the present time is the ideal time to 
undertake this study.   
 
Before examining the existing literature on the topic, I feel it is necessary to clearly 
define the terminology I use throughout my work. Terrorism is an over-used, 
confused and almost meaningless term. There is no single recognised definition of 
terrorism - in fact Schmid and Easson have collated more than 250 definitions in 
active use.50 The term terrorism is so polluted that it would be preferable to avoid 
using it, primarily because it is now seen as a pejorative term. In his work on the act 
of ‘naming’ and the deep meaning that emotive terms hold, Michael Bhatia argues 
“the description or 'reduction' of a revolutionary movement to that of an insurgency 
removes the political or anti-occupation core of its actions, relegating it to a position 
of lawlessness and proposing it as an agent of disorder”.51 In What Terrorists Want, 
Louise Richardson argues “terrorism is something the bad guys do… if you can 
successfully pin the label ‘terrorist’ on your opponent you have gone a long way 
towards winning the public relations aspect of any conflict”. 52  In the case of 
nationalist terrorism, this action de-legitimises the pursuit of an independent state and 
treats this endeavour as immoral, and those involved as criminals. When I refer to 
those involved with violent nationalist groups I do not challenge the legitimacy of 
their ends, only the means by which they would achieve it.  
 
Given that no widely accepted definition of terrorism exists, I have for simplicity 
adopted the definition proposed by one of the field’s key scholars, Paul Wilkinson - 
“Terrorism is the systematic use of coercive intimidation, usually to service political 
ends. It is used to create and exploit a climate of fear among a wider target group than 
the immediate victims of the violence and to publicise a cause, as well as to coerce a 
target to acceding to the terrorists’ aims”.53 I believe that this definition captures the 
key essence of terrorism; the duality of publicity and coercion through action. Where 
																																																								
50 Alex P. Schmid & Joseph E. Easson, “Appendix 2.1: 250-plus Academic, Governmental and 
Intergovernmental Definitions of Terrorism”, in Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, ed. Alex 
P Schmid (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 99-148. 
51 Michael V. Bhatia, “Fighting words: naming terrorists, bandits, rebels and other violent actors”, 
Third World Quarterly 26 (2005), 14. 
52 Richardson, What Terrorists Want, 19.  
53 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response [Second Edition] 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 15. 
	 19 
possible, when referring to the act of terrorism I will attempt to avoid using the term, 
and instead will use synonyms such as ‘political violence’ or ‘militancy’. 
 
Geographically, it is also beneficial to clarify terminology. In the case of Ireland, I 
discuss events from the late eighteenth century to the present day - encompassing 
imperial Ireland and post-partition Northern Ireland (referred to as ‘Northern Ireland’ 
or ‘Ulster’). I refer to pre-1921 Ireland as ‘Ireland’ and, post-1921, as either the ‘Irish 
Free State’, or later the ‘Republic of Ireland’. When discussing Londonderry/Derry I 
refer to it by both names unless directly quoting from a source that does not. Finally, I 
refer to those who advocate an independent unified Irish state as ‘nationalists’ or 
‘Republicans’ and those who oppose this as ‘unionists’ or ‘Loyalists’. These terms are 
used without any value judgements on the respective political aims.  
 
Nationalism is another controversial term, here I use Ernest Gellner’s definition: 
“nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the 
national unit should be congruent”.54 One element crucial to concept of nationalism is 
struggle, as proposed by Richard English in his work on nationalism in Ireland.55 It is 
the need to struggle for the nation, to struggle against an out-group for whatever 
reason, which turns patriotism into nationalism. Finally, I also agree with John 
Hutchinson assertion in The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism that two entirely 
different ‘types’ of nationalism exist56 - cultural and political; I believe that this study 
will prove this assertion to be correct, by comparing the cases of Scotland and Wales. 
When discussing these cases I often refer to the physical manifestations of 
nationalism as ‘national movements’ (e.g. the Scottish national movement), to 
distinguish them from ‘nationalism’ – the political ideology (e.g. Scottish 
nationalism).  
 
 
 
																																																								
54 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 1.   
55 Richard English, Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland (London: MacMillan, 2006), 
454.  
56 John Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the 
Irish Nation State (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987). 
	 20 
Literature Review 
 
The existing historical accounts of Welsh and Scottish nationalist violence are limited 
- both in breadth and in quality. I will briefly discuss the existing literature on these 
topics and the limitations of the few works that exist. I also consider how militant 
nationalism in Scotland and Wales has been treated in the wider literatures on the 
nationalisms and histories of these countries. Additionally, I examine similar 
comparative works on variations in levels of violence between comparable locales and 
discuss how their findings relate to my work.  
 
 In the case of Scotland, the first published monograph on the activities of violent 
nationalists was Andrew Murray Scott and Iain MacLeay’s Britain’s Secret War: 
Tartan Terrorism and the Anglo-American State. This book examines various plots 
and exploits of the militant fringe of the Scottish nationalist movement. In total, the 
author’s claim that violent Scottish nationalists were responsible for “79 bombing 
incidents, 40 armed ‘political’ bank raids and numerous hoaxes and bomb-scares 
since 1968” and that “52 Scottish terrorists [received] a total of 286 years in jail”.57 
The book makes a number of conspiratorial claims about British and American state 
involvement in the suppression of Scottish nationalism to “secure political stability in 
Scotland”,58 because “’the Anglo-American Defence Community’ and NATO Chiefs 
of Staffs believed that an SNP victory would destabilise the West’s defences”.59 This 
alarmist tone detracts from the book and weakens the text as a whole.  
 
Scott and MacLeay’s work has been criticised by both academics and members of the 
militant nationalist fringe. Murray Watson claims that the work “was less than 
rigorous”, highlighting one example that Macleay and Scott had misattributed to the 
militant fringe and leading Watson to suggest the narrative account of the book is 
“questionable”.60 However he does preface this assertion by highlighting the difficulty 
faced trying to find reliable sources when researching terrorism.61 Further to these 
																																																								
57 Andrew Murray Scott & Iain Macleay, Britain’s Secret War: Tartan Terrorism and the Anglo-
American State (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1990), 201.  
58 ibid., 207.  
59 ibid, 12.  
60 Murray Watson, Being English in Scotland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 13. 
61 ibid., 13. 
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criticisms, the Scottish Separatist62 - a journal produced by the Scottish Separatist 
Group (the supposed political wing of the SNLA) - claims that the book contains 
“literally thousands” of factual errors and disinformation, and that “the authors are a 
pair of downright liars in this, and in numerous other regards”.63 The group claims 
that the authors fabricated interviews and smeared members of the nationalist fringe. 
The journal goes on to libel both individuals, alleging that they were members of the 
Scottish Republican Socialist League (SRSL), and Siol nan Gaidheal (SNG) - two 
fringe nationalist groups that emerged in the 1980s - and that MacLeay was “one of 
the League’s leaders, actually an elected office-bearer”.64 The Scottish Separatist 
Group also claims that the book was motivated by the desires of the authors to “return 
to the respectability of the SNP fold” following their involvement in “fringe 
politics”.65 If, as alleged, the authors were involved in the Scottish nationalist fringe 
this would give them a unique insight into the activities of the groups and individuals 
involved. However, their withdrawal from, and denunciation of, these groups does 
make their objectivity questionable. The language employed suggests a personal 
connection between the author (or authors) of the Scottish Separatist, and Macleay 
and Scott, and the context implies that it ended on bad terms.  
 
The authors are also criticised in Andrew Leslie’s Inside a Terrorist Group: The Story 
of the SNLA, in which it is claimed that members of the SNLA refer to Britain’s 
Secret War as the ‘Black Book’,66 and that they believe it to be “state-inspired 
propaganda…[and] largely inaccurate nonsense”.67 Leslie’s work, Inside a Terrorist 
Group, also covers the activities of fringe nationalist groups. The full text of Andrew 
Leslie’s work is available online, but it would seem that paperback copies of the work 
were only available through the website of a republican group Saor Alba, which 
ceased operations in 2007. That it has never been published is noteworthy itself, but it 
has been made freely available on ElectricScotland - a website dedicated to Scottish 
history, genealogy and hosting Scottish content - and it is claimed within the text that 
																																																								
62 Scottish Separatist Group, The Scottish Separatist 1 (1996): 3. 
63 The Scottish Separatist, 3. 
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66 David Leslie, “Inside a Terrorist Group: The Story of the SNLA”, ElectricScotland, last modified 27 
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it has been hosted in the past by the website of the Russian Maoist Party.68 The text 
itself focuses (as the title suggests) primarily on the SNLA, but does cover other 
groups whose membership overlapped. Similar to Britain’s Secret War, Leslie 
provides a narrative account of the SNLA, the flight of the group’s leaders to the 
Republic of Ireland and the group’s subsequent actions.  
 
Previously a journalist for the Scottish edition of the News of the World, Leslie claims 
his first interaction with the group occurred in March 1995 when a member of the 
SNLA contacted him directly regarding a story he had written about the group.69 His 
direct access to SNLA communiqués means that Leslie was party to information (or, 
at least, claims) that was not made public. Additionally, he claims to have had an 
anonymous source within the group, to whom he applies the moniker “Alec”.  The 
text often reads like a tabloid newspaper article in tone, and the author even alludes to 
his colleagues suggesting that his claims were “speculative and alarmist”.70 The 
overall tone of the book is sympathetic to the group’s members who he believes are 
“highly intelligent revolutionaries and terrorists” and claims their activities have 
“forced the highest authorities in the British State to engineer an elaborate cover up in 
order to avoid a political scandal which threatens the integrity of the state itself”.71  
 
Another work available online on ElectricScotland is The Tartan Army, 72 authored 
anonymously by someone with close knowledge of the two key figures in the Tartan 
Army,73 a militant Scottish nationalist group active in the 1970s, responsible for a 
handful of bomb attacks against oil pipelines, a radio tower and an electricity pylon. 
The narrative focuses on the activity of this group, examining their use of political 
violence and their role in the theft of the Wallace Sword,74 as well as their eventual 
arrest and trial. Similar to the other works on militant Scottish nationalism, the text 																																																								
68 Leslie claims that the SNLA maintained a relationship with the Russian Maoist Party, who would 
release statements in their name, (Leslie, “Inside a Terrorist Group”).  
69 Leslie, “Inside a Terrorist Group”.  
70 ibid.  
71 ibid.  
72 n.a. “The Tartan Army.” [Online] (1996) Available at: 
http://www.electricscotland.com/history/tartan_army.htm [Accessed August 2014] 
73 Such as the level of detail about the two individuals, one could speculate that the author is one of the 
individuals themselves, however the website where the work has been hosted was not prepared to 
divulge any further details about the author. 
74 It is claimed that the sword was once owned by William Wallace, a key figure in the Scottish Wars 
of Independence in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.  
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portrays those involved favourably and argues that their actions “achieved what 
millions of words, meetings and argument had failed to achieve”.75 
 
None of these texts are academically rigorous, as illustrated by the suggestions that 
Britain’s Secret War contains deliberate inaccuracies and misinformation. The small 
scale of the violent nationalist fringe in Scotland has meant that the subject has been 
largely overlooked by academia, and only touched upon by the media when individual 
members are in court.  The result of this is that no single core text covering the actions 
of violent Scottish nationalists exists, considering the chronological limits of the 
existing works.  
 
Academic contributions on political Scottish nationalism don’t refer to the militant 
fringe in any particular depth. Christopher Harvie’s Scotland and Nationalism notes 
that “on the fringe of nationalism there was a fair amount of violence”, and refers to a 
number of court cases involving those accused of political violence, describing the 
groups involved as “crazy”. 76  Meanwhile, Jack Brand’s National Movement in 
Scotland refers to paramilitary organisations that emerged in the 1930s associated 
with maverick nationalist Wendy Wood,77 pointing out that “apart from a few 
attempts at sabotage there never was any violence” and “the more militant 
organisations… were all tiny”.78 He summarises his thoughts on violent Scotland 
nationalism by concluding:  
 
There has been talk of the Scottish Republican Army, a Tartan 
Army, a Border Clan and so forth. It is never clear that such 
organisations really exist or whether they are a fiction created by 
some policemen, isolated individuals or the imaginings of popular 
newspapers. The most important point in this respect is that, apart 
from these rather questionable and very unimportant groups, 
violence has never been an aspect of Scottish nationalism.79 
 																																																								
75 “The Tartan Army”, ElectricScotland. 
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T. M. Devine’s The Scottish Nation notes briefly the emergence of Siol nan Gaidheal 
(SNG - Seed of the Gael), who “posed as a kind of nationalist militia and were fond of 
the ritualistic public burning of Union Jacks”.80 Devine asserts that their “militaristic 
image pleased some supporters who were in despair at the collapse of the SNP’s 
electoral fortunes”.81 Journalist Andrew Marr also comments on SNG’s emergence in 
The Battle for Scotland, describing the group as “a bizarre organisation… militaristic 
in image… hardline, romantic, even fantasist, and obsessed with Celtic culture.82 Yet 
he claims: 
 
It is one of the more cheering aspects of Scottish public life that (so 
far) even militant nationalists have shown little inclination for 
violence of any sort. And the very few who have have shown even 
less aptitude: a recent account of ‘tartan terrorism’ is mainly a 
record of minor explosions at remote sites, failed letter bombs and 
captured bank robbers.83  
 
 
Murray Watson also refers to SNG in Being English in Scotland, primarily in relation 
to their campaign to stop the ‘colonisation’ of Scotland by English settlers, 84 
alongside similar anti-English migration groups, such as Scottish Watch and Settler 
Watch, and the Scottish Separatist Group.85 He claims that these groups have been 
“small, their activities… short-lived, and they failed to have an impact on the lives of 
the contributors [English migrants living in Scotland] - many of whom were not ever 
aware of their existence”.86 In The Road to Independence, Murray Pittock alleges that 
the SNP were “smeared” for their sympathy for “quasi-paramilitary and terrorist 
groups such as the ‘Tartan Army’ and ‘Border Clan’, who attempted to attack pylons 
and pipelines”, he concludes that groups like these were “no help to the cause they 
claimed to support”.87  																																																								
80 T. M. Devine, The Scottish Nation: A Modern History (London: Penguin, 2012), 600. 
81 ibid.  
82 Andrew Marr, The Battle for Scotland [Third Edition] (London: Penguin, 2013), 187-188.  
83 ibid., 188. 
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85 ibid., 140.  
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87 Murray Pittock, The Road to Independence: Scotland Since the Sixties (London: Reaktion Books, 
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The pattern that emerges from reading these texts is that most authors note the 
existence of these groups on the nationalist fringe and spend a few paragraphs 
discussing their activities, before concluding that they are not representative of the 
wider nationalist movement and consist of merely a handful of impatient individuals. 
Some of the groups considered in this study took to producing their own journals to 
raise their profile. The most notable is The Scottish Separatist, published in 1996, 
which refers to itself as “the Organ of the Scottish Separatist Group”,88 and contains 
an explanation of the groups raison d'être and information on the activities of the 
SNLA, and personal attacks on authors (as noted above), other members of the 
nationalist fringe, and journalists. At the present time only two issues of the journal 
have been published.  
 
Another publication along the same lines was Skian Dhu/Sgian Dubh (hidden knife)89 
a long-running nationalist journal published from 1963 - 1976 and produced by Major 
F. A. C. Boothby, whose involvement with the Army of the Provisional Government 
of Scotland (APG) resulted in his imprisonment. In the first few years of publication, 
Skian Dhu, contained information about the ‘Scottish Liberation Army’, as well as 
suggestions for individuals who wanted to demonstrate public support for the group. 
Whether a group with that name ever existed, it is not clear, but the group are not 
mentioned from the third volume onwards. The tone of the journal could be described 
as revolutionary - the author refers to Scotland’s status as an oppressed nation, and is 
confident that this situation will be rectified, often suggesting that direct action may 
be needed to obtain this goal. It is contradictory in its treatment of the English who are 
the subject of ridicule and vilification in some issues, despite the claim that the 
author(s) “bear no animosity to either England or the English”.90 The journal also 
targets figures from the entire spectrum of Scottish politics, contains poetry and other 
cultural contributions and regularly refers to the activities of the nationalist fringe in 
Wales.  
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While some attention has been given to the violent fringe of Scottish nationalism it 
has not been academically rigorous and has tended to focus on the actions and actors 
of the groups involved rather than the root causes of their motives. When violent 
Scottish nationalism is discussed in the wider literature it is usually to highlight the 
insignificance of the groups involved, and the works that focus specifically on these 
groups do not do so objectively. Welsh militancy, on the other hand, has received 
greater attention, likely because militant Welsh nationalists - as well as non-violent 
direct action campaigns in support of the Welsh language - were more professional 
and received greater attention. Three published works exist on the emergence of a 
violent fringe of Welsh nationalism - Roy Clews’s To Dream of Freedom,91 John 
Humphries’s Freedom Fighters92 and Wyn Thomas’s Hands off Wales.93  
 
The first released, To Dream of Freedom, is dedicated to Cayo Evans, one the leaders 
of the Free Wales Army94 and the foreword is written by Evans’ daughter. Both 
details should allude to the authorial slant of the work. Clews covers the violent fringe 
of Welsh nationalism from the flooding of Tryweryn valley and the drowning of 
Capel Celyn in 1962 to the arrest of John Jenkins, leader of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru 
(MAC - Movement of the Defence of Wales) after the Investiture of the Prince of 
Wales in 1969. The strength of the text is that it contains detailed testimony from key 
figures within militant nationalist groups - both MAC and the Free Wales Army 
(FWA), one trait of the work is that the author will often quote his subjects at great 
length, only making the occasional comment when the narrative requires. The result is 
hugely beneficial as it ensures the reader is getting first-hand accounts from those at 
the centre of the action. The author is sympathetic to his subjects and critical of the 
state, but refrains from overdramatising events. The author’s decision to allow his 
interviewees to tell the story themselves works well. 
 
John Humphries’ Freedom Fighters takes an entirely different approach. 95  The 
author’s insight comes from his career as a journalist for a Welsh newspaper, the 
Western Mail. In his foreword, he hopes his work will “rehabilitate Welsh freedom 																																																								
91 Roy Clews, To Dream of Freedom: The Story of MAC and the Free Wales Army [Third Edition] 
(Talybont: Y Lolfa, 2004). 
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fighters into the mainstream history of Wales”.96 This claim, and other emotional 
statements about Wales he makes in the same chapter, immediately calls the 
objectivity of the book into question. Throughout the book he makes his nationalist 
allegiances apparent with statements such as “perfidious Albion has always been a 
skilful propagandist, wilfully and wickedly presenting primarily English interests as 
‘British’, a deception that has reduced Wales to an economic and social 
dependency”.97 However, it is rich in detail and engaging, and the coverage of 
Meibion Glyndŵr (MG - Sons of Glyndŵr: a group that was allegedly responsible for 
the arson of more than one hundred English-owned holiday cottages in Wales 
between 1979 and 1992), makes it unique in the literature.  
 
At times, the book is written from his perspective, as he recalls his interaction with 
members of the nationalist fringe he is discussing. Similar to Clews’s work, the 
narrative is very detailed and starts at roughly the same point: the flooding of the 
Tryweryn valley. However, Freedom Fighters goes beyond the arrest of John Jenkins 
in 1969 and the collapse of MAC that resulted from his arrest, and discusses the 
actions of Meibion Glyndŵr. Of the three works covering the activities of the Welsh 
nationalist fringe, Freedom Fighters is the only one that covers MG’s campaign, but 
Humphries’s work cannot be described as objective, nor did he intend it to be.  
 
The final work, published most recently is Wyn Thomas’s Hands Off Wales.98 Like 
Clews’s work, Hands off Wales both covers the same time period - the 1960s - and 
details the author’s lengthy conversations with key actors from the Welsh nationalist 
fringe. However, he also supplements oral testimony with archival research that, at 
times, contradicts his sources. The book’s concluding chapter, covering the historical 
legacy on the militant campaign analyses the root causes and effectiveness of the 
groups involved. Overall, Hands off Wales is the most academically rigorous work.  
 
These three texts cover the same period in Welsh history, and all do so in depth and 
with respect for their subjects. Even though one can question the objectivity of Clews 
and Humphries, their work is detailed and adds something unique to the literature on 																																																								
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the Welsh nationalist fringe. As a result, this literature is far more developed than that 
concerning such movements in Scotland. The existence of Welsh militant nationalism 
is also mentioned in key texts on Welsh history, and on Welsh nationalism generally; 
for example, John Davies’s comprehensive A History of Wales covers the emergence 
of violent Welsh nationalism briefly, suggesting that it was borne out of frustration 
felt by Plaid Cymru supporters, without passing comment on those involved.99 Geraint 
Jenkins, on the other hand, describes the Free Wales Army as “a gimcrack outfit with 
a reputation for flamboyant gestures rather than military prowess” whose antics were 
“risible”,100 but pays neither the FWA nor MAC any further attention.   
 
Gwynfor Evans’s The Fight for Welsh Freedom also touches on the existence of this 
violent fringe. His position as the leader (and first MP) of Plaid Cymru means that the 
focus is the extent to which the actions of the nationalist fringe impacted upon his 
party. Evans claims that the trial of the Free Wales Army “did serious harm” to Plaid 
Cymru,101 but suggests that agent provocateurs were operating within the nationalist 
fringe at this time.102 Whilst he is careful not to directly claim that their involvement 
was intended to smear Plaid Cymru, he certainly implies it. Although Evans does not 
pass comment on the actions of the Free Wales Army in his own text, Thomas records 
that Evans felt that the group was an “inconsequential oddity”103 that “brought 
ridicule upon the Welsh national movement”.104 At the time, he publicly opposed 
direct action, but was not prepared to condemn those involved. Despite this, in The 
Fight for Welsh Freedom, he praised the “heroic ten-year struggle” of Cymdeithas yr 
Iaith Gymraeg (The Welsh Language Society - WLS), and their use of direct action 
tactics in pursuit of a Welsh language television station.105 He would himself later go 
on to engage in a hunger strike to aid this pursuit.  
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In Wales: A Nation Again!, Berresford Ellis discusses Welsh history and the rise of 
Welsh nationalism, and again touches on Welsh nationalist militancy.106 Additionally 
he devotes a short chapter to the Free Wales Army, examining the activities and 
motivations of the group, as well as including some of the wild claims the group made 
over the years. In the foreword by the aforementioned Gwynfor Evans, he is critical of 
the group, and of the continued claims made of an association between the Free Wales 
Army and Plaid Cymru.107 
 
Another work that refers to the existence of violent action in the name of Welsh 
nationalism is Ned Thomas’s The Welsh Extremist, an emotionally charged work on 
the Welsh language and its place in Welsh culture. In it Thomas discusses the 
accidental deaths of two men in Abergele, killed when laying explosives the day 
before the Investiture of Prince Charles, as “the first deaths in the name of the Welsh 
national movement”, although he describes their motives as “misguided”.108 He 
proceeds to argue that the use of violence is indicative of a group put under extreme 
pressure, and suggests that concessions to the Welsh nationalist movement have been 
most frequent “in the period of multiplying bomb incidents”.109 The title of the book 
comes from his suggestions that the explosions carried out by Welsh nationalists 
resulted in the tarring of the entire nationalist movement with the extremist brush - 
“looked at from London, all Welsh demonstrators merge and are written off as 
nationalist extremists”.110 This suggestion is made elsewhere in the literature - Chris 
Williams’s article Non-Violence and the Development of the Welsh Language Society, 
supports Thomas’s assertion. Williams opines, “the ensuing bomb blasts damaged the 
image of the Language Society for some time afterward” and claims that it was 
assumed that members of the Language Society were involved with the Free Wales 
Army.111 
 
In sum, the coverage received by the violent nationalist fringe in works on 
mainstream Welsh nationalism is similar to that received by their Scottish 																																																								
106 P. Berresford Ellis, Wales: A Nation Again! (London: Tandem, 1968).  
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counterparts. When these groups are considered, it is usually in relation to other 
elements of the national movement in Wales (either Plaid Cymru or the Welsh 
Language Society), and the impact they had on the success, and respectability, of the 
movement as a whole. Interestingly, the differences between the Free Wales Army 
and MAC are never explained and the two groups are often treated as analogous, or 
the actions of the latter are attributed to the former. Considering that the Free Wales 
Army sought and received substantially more publicity than MAC, this is perhaps 
unsurprising. 
 
Political violence in Ireland, on the other hand, is a subject that has received a great 
deal of academic attention, and it would be folly to try to consider all of it in detail. 
For example, the campaigns of some of the earliest practitioners of political violence 
in Ireland have been extensively covered. One such work, The Dynamiters,112 by Niall 
Whelehan looks at the Skirmishing campaign – a series of dynamite attacks carried 
out by members of Clan-na-Gael and the United Irishmen in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, and the links between European anarchist ideologues and the Irish 
diaspora in America. The Fenians - and principally the Irish Republican Brotherhood 
(IRB) are also studied in detail in McGarry and McConnel’s edited volume The Black 
Hand of Republicanism,113 in which the authors examine the ‘Fenian tradition’ in 
Ireland and try to uncover some of the nuances of the IRB that have been overlooked 
in the histories of the organisation. In this work it is argued that the IRB were 
important in shaping Irish history, nationalism and identity, but suggest that the 
association with political violence polluted the legacy of Fenianism. The academic 
literature on these groups is deep,114 and far more attention has been paid to one era 
on Irish republican political violence than has to the entirety of Scottish and Welsh 
political violence combined.  
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Charles Townshend’s Political Violence in Ireland115 also examines these groups in 
his study of the relationship between Irish nationalism and violent resistance. In this 
work he examines the correlation between British laws (especially the land laws) and 
violence in Ireland, focusing on the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The 
author examines the correlation between the representatives of the British state in 
Ireland and the perpetuation of forms of violence in the run-up to the Irish War of 
Independence. Two of Townshend’s other works on Irish history: Easter 1916116 and 
The Republic,117 are also of great value in the study of militant nationalism in Ireland. 
In these books, he considers two key chapters in the history of militant Irish 
Republicanism, and of Ireland more generally - the Easter Rising, and the Irish War of 
Independence and subsequent civil war that followed, as the formative years of the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA). On the subject of the IRA, The Secret Army by J 
Bowyer Bell, 118  and Armed Struggle by Richard English 119 both provide 
comprehensive accounts of the group, its development and key personnel.120 The first 
examines the IRA throughout the twentieth century - focusing on the Irish War of 
Independence and (in later editions) the Troubles, but does not ignore the altered role 
they played in the intervening years.121 In Armed Struggle, English examines the IRA 
throughout the twentieth century - looking at the Easter Rising and the formation of 
the IRA thereafter, the lean years, and the birth of the Provisional IRA when the 
Troubles erupted in the early 1970s. In his conclusion he argues that their defensive 
role in the Catholic community could be justified, but highlights their role in 
sustaining the conflict - directly and indirectly - far longer than it needed to last.122  
 
Conversely, there has been no literature on English nationalist political violence, 
because none has occurred. Indeed, the very existence of an English national 
movement at all has been questioned, yet the phenomenon of political Englishness has 																																																								
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been studied by a number of authors. In The Politics of Englishness,123 Arthur Aughey 
talks about the distinction between British and English identity and argues, among 
other things, that English culture is overwhelmingly in line with Protestant, 
Conservative values. He suggests that many of the things that would define England 
have been applied, and shared, to the entire United Kingdom. Aughey proposes that 
the ideas of Britishness and Englishness have overlapped to such a great extent that is 
only recently that the English have ‘awoken’ and realised that they lack a distinct 
identity of their own. However, Aughey suggests that this identity has begun to 
emerge, however, and suggests that it has done so through sport: the outpouring of 
national support for the English football team at the 1996 European Championships124 
leads him to suggests that this identity emanated from the people and was taken up by 
the establishment, rather than being a state-direct endeavour. Michael Kenny’s The 
Politics of English Nationhood 125  considers English identity and its increasing 
political salience since the 1990s (noting, as Aughey and others did, the importance of 
the 1996 European Championships), as well as the role Scottish and Welsh devolution 
had on this phenomenon and how this newly emergent salience has manifested. He 
suggests that if English nationalism has emerged it has done so as a voice of 
“discontent on a disparate range of issues, such as welfare, Europe and 
immigration”.126 Finally, in The Making of English National Identity,127 Krishnan 
Kumar adopts a historical approach to this topic, examining how English identity was 
shaped by contact with their British neighbours and continental rivals, the correlation 
between Englishness and Britishness, and how Englishness has re-emerged as an 
identity in the wake of the decline of Britishness in the latter part of the twentieth 
century.  
 
The most detailed debates on the subject of nationalism surround the historicity of 
nationalism as a political force, with authors such as Ernest Gellner128 and Eric 																																																								
123 Aughey, The Politics of Englishness. 
124 This is an argument also made by Simon Heffer, who remarks that the proliferation of the English 
flag “was like bringing a long-forgotten ornament out of a long-closed room. That flag has been 
somewhere in the collective memory; we all knew it was up in the attic somewhere, but we could not 
quite remember what it was for, or what its point was.” (Simon Heffer, Nor Shall My Sword: The 
Reinvention of England (London: Phoenix, 1999).  
125 Michael Kenny, The Politics of English Nationhood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
126 ibid., 233. 
127 Krishnan Kumar, The Making of English National Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003). 
128 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. 
	 33 
Hobsbawm129 arguing that nationalism is a construct of the industrial age. The 
evidence in the United Kingdom indicates that national groupings were quite clearly 
defined by the twelfth or thirteenth century. It would be wrong therefore, to suggest 
that the nations for which modern actors struggle were thought into existence in the 
last two centuries. Whilst I will show that there is a long history of fighting to defend 
one’s nation in Scotland, Wales and Ireland, the relatively short history of the national 
movements in Wales and Scotland indicates that nationalism, as a political force, is a 
modern phenomenon. I believe that the most appropriate understanding of 
nationalism’s modernity, for the study of the United Kingdom, is the one proposed by 
Anthony Smith in his work Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, often termed 
‘ethno-symbolism’.130  This approach draws from both primordial and modernist 
schools, proposing that an ethnic community exists with deep historical roots,131 and 
argues that it is from these roots that nationalism derives its popular force in modern 
society.132 This approach provides the most convincing explanation for the emergence 
and ideological success of nationalism in the United Kingdom.  
 
Similar comparative studies of differing levels of violence employed in comparable 
locales have been conducted, examining a wide array of countries. Daniele Conversi’s 
excellent The Basques, The Catalans and Spain133 examines Basque and Catalan 
nationalism, and more specifically why Catalan nationalism was far less violent than 
the Basque nationalist movement. Conversi studies the differing geneses of the two 
movements, their growth during the fraught political situation of twentieth century 
Spain, their reaction to dictatorship and how they mobilised support, focusing on 
language, culture and voluntarism. The author argues that Catalan nationalism has 
focused heavily on a shared culture - in this case a surrogate for language - allowing 
Catalan nationalism to integrate incomers, even when the language was proscribed 
under General Franco. Additionally, Conversi argues that the nationalist movement in 
Catalonia was able to unite with workers’ rights movements, presenting a wide-
ranging coalition seeking regional devolution as a means to achieve basic democratic 																																																								
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rights. Conversely, Conversi argues that Basque nationalism was heavily influenced 
by one individual (Sabino Arana) whose focus on race and ethnicity left Basque 
nationalism culturally fragmented and exclusionary.134 The author concludes that the 
cultural fragmentation of the Basque country, and the limited diffusion of Euskara 
(the Basque language) left the founders of modern Basque nationalism requiring a 
unifying element, and action against the state became this element. However, for this 
to be effective, state repression was requisite to generate the necessary response to 
Basque nationalist action. Conversi’s work demonstrates how this type of study can 
be carried out, and the benefits of doing so comparatively.  I find Conversi’s argument 
persuasive and directly relevant to this study, as I show how national identity in 
Scotland and Wales, like in Catalonia, has been defined in a less exclusionary way 
than Irish (or Basque) national identity was.  
 
A similar comparison of the Basque and Catalan cases has been carried out by Juan 
Medrano, whose work focuses less on the comparative non-violence of the Catalan 
case, but on the broader differences between the two nationalist movements of which 
the use of political violence is one important factor.135 Medrano proposes that 
different patterns of economic development in the two regions (a focus on capital 
goods in the Basque Country, but consumer goods in Catalonia) led to very different 
social structures, attitudes towards capitalism and membership within the Spanish 
state.136 
 
Another study comparing levels of violence in two similar locations is Timothy 
Wilsons’s Frontiers of Violence.137 This book compares the violence in Ulster and the 
formerly German Upper Silesia, Polish since 1945. Wilson seeks to explain why 
violence in the latter was more frequent and more brutal, focusing on the early 
twentieth century. The author thematically examines a number of potential factors to 
explain the difference, ruling some - such as external interference - out, before 																																																								
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focusing on the role of identity. The author notes that the main societal cleavage in 
Upper Silesia was language; something which one can acquire many of, and could 
thus be claimed to be non-national. By comparison, in Ulster, the main division was 
religion, which is exclusivist and clearly set the boundary between the two 
communities. His primary argument follows that the violence in Upper Silesia was 
committed by paramilitaries to create boundaries, while clearly defined boundaries in 
Ulster meant the violence was more restrained as neither side sought to create new 
boundaries but merely to maintain the existing ones. Additionally, identities in Ulster 
were primarily communal, whereas in Upper Silesia they were much more personal, 
and Wilson suggests that this made the conflict in Upper Silesia much more personal 
in turn.  
 
The case of Wales has similarities with that of Wilson’s more violent case, Upper 
Silesia, in that the cleavage between social groups was linguistic. In Wilson’s study, 
he postulated that the lack of clearly defined boundaries between the language 
communities led to the use of violence to polarise the communities and create these 
boundaries. I find this argument persuasive, but do not encounter a similar 
phenomenon in Wales. However, I do not believe this discrepancy means that the two 
arguments are contradictory – in the case of Upper Silesia, the two linguistic 
communities were associated with competing national identities, however in Wales, 
the competition was between a national identity and a state identity. As I will discuss 
in Chapter 4, British and Welsh identities were viewed by the overwhelming majority 
as complimentary, thus eliminating mutual competition between the language 
groups.138  
 
Discrepancies between violent and non-violent conflicts are further considered in 
Jeremy Weinstein’s Inside Rebellion.139 In this text, the author addresses the questions 
of why rebellions target non-combatants in some conflicts and not in others. He 
focuses on the resource endowments (either material or social), and argues that the 
initial endowments available to a rebellion will influence the organisation and 
membership of a group – in turn, these two factors will influence the level of violence 																																																								
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that rebels commit against non-combatants. Weinstein believes that material-rich 
rebellions will attract those searching for short-term gains, and this leads to a 
disregard for civilian support as well as violence, and looting. Rebellions that take 
place without material resources, but with social endowments tend to lead to less 
violence as ‘activist rebellions’ require the support and resources of the populace. He 
adopts four cases (two from Peru and the others from Mozambique and Uganda) - two 
material-rich, two material-poor - to demonstrate this argument, however his focus on 
rebellions means that his findings are not directly relevant to this work.  
 
Lee Dutter’s article Why Don’t Dogs Bark (or Bomb) in the Night? is not 
comparative, but does examine the ‘non-development’ of violent nationalism in the 
Canadian province of Quebec.140 In it, Dutter explains the origins of the distinct 
Québécois identity, and the development of the Front de Liberation du Québec 
(FLQ). He argues that ethnic political activity evolves in five stages, starting with the 
emergence of potential leaders, whose entrepreneurial ability allows them to make 
political capital out of the historical experience of an ethnic group, and potentially 
going as far as organised political violence. He then tries to identify why violent 
Québécois nationalism was unlikely to gain popular support, identifying a specific 
miscalculation by the group - the murder of kidnapped government minister Pierre 
Laporte, and the public revulsion that followed - as the primary reason that the FLQ 
did not sustain a campaign of political violence. In his conclusion, the author suggests 
that it may be able to tell us more about ethnically based political activity in other 
contemporary contexts, and references Scotland and Wales specifically. However his 
findings are not directly relevant to this case, as militant nationalists in Scotland and 
Wales did not commit any acts of deliberate killing,141 and thus committed no acts 
that would elicit a similar response.  
  
‘The struggle made me a nonracialist’, by Jeff Goodwin, is similar, as he seeks to 
ascertain why the South African anti-apartheid movement largely refrained from a 
sustained campaign of political violence. Goodwin argues that the African National 																																																								
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Congress’s policy of non-racialism and a fear of alienating potential allies, both 
within and outside South Africa, led those at the head of the campaign to focus their 
attention on greater utility of non-violent protest.142 David Laitin has also studied the 
puzzling phenomenon of why some ethnic conflicts are violent and others are not. In 
Nations, States and Violence - a study of the relationships between nationalism and 
the state, as well as nationalism and ethnic conflict - Laitin notes that there is a 
tendency to focus “far more on the few cases of communal violence than on the 
normal situation of ethnic peace”.143 Laitin has also written extensively on the 
relationship between ethnic cleavages and conflict, in a jointly authored article with 
James Fearon, Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War; 144 as well as another article titled 
National Revivals and Violence. 145  In this article, Laitin examines why some 
nationalist groups use violence and others don’t, looking at the examples of Basque 
Country and Catalonia, and Ukraine and Georgia. He argues that “nothing inherent in 
nationalism leads to violence”,146 but draws attention to the important roles a rural 
social structure, a region-wide shift in allegiance, and sustaining mechanisms had in 
his case studies. His argument is predicated on the ‘tipping-game’ phenomenon, 
whereby an individual is forced to choose between two alternatives. I do not believe 
that the vast majority of individuals in Scotland and Wales have been in a position in 
which they were forced to choose between their national and state identities, until the 
referendum on Scottish independence in 2014. However, the associated notion of 
ethno-national polarisation associated with this model is directly relevant to this 
thesis, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 5.  
 
The state of the literature on Scottish and Welsh militancy is comparatively limited, 
more so in the case of Scotland than Wales. Nevertheless, there are similarities in the 
treatment of the violent fringe of both national movements in the literature on the 
histories and nationalisms of both countries. When these works do discuss these 
groups, it tends to be for only a page or two, and usually only to discuss their effect on 
the success of the SNP or Plaid Cymru. It is common for the names of violent groups 																																																								
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to be used interchangeably - resulting in the misattribution of violent actions - and for 
authors to denounce the antics of these groups and describe them as a tiny minority. I 
believe that this work will go a long way to explaining some phenomena that have not 
been examined academically. Studies that compare differing levels of violence in 
similar political conditions have also been undertaken and have demonstrated the 
potential benefits of conducting this form of research. However, none of these studies 
discussed have considered the cases included in this thesis.   
 
 
Additional Sources 
 
In addition to the academic literature on nationalism, identity, political violence and 
history of the relevant countries (which will be the primary source for this research) I 
draw heavily from news sources, primarily British newspapers. In the case of Wales 
and Ireland, a great deal of information about the attacks carried out by groups in 
these states is available in the aforementioned literature discussed above, but there is 
no single reliable text on violent Scottish nationalism that provides the complete 
picture. It is therefore necessary to access this information elsewhere, and the most 
obvious source is the media, specifically in this instance newspaper sources from the 
British media. There is a further advantage to drawing from media sources: before the 
advent of the Internet and the option for terrorists to self-publish their statements 
became an option, the news media was the primary outlet for terrorist groups to 
communicate with the public. As Leslie’s work makes clear,147 the SNLA frequently 
sent communiqués to the Scottish media, even though they felt their message wasn’t 
being transmitted. Additionally, the literature on terrorism in Wales details the Free 
Wales Army’s constant pursuit of media attention, as well as the kidnap of journalists 
by MAC in order to allow those journalists to interview them. This connection 
between terrorist groups and the media means that the latter are often the best source 
for information on terrorist activity. 
 
Another supplementary source of not just information but justifications for violent 
nationalism were those involved in the groups, and I have spoken with two 																																																								
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individuals jailed for their role in militant Welsh nationalism in order to learn more 
about their motivations, their conception of identity, and exactly what it was they 
wanted to achieve, as I feel these topics were not covered sufficiently in other works. 
The foremost figure in the Scottish National Liberation Army has recently been 
extradited to the United Kingdom from the Republic of Ireland on terrorism charges, 
and with legal disputes on-going I have been unable to speak with him about his 
actions. This is one of the primary difficulties of conducting terrorism research: the 
sensitive nature of sources. That said, I do not believe my understanding of the group 
has been vastly limited by these factors. 
 
 
Chapter Outline 
 
This thesis consists of four chapters (excluding this introduction). In the first two 
chapters I examine the cases of Wales and Scotland and both chapters follow a 
broadly similar structure. I consider the historicity of these nations, the roots of 
national identity and the key motivating factors behind the emergence of the national 
movements in these three countries. These deep historical accounts of identity in 
Wales and Scotland demonstrate that to understand why a national movement did or 
did not use political violence, one first must understand why the national movement 
came into existence at all and consider how nationalists would construct the roles of 
self and other. Having laid this groundwork I discuss the growth of political 
nationalism in these two countries, as well as the use of non-violent civil resistance 
tactics by nationalists in both. Following this, I move on to discuss the emergence of 
militant nationalism, the key figures involved and detail the use of political violence 
in both Scotland and Wales. To conclude the chapter I analyse the extent to which 
these violent groups were able to attain ‘success’ and the extent to which these groups 
were ‘important’ to the national movements.  
 
In the third chapter, I examine the case of England and discuss why a distinct national 
identity and, subsequently, nationalism have failed to emerge in England. To do this I 
discuss the history of England and the extent to which England’s primacy in the 
British Empire discouraged the ruling elite from constructing Britishness as purely 
English. I consider how the decline of the Empire (and the internal breakdown of the 
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United Kingdom) have led to a re-evaluation of political identity in England and the 
impact this has had in the last twenty years. Having done this I consider the 
emergence of Cornish nationalism and the use of political violence by nationalists in 
Cornwall. I conclude this chapter by arguing that English nationalism has not 
emerged, and thus, there has been no English nationalist political violence.  
 
I have not included a chapter on the national movement in Ireland, because (as I have 
already discussed) it has been covered in great detail in the academic literature. 
Instead, in my fourth and final chapter, I compare the accounts of militant nationalist 
groups in the United Kingdom, and explain why political violence has been a feature 
of the national movement in some countries, and not others, focusing on key factors 
such as non-violent alternatives and national identity. To do this I examine key 
historical aspects of the national movement in Ireland and the development of 
nationalist (or Republican) militant groups in Ireland (covering both the early 
twentieth century, and post-partition Northern Ireland in the 1960s) and attempt to 
identify the societal conditions that led Irish nationalists to adopt political violence. I 
then compare the cases of Ireland, Scotland and Wales to examine whether the 
absence of these key factors (the construction of national identity, a historical 
precedence of violent revolt, the availability and viability of non-violent alternatives, 
the importance of religious difference and the British state’s response to nationalism) 
in Scotland and Wales can account for the variance in the use of political violence by 
nationalists.  
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2. Cultural Militancy - Welsh Nationalism and Political Violence 
 
 
How do Welsh sheep differ from English sheep? It was this rhetorical device that 
Welsh Labour MP Aneurin Bevan employed to pour scorn on the prospect of Welsh 
home rule, in a debate on the matter in 1944.148 His argument was that Wales differs 
little from its larger neighbour, but he was not the only commentator to make this 
claim. Indeed, the Encyclopaedia Britannica entry for Wales in 1888 infamously read, 
“For Wales, see England”, a trivialisation that “goad[ed]… generations of nationalists 
in Wales”.149 In the past century, nationalist efforts to sustain and support Welsh 
culture, have led to the introduction of Welsh language broadcasting, the use of Welsh 
in official documents and on road signage, and the introduction of a devolved 
assembly. Where, in the past, diversity may have been seen as an impediment to 
development, it is now celebrated and actively supported by the devolved government 
in Wales.  
 
In this chapter, I examine the development of nationalism in Wales, the brief history 
of Welsh nationalist militancy, and consider to what extent Welsh nationalist 
militancy could be defined as ‘successful’. To do this, I consider the origins of Wales 
as a conceptual national unit, the development of a Welsh national movement, and the 
birth and growth of Welsh political nationalism, with focus on the unifying factors 
behind Welsh nationalism and with reference to the Welsh language, Wales’ distinct 
culture and way of life and the Welsh non-conformist tradition. Doing this allows me 
to explain the foundations on which nationalism in Wales operated and highlight 
distinct aspects that impacted the adoption of political violence by nationalist actors in 
Wales.   
 
Having done this, I discuss the militant fringe of Welsh nationalism by analysing 
three phases of nationalist violence in Wales, looking at the aforementioned militant 
Welsh nationalist groups. When discussing these groups I examine their target 																																																								
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selection, goals, and rationale, and analyse the extent to which they achieved their 
goals. I conclude the chapter by considering the impact their actions had on the 
national movement in Wales.  
 
 
The Concept of Wales 
 
Wales, as a nation, has a long history. Kenneth Morgan notes that a “sense of 
difference between the Welsh and the Anglo-Saxons” was discernible as early as 
597.150 It is at this time that the name Cymry was adopted as a term to describe one’s 
fellow countryman within Wales, and by 790 the territorial limits of Wales had 
solidified with the construction of Offa’s Dyke, a landmark still associated with the 
English border today.151 It took until 1057 for Wales to be ‘united’ as one kingdom, a 
feat finally achieved by Gruffudd ap Llywelyn, who achieved a period of unity that 
lasted seven years, until his death in 1063.  
 
There is some disagreement about where the word ‘Wales’ derives from - Evans 
claims that it was from the Teutonic language, meaning “a foreigner who has been 
under Roman rule”;152 Pritchard and Morgan suggest that it “derives from Wealas, 
Anglo-Saxon for foreign”.153 Davies dismisses the ‘foreign’ element, and argues that 
it meant ‘Romanised’, and can be seen in other border regions in Europe.154 The 
Welsh name for Wales, Cymru, is also still in popular usage. Thus it is a “land of two 
names”, according to Thomas, who believes that they represent “two different places - 
linguistically, literally and certainly figuratively”.155 Both names for the nation as well 
as the border with England have persisted over fifteen centuries, through changing 
political and cultural pressures.  
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The vast majority of these pressures have come from the east. Much in Wales has 
been shaped by its relationship with its neighbour - Lindsay Paterson and Richard 
Wyn Jones contend that “little in Welsh history can be understood without reference” 
to this “often complex and uneasy, always unequal” connection.156 For hundreds of 
years, battles were fought between Norman and Welsh rulers, with land and castles 
frequently changing hands, until Wales came under English rule in 1283, when 
Edward I conquered the last of the Princedoms. This rule was not accepted gently, and 
over the following centuries rebellions broke out at various points - the most notable 
of these risings occurred in 1400, when Owain Glyndŵr successfully led a remarkably 
broad spectrum of Welsh society in revolt, and was proclaimed Prince of Wales. 
Glyndŵr was able to claim authority over large swathes of the country within two 
years, and by 1404 he controlled the castles at Aberystwyth and Harlech, and held a 
parliament at Machynlleth. Glyndŵr has been treated by some in the national 
movement as a national hero, and his name was even invoked by a group of violent 
nationalists who styled themselves Meibion Glyndŵr (Sons of Glyndŵr). His rule, 
however, came to an end within a decade and he was the last native Welshman to be 
Prince of Wales.  
 
The Law in Wales Acts of 1535 and 1542, passed without any form of Welsh 
consultation or approval,157 extended English legal rule to Wales, abolished Welsh 
law, and debarred those who conversed in the Welsh language from public office. 
These were not Acts of Union, as were offered to Scotland - these were Acts of 
Dominion. After this point Wales and England were, to all intents and purposes, one 
country. Very few of the independent institutions that existed in Wales, within which 
Welsh culture and language could be incubated, survived the incorporation of Wales 
into England.158 The result of these impositions was that the Welsh ruling class 
adopted the traits and speech of their English counterparts.  
 
Despite this, Linda Colley states that Welsh distinctiveness did survive through folk 
customs, music, poetry, and most importantly, language.159 Despite the passage of 
legislation to ensure the primacy of English in official contexts, the desire to 																																																								
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guarantee the success of the Protestant Reformation in Wales ensured parliamentary 
support for the translation of the Bible and Book of Common Prayer into Welsh.160 
Having worked hard to ensure the Reformation was a success in England, figures in 
London were keen to spread the faith in Wales as well.161 Initially treated by some in 
Wales as ‘the English religion’, the spread of a myth162 (alleging that the original 
Celtic Church had been a Protestant Church whose adherents had been led astray by 
the wicked practices of Catholicism) allowed Protestantism to be portrayed as a return 
to Welsh roots.163 Diarmaid MacColloch also points to the appointment of native 
Welshmen to prominent positions within the church, and the establishment of a new 
college in Oxford University that would become “a seedbed for Protestant Welsh 
clergy and gentry” as contributing to the success of the Reformation in Wales.164 In 
1553, Westminster instructed Welsh bishops to ensure Welsh versions on the Bible 
and Prayer Book were available in all churches within four years.165 Even though it 
took more than thirty years, a complete Welsh-language Bible was available by 1588, 
commonly referred to as the William Morgan Bible,166 and Protestantism took hold in 
Wales.167  
 
The success of the Protestant Reformation in Wales in central in shaping how Welsh 
society and identity interacted with the British state over the centuries to follow. 
Reformation was crucial for the survival of Welsh, as both a written and spoken 
language, and ensured further generations would have a reason to learn it. “From the 
earliest dawning of the Welsh nation,” it has been claimed “Christianity has played an 
integral part in its life and culture”. 168  It is no coincidence that when Welsh 																																																								
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nationalism arose, one of the primary organs through which it developed was the 
Welsh Church.  
 
Sir Reginald Coupland,169 Vernon Bogdanor170 and Linda Colley171 all agree that this 
action secured the future of the Welsh language. John Davies is more cautious, 
suggesting the claim has “little substance” but he does concede that it ensured that 
Welsh survived as more than just a spoken language.172 The production of the Welsh 
Bible ensured that the language was used in chapels throughout the country every 
Sunday, and vitally secured its future as a written language. Thus linguistic uniformity 
was sacrificed to ensure the demise of Catholicism in Wales.  
 
The success of the Protestant Reformation in Wales is a crucial component in 
understanding why the Welsh were receptive to a British identity, but the resulting 
survival of the Welsh language helps to explain why nationalism emerged in Wales 
and why it took the shape it did. It is one of the great ironies of history that the 
instrument used to ensure Welsh allegiance to Protestantism, and thus to Britishness, 
was also the instrument that ensured the survival of the single most important national 
attribute on which a future national movement could be constructed.  
 
It was still hoped in London that the official promotion of English for administrative 
matters would eventually secure the status of English as the primary medium of 
communication in Wales (and it did), but ensuring the success of the Reformation was 
seen as more important. This sustained the primary cleavage in Welsh society; the one 
between Welsh-speaking natives and English-speaking incomers. That other 
cleavages (class and denomination) would map themselves neatly onto the existing 
linguistic division would further cement the importance of the language as a 
differentiating factor. 
 
Kenneth Morgan makes the claim that Welsh nationalism arose as a result of two 
societal forces in nineteenth-century Wales: the first was the growth of industry in 
Wales, providing a “safety-valve” for the “surplus population of the impoverished 																																																								
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countryside”, reducing the need for emigration;173 the second factor was the rise in 
religious non-conformism. Hempton argues that Methodists and Evangelical non-
conformists took advantage of the “religious market” that the Established Church in 
Wales had created “through education and catechisms” but had been unable to capture 
itself due to its “establishmentarian assumptions”.174 This left as many as 80% of 
Welsh churchgoers outside the Anglican Church by 1851.175 Philip records that the 
growth in Methodism “counteracted anglicisation, and changed the national, social, 
and moral consciousness of the people”.176 Nonconformity divided the vast majority 
of Welsh people from the Anglican, English-speaking, ruling classes.  
 
During the nineteenth century, another change was visible in Welsh society – the 
increasing popular support for the Liberal party. There is a relatively simple 
explanation for this; the extension of the voting franchise in 1867 and 1884 opened 
the ballot booth to Welsh working class voters who had previously been unable to 
make their voices heard.177 This group was comprised of mine workers, small tenants 
(of primarily anglicised landowners), and non-conformists.178 It was along these lines 
– on issues of land, religion and language - that Wales was split in the nineteenth 
century, and those who sought redress on these matters aligned with the Liberal Party. 
Davies argues that the alliance between non-conformists and the Liberals (and before 
them, the Whig party), was “a central feature of Welsh politics”,179 and Jones suggests 
that the success of the Liberals in Wales was built on “a marriage of farsighted 
liberalism with hard-headed nonconformity”.180  
 
Standing opposed to this alliance were the structural representations of England’s 
influence in Wales, in the form of the anglicised ruling class, and the Anglican 
Church. Jones proposes that the “Welsh liberal-nonconformist assault” on these 
targets was “central to the defining credo of the Welsh people”.181 Welshness was 																																																								
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shaped and defined by this group, and it is no surprise that when the national 
movement in Wales was born, its parents were the Liberal Party and the non-
conformist sects. Morgan suggests “the national movement in Wales was to be 
cradled in the [nonconformist] chapels, while the Anglican Church was to appear 
isolated from it, and even to be its enemy”.182  
 
The spark to ignite the national movement in Wales was the publication of a report 
(later referred to as the ‘Blue Books’) on the state of education in Wales in 1847. An 
examination of Welsh education was ordered by Westminster following the 
lawlessness that erupted in Wales during the ‘Rebecca Riots’ between 1839 and 1843, 
a period of working class agitation over the perceived inequality of taxation. It was 
believed, Coupland writes, that the riots resulted from the “ignorance of the working 
class”, to which the “remedy for unrest… was not repression, but more and better 
education”. 183  To this end, three English gentlemen - Ralph Lingen, Jellynger 
Symons, and H.R. Vaughan Johnson - were tasked to report on the state of Welsh 
education. Being English, and speaking no Welsh, they carried out their study by 
speaking with English-speaking Welshmen, the majority of whom were from the 
ruling elite, or the Anglican clergy. As a result, their report was highly critical of the 
Welsh language, describing it as “a vast drawback to Wales and a manifest barrier to 
the moral progress and commercial prosperity of the people”.184 Along with the 
language, the final report was scathing about Welsh education, the morality of the 
Welsh people, and religious non-conformism. Coupland argues that the outrage 
caused by the report made the Welsh people appreciate how proud they were of their 
language and their faith, and “made the Welsh more conscious of their 
nationhood”.185 
 
Unlike other nationalists of the era, the fledgling Welsh national movement was not 
striving for an independent state. Rather they simply sought equality in the United 
Kingdom and the Empire.186 Britain, and Britishness as an identity, remained a 
valuable resource for Wales. This is not unique to Wales; in Scotland, nationalist 																																																								
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figures demanded better union, not less of it. Morgan believes that this results from 
the centrality of liberalism, rather than nationalism, to the national movement in 
Wales, and the lack of an influential, unifying nationalist figure such as Ireland’s 
Charles Parnell.187 The first nationalist group to achieve significant strength in Wales 
was Cymru Fydd (Young Wales) who rose to prominence in Wales in the 1890s. 
Originating in Welsh expatriate communities in London and Liverpool in the mid-
1880s,188 the group gained momentum when Lloyd George took the helm, and 
brought with him half of Wales’s MPs with him to join the ranks, but failed when the 
group could not agree a merger with the Liberals.  
 
 
The Arrival of Plaid Cymru  
 
The decline of Cymru Fydd did not dispel the nationalist sentiment that existed in 
Wales, nor did it dissuade those in the Liberal movement who had advocated Cymru 
Fydd, but it was more than two decades, and a World War, before an equivalent 
movement emerged. Plaid Genedlaethol Cymru (the National Party in Wales, later 
contracted to Plaid Cymru) emerged in August 1925 as an endeavour of H R Jones, 
the leader of the Army of the Welsh Home Rulers, and Saunders Lewis, who would 
go on to become arguably the most important figure in twentieth century Welsh 
nationalism. The founders were intent on operating independently of the Liberal 
Party, fearing that too close a relationship with the Liberals would see this new entity 
go the same way as its predecessor.189 Understanding the form Plaid Cymru took, the 
political ideologies it adopted and the efficacy of their form of political action is 
important in understanding why some in the national movement adopted violent 
methods. I show that incidences of political violence directly follow the failures of 
constitutional methods to achieve political change.  
 
By the time Plaid Cymru emerged, Wales had changed politically; the Labour Party 
had usurped the Liberals as the party of Wales following the First World War, and the 
Welsh Church Act of 1914 had ended the ascendancy of the Anglican Church, 																																																								
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addressing the principle non-conformist demand. However, by this time their 
hegemony in Welsh society was ending and organised labour movements were taking 
their place,190 and thus it was into a different political environment that the new 
movement emerged. Labour’s position of strength, built on their support in the 
coalfields, has been a feature of Welsh politics for the last century – and the 
relationship between Labour’s socialist ideology and mining was a significant part of 
the Welsh identity and Welshness during this time,191 yet it was a unionist identity at 
its core - more concerned with the pursuit of workers’ rights throughout the United 
Kingdom, than demanding separate treatment for those in Wales. Similar to the 
Liberals, Labour contained home rulers within their ranks who, while nominally in 
favour of devolution, but were unwilling or unable to follow up their pledges with 
action once in power.192 For Labour and the Liberals - both pan-British parties - the 
Welsh national question was arguably of secondary importance prior to the late 1960s, 
and to some extent, the lack of support for Plaid Cymru demonstrates that the Welsh 
public held it in similar regard. Both the Liberals and, more recently, the Labour 
Party, strengthened the connection between Wales and the rest of Britain: maintaining 
that Wales could play an important role in the success of Britain as a whole. Since the 
decline of the British Empire, the Labour Party has arguably been the key institution 
of Britishness in Wales.  
 
Morgan argues that for the early part of the group’s existence, Plaid Cymru was 
primarily “a pressure group of intellectuals and litterateurs campaigning on behalf of 
the Welsh language”.193 From its outset, the principal aims of the party were linguistic 
ones – they sought to make Welsh the official language and widen its use as a 
medium of education.194 One of their first campaigns was to withhold the licence fee 
paid to the BBC in protest at the lack of Welsh language radio broadcasting.195 The 
policy of self-government was not part of the agenda until 1932, and even then it was 
only a measure to help ensure the survival of Welsh; the issue of language has been 
key to Plaid Cymru from its inception and has remained central to the party’s agenda 
																																																								
190 Philip, The Welsh Question, 10. 
191 Jones, “Beyond Identity”, 340.  
192 Philip, The Welsh Question, 13 
193 Morgan, “Welsh Devolution”, 206.  
194 Philip, The Welsh Question, 14. 
195 Davies, History of Wales, 573 
	 50 
ever since. This focus on language has shaped the nationalist movement, and how 
others in Wales see it.  
 
In a famous radio address, Saunders Lewis made the claim that the survival of the 
Welsh language “is this only political matter which it is worth a Welshman’s while to 
trouble himself about today”.196 In a pamphlet outlining the policies of Plaid Cymru, it 
was claimed that: 
 
The English government has destroyed practically all the bases of 
our national unity… but there still remains one heritage, in whose 
bonds North and South are one - the Welsh language. This is our 
possession; it needs not to be regained but only to be safeguarded. It 
is the proof of our nationality, and our right to a place in the society 
of nations. It is the rampart behind which the nation may gather its 
strength for the reconquest [sic] of the lost territories.197 
 
The national movement has focused so heavily on the protection of the language 
because it is akin to their property; the symbol of the distinctiveness of the Welsh 
people, and of their history as a national group. To converse in Welsh is to partake in 
the kind of ‘imagined community’ that Benedict Anderson writes of,198 one that is 
both present, but stretches far back into history. Colin Williams argues that language 
is often treated as synonymous with the nation’s culture, and posits “there are 
instances… where language becomes both the symbol and the instrument for a 
group’s cultural survival in an otherwise assimilatory environment”.199 In short, the 
Welsh language is the reason that Wales is not West England. However, to treat 
language as a surrogate for Welsh culture in general is misrepresentative, as one can 
partake in one without the other. Nonetheless, the language has long been the unifying 
factor around which Welsh culture has been centred. 
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The existence of a distinct language, however, is insufficient to generate a national 
movement - in isolation language cannot induce a great deal of political capital. This 
only occurs when there is a threat to the language; it has been the pressures exerted on 
the language, and the associated Welsh way of life, that have generated the national 
movement. In his work on Irish nationalism, Richard English emphasises the 
importance of struggle to nationalism, as a societal force.200 Nationalist struggle, he 
argues, “ involves the rectification of what is wrong: the replace of an unfortunate ‘is’ 
with a desired ‘ought to be’”.201 It has been the need to struggle against the pressures 
placed on the Welsh language and culture that generated and sustained the national 
movement.  
 
These pressures have been twofold: the first, as I have discussed at length, is the 
existence of a rival, state-supported language; the second has been modernisation, a 
force that seeks to extinguish diversity in the drive to achieve maximum economic 
efficiency, and one that has both brought incomers in to Wales and forced natives to 
look outward the country for work. In his famous radio address Saunders Lewis 
claims that this latter force - that of emigration for employment - was mediated in the 
nineteenth century by the industrial revolution, highlighting the importance of the 
coal-mining valleys.202  
 
In their early days, the party was unable to make much of an impression electorally, 
although the group’s earliest members saw the establishment and survival of the 
infant party as an achievement in itself.203 It took until well after the Second World 
War before Plaid won their first seat – winning the Carmarthen by-election in 1966. 
The Labour Party reacted to the success of the nationalists by claiming that it “was a 
protest vote and not a positive vote”.204 The party rose in prominence after this 
success and, with the SNP flying high in Scotland, the early 1970s was politically 
dominated by the threat nationalists posed to the mainstream parties. This secured a 
referendum on Welsh self-government in 1979, but the plans were overwhelmingly 
rejected throughout Wales by the 80% of the Welsh electorate. The severity of the 																																																								
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defeat did not end the issue though, and less than two decades later, Welsh voters 
were again polled on devolution, this time approving it by the narrowest of 
margins.205 Labour has dominated the Welsh Assembly since its opening, although the 
use of proportional representation has forced Labour to enter into coalitions with both 
the Liberal Democrats and Plaid Cymru on separate occasions, in the latter’s first 
experience of governing at a national level. 
 
During Plaid Cymru’s history, the issue of how Wales is governed has been a thorny 
one. As discussed above, the party moved to support self-government in 1932, a year 
after it published a pamphlet arguing that the only way “the economically depressed 
and exploited Wales” could be transformed was though devolution.206 In 1943, the 
party elaborated on the form they wished this to take, arguing that Wales should have 
Dominion Status, with membership of the League of Nations.207 This demand was 
tailored, over time, to match the political conditions, but it was always been couched 
in terms of Wales continuing within the United Kingdom or the British Empire. This 
continued until 2011, when the party voted to support independence as party policy.208 
Thus until very recently, the principal medium of Welsh nationalism was committed 
to remaining within the United Kingdom, differing from the nationalist movement in 
Scotland, for whom independence was seen as the ultimate goal.  Instead, Plaid 
Cymru have focused on addressing Welsh problems with Welsh solutions and 
ensuring the maintenance of their language and identity.  
 
Despite the growth of the SNP in Scotland, Plaid Cymru has been unable to perform a 
similar electoral feat and remain a minor party in Wales. Despite calling themselves 
the Party of Wales, the real party of Wales is the Labour Party, which has won the 
most Westminster seats in Wales at every General Election since 1922, and has held 
the most seats in the Welsh Assembly since it was established in 1999 (albeit not 																																																								
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always as a majority). By contrast Plaid Cymru has never won more than 4 seats at 
Westminster and has even regressed in the Welsh Assembly: dropping from 17 seats 
(of a total 60) in 1999 to 11 today. Balson et al. argue “the Labour Party is not simply 
the party of the working class in Wales, but is also strongly Welsh in its support… the 
chosen vehicle of Welsh sentiment has been, for fifty years now, the Labour Party”.209 
As such, Plaid Cymru has been “cheated of what might seem its natural 
constituency”.210  
 
The Welsh Labour party remains the dominant political force in Wales, but the case of 
Scotland (as I discuss in Chapter 3) where the SNP have displaced the Labour Party as 
the party of Scotland demonstrates that this dominance cannot be taken for granted. 
However, unless Plaid Cymru can expand its appeal outside its traditional heartland, it 
seems unlikely they will usurp Welsh Labour in the immediate future.  It is possible to 
make the case that Plaid Cymru has been unable to challenge Labour in Wales as the 
SNP have challenged Labour in Scotland, because of Plaid Cymru’s focus on the 
Welsh language community and a sense to which English-speaking Welsh voters feel 
excluded by this.211  
 
Throughout their history, Plaid Cymru tended to avoid direct forms of political 
protest. Following the arson of a proposed RAF bombing school in a culturally 
important part of Wales in 1936 (later known colloquially as the ‘Fire at Llŷn’ – 
discussed in further detail below), however, a motion was passed urging the leaders of 
Plaid Cymru to use direct action to further its aims, and one such protest occurred in 
September 1951.212 Yet, at key times in the following two decades, the party was 
ambivalent and even hostile to those veering from the constitutional path.  As a result, 
other nationalist groups were prepared to use more direct means of making their point 
arose and occupied a role many believed Plaid Cymru should have filled.  
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Direct Action and Welsh Nationalism 		
Direct action methods of political protest can be described as an intermediate point 
between constitutional politics and political violence, as direct action protest can 
involve the commission of an illegal act. However, these acts are rarely violent in 
nature; when they are, the target of the violence is rarely another human being. 
Understanding the use of direct action protest in Wales can help us understand why 
militant Welsh nationalism took the limited form that it did, as individuals who would 
likely be tempted to adopt a covert campaign of political violence would be equally 
likely to undertake non-violent protest, if the latter was shown to be efficacious. In 
this section I cover some prominent acts - and actors - of Welsh nationalist direct 
action.  
 
In 1935, the British Government announced plans to construct an RAF training 
facility situated at Penyberth, near Pwllheli on the Llŷn peninsula. It was claimed that 
this was an area of cultural significance to Wales – containing a farmhouse that was 
historically a resting-place for Welsh pilgrims, and had associations with Owain 
Glyndŵr.213 Additionally, it was home to a vibrant Welsh language community. 
Objections were also raised on religious,214 as well as pacifist and environmental 
grounds.215 Following the announcement, Plaid Cymru (and others) raised formal 
objections to the plan.216 The nonconformist church also played a key role providing, 
Saunders Lewis claimed, “a lead to the whole country in the matter”.217 Despite 
receiving a great deal of popular support and a petition signed by almost every 
resident of Llŷn,218 the construction went ahead. 
 
The building of the bombing range started in June 1936. On the night of 8th September 
1936, Saunders Lewis, president of Plaid Cymru, along with two fellow nationalists - 
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Reverend Lewis Valentine and D. J. Williams219 (later referred to collectively as the 
‘Three’) - set fire to buildings and materials at the site, having first ensured that there 
was no risk to human life.220 Soon after, they gave themselves up to the police and 
admitted their guilt. Arguably, the court cases that followed were as important to the 
legacy of the arson, as the fire was itself; the defendants used the trial as an 
opportunity to exercise their right to speak Welsh in court, in an effort to ensure 
Welsh was afforded equal status with English.221  
 
During their defence, the trio sought to portray both the act of building the bombing 
range, and the trial itself, as an assault on Wales by a “foreign government”,222 to 
whom Wales was just “a region on the map”.223 The ‘Three’ couched their arguments 
in religious language, referring to themselves as “leaders of the crusade”; 224 
comparing the actions of the “English Government” to the “new Anti-Christ”;225 
claiming the support of other religious leaders;226 and arguing that “the moral law of 
Christian tradition” was of greater importance that “the law of the English State”.227 
Finally, they maintained that their actions had been non-violent and moral, but did 
warn “had we wished to follow the methods of violence… nothing could have been 
easier than for us to ask some of the generous and spirited young man of the Welsh 
Nationalist Party to set fire to the aerodrome and get away undiscovered. It would be 
the beginning of methods of sabotage and guerrilla turmoil”.228  
 
The jury in Caernarvon failed to agree on a verdict, and the trial was moved to the Old 
Bailey in London; a move later described as “the most significant victory of the whole 
campaign”.229 At the conclusion of the trial they were found guilty, and sentenced to 
nine months imprisonment. In the immediate aftermath of the trial, and the 
imprisonment of the ‘Three’, Davies suggests there was evidence that Welsh 																																																								
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nationalism could emerge as a mass movement, but attempts to build on the 
momentum created over the period failed to elicit anything other than a slight boost in 
support for Plaid Cymru.230 Nevertheless, the ‘Fire at Llŷn’ and the subsequent trial 
compose an important chapter in the development of Welsh nationalism in the 
twentieth century. It was claimed that the burning of the bombing school represented 
“the first time in five centuries that Wales had struck back at England with a measure 
of violence”,231 and it has been treated as “something of a turning point” in relation to 
both the “revival of the Welsh national consciousness” and the status of the Welsh 
language.232  
 
During their defence, Lewis and his co-defendants claimed that they had resorted to 
unlawful methods only after exhausting constitutional options.233 It is precisely this 
form of exclusion from democratic politics that leads actors to adopt more direct 
forms of protest.234 In his concluding remarks, the judge in the Caernarvon trial later 
suggested that the British government might have been guilty of treating the protests 
with contempt.235 As we shall see this was not the first time in the twentieth century 
that decision-makers in Westminster ignored Welsh voices. The campaigners’ 
attempts to address the matter through constitutional channels were ignored, despite 
the level of local sentiment on the matter, and it took an act of defiance to raise 
awareness of the issue outside of Wales. This important chapter in the history of 
Welsh nationalism was crucial in setting a precedent for the forms of political protest 
that were to follow.  
 
Cymdeithas yr Iaith 
 
Saunders Lewis’s role in Plaid Cymru and his involvement in the burning of the 
bombing school made him one of the most prominent figures in the national 
movement, and in 1962, he was invited by the BBC to give a radio address in which 
he chose to speak about the Welsh Language. His address - ‘Tynged yr Iaith’ (The 																																																								
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Fate of the Language) - would have a monumental impact on Welsh politics over the 
next decade. In it, he argued that the English Government had nearly achieved the aim 
they set out with in 1536 of extinguishing the Welsh language, and suggested that it 
would be extinct by the beginning of the 21st century.236 Lewis argued passionately 
that, rather than external factors, it was the apathy of the Welsh that was to blame for 
this decline, and suggested that “nothing less than a revolution” would be able to save 
the language.237 For Lewis, the Welsh native tongue was “the only political matter 
which it is worth a Welshman’s while to trouble himself about today”, and even self-
government would be unable to save it unless the language was given equal status to 
English first.238  
 
The revolution Lewis talked of had already begun. In his speech, he referred to the 
actions of a Welsh couple living in Llangennech who had refused to pay local rates 
until the demand came in Welsh, and had fought at great personal expense to achieve 
this. Lewis asked the listeners to “make it impossible for the business of local and 
central government to continue without using Welsh”.239 He asked the people of 
Wales to challenge the authorities and make sacrifices for the future of their language. 
It was the younger generation that answered his call, with the creation of a group 
called Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg (the Welsh Language Society - WLS; often 
shortened to Cymdeithas).240 The group was formed in the summer of 1962 by young 
members of Plaid Cymru dissatisfied by the party’s campaign to protect the 
language241 and unhappy that the party’s leadership were interfering with their 
original policy platform.242 The early goal of the movement was to achieve official 
status for the language, and whilst this aim differed little from those of Plaid Cymru, 
members of the new group were prepared to go to greater lengths to achieve it.  
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Philip argues that it is impossible to view the development of Cymdeithas without 
considering the global political context of the time.243 The 1960s was a time of student 
protest movements and radical politics among the younger generation, who had 
become disillusioned with democratic politics, and Cymdeithas offered a generation 
of Welsh youngsters “a chance to be an organised deviant minority, mobilised behind 
a counterculture”.244 Key to informing and educating this generation was a wave of 
Welsh pop music that emerged during this period, headed by singers such as Dafydd 
Iwan,245 who delivered a sentimental and political message that referred to past 
injustices suffered by Wales.246 Once again, nonconformists were shaping Wales, 
although this time it was political nonconformity that was leading the way.  
 
The first campaign Cymdeithas were involved in concerned a summons received by 
one of the group’s founders, after he was caught giving his girlfriend a lift on the 
handlebars of his bicycle. The group argues that he had the right to receive the 
summons in Welsh, and when this was refused, an organised protest (the group’s first) 
resulted in a sit-down on Trefechan Bridge in Aberystwyth.247 Aside from bringing 
traffic to a halt, the protest was unsuccessful, but Williams argues that it came to 
represent the starting-point of the campaign.248 Further campaigns on the issue of 
bilingual road fund licenses and signage for Welsh Post Offices followed, with those 
involved using civil disobedience tactics such as sit-ins, hunger strikes and refusal to 
pay fines to make their point,249 with many facing imprisonment for their actions.250  
 
Campaigning dipped in the wake of Gwynfor Evans’s by-election victory in 1966 and 
the introduction of the Welsh Language Act in 1967, but soon after it was felt that the 
legislation was insufficient, and the campaign of non-violent civil disobedience 
resumed, and increased in militancy. Following this, Cymdeithas ran a number of 
campaigns: drawing attention to the issue of Welsh language broadcasting, by 
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invading BBC studios in Wales251 and climbing transmission masts;252 protesting the 
Investiture of the Prince of Wales by playing a prominent role in organising protests 
and heckling the Prince when he appeared at public events;253 and protesting the 
payment of the road license, with the support of the magazine Barn.254 This latter 
protest was especially successful as it was able to draw older, more respected figures 
in Wales into their campaign, and the authorities quickly made a bilingual tax disc 
available. This success, which could be seen as a symbolic victory by outsiders, was 
evidence nonetheless that non-violent forms of protest could reap rewards.   
 
The most prominent campaigns255 (or at least the two that received the most attention) 
were the sabotage of road signs with anglicised Welsh place names, and concerted 
action for the establishment of a Welsh language television station. The road sign 
campaign elicited “strong emotional reactions”, but the “immediate reaction was for 
the most part unsympathetic”.256 Davies goes further; claiming the protests were 
“wildly unpopular”,257 and it was even claimed (by the party) that this activity 
damaged Plaid Cymru’s showings in local elections.258 By 1971, over a hundred 
protesters were in jail for offences related to the Language Society’s campaigns.259 In 
court, campaigners would admit technical guilt, but put forward a case on moral 
grounds,260 similar to that used by the ‘Three’ in their trial two decades previously. 
The issue of Welsh language broadcasting later came to a head in the wake of the 
1979 election, when the Conservatives announced they were reneging on a pledge to 
establish a Welsh language television station. This reversal forced the WLS and Plaid 
Cymru into life, and led Gwynfor Evans (whose personal misgivings about the use of 
non-violent protest had led Plaid Cymru to avoid such action in the 1960s) to 
announce he would undertake a hunger strike unless the Government fulfilled its 
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original promise. It has been shown that this threat directly led to the change in 
government policy on the issue.261 
 
Following the end of the broadcasting campaign, Cymdeithas began to move away 
from symbolic violence; a result of either fears that the severity of their actions would 
lead to public condemnation, or of the success of Plaid Cymru in the elections of 
1974.262 The group, nearly three thousands members strong by this point, continued to 
campaign through direct action on the issue of the Welsh language, and it has been 
argued that their actions have successfully led to a “vast increase in visible Welsh”,263 
but possibly at the cost of “deepen[ing] and exacerbat[ing] the linguistic cleavage that 
exists in modern Wales”.264  
 
There can be no doubt that Cymdeithas has formed an important part of the Welsh 
national movement since their inception, and has at times been able to make progress 
where Plaid Cymru has not. During this time, its relationship with Plaid Cymru has 
been tumultuous. While it was widely acknowledged that, during the group’s 
formative years, the majority of Cymdeithas members were also Plaid Cymru 
members,265 at times Plaid Cymru claimed to have been embarrassed by their actions, 
and the editor of their magazine suggested their activities were “sheer 
hooliganism”.266 Gwynfor Evans later claimed they were an “important wing” of the 
national movement, who engaged in an “heroic struggle” led by “men and women of 
extraordinary commitment”.267 Yet there were occasions, especially at the height of 
the group’s militancy, that Plaid Cymru felt the need to distance itself from the actions 
of a youth movement over which it had no control. However, their actions raised an 
awareness of the issue, and made progress at a time that Plaid Cymru appeared 
politically irrelevant. The importance of Evans’ hunger strike in ‘forcing’ the 
Thatcher government to fulfil its commitment on Welsh language broadcasting 
demonstrates how effective the use of non-violent protest can be. 
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At times, the nature of their protests led to assumptions that members of Cymdeithas 
must be involved with the Free Wales Army.268 Considering that both groups were 
seen to adopt similar forms of protest, through the use of sabotage, this is not entirely 
unexpected. Thomas, however, writes that ‘key figures’ in the Language Society 
treated the FWA with disdain, although there were some within the group who were 
more supportive of the FWA’s methods.269 Meanwhile, the FWA, according to one of 
the group’s leaders, respected them, but still thought that they were “spoilt little 
college boys” who considered the FWA in turn “ill-educated and uncouth”.270 When 
questioned about the relationship between Cymdeithas and MAC, the leader of the 
latter group, John Jenkins, claimed that senior members of both groups were known to 
one another, alluding to a measure of collaboration between the groups.271  
 
Sitting between Plaid Cymru and the FWA and MAC on a hypothetical nationalist 
spectrum allowed Cymdeithas to appear more radical and pro-active than Plaid 
Cymru, but more reasoned and principled that the violent groups. That groups existed 
on either end of the scale thus worked to their advantage, as they could portray 
themselves as occupying the middle ground. Whilst Thomas argues that they weren’t 
a political group in the sense that they didn’t seek office or power, their purpose was 
political - to turn speaking Welsh into a “revolutionary act”.272  
 
Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg emerged at a key point in both Welsh history and the 
global political climate. That they emerged at all demonstrates that elements within 
the national movement in Wales no longer believed political methods alone could 
work. Frustrated young people in Wales took the lead from protesters in other 
Western countries, becoming the “principal protest movement for the youth of 
Wales”.273 Yet they also took a lead from closer to home: from Saunders Lewis. His 
passionate plea for a revolution to defend the language, and his experience as a 
nationalist ‘martyr’ energised a disillusioned generation into action - action, that bore 
the hallmark of the ‘Fire at Llŷn’; principled non-violence, but only after 
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constitutional methods were seen to have failed.274 Like Lewis, and his co-defendants, 
the protesters used court appearances to plead a moral case, despite technical guilt.  
 
In his work on the different types of nationalism, John Hutchinson argues that cultural 
nationalism is often seen as “a regressive force, a product of intellectuals in backward 
societies, who, when confronted by more scientifically advanced cultures, compensate 
for feelings of inferiority by retreating into history”.275 Tom Nairn argues that, to 
some extent, this applies to Welsh nationalism, proposing that it was “a reaction to the 
anglicising capitalist invasion of the South”.276 The industrialisation of Wales was led 
from outside, by the English,277 and although it largely prevented the exodus of a 
significant portion of the language community, this brought with it additional 
pressures on the Welsh culture and way of life. Since that time, the Welsh national 
movement has been on the defensive, protecting their language and the national 
consciousness from the outside world. It has been the pressures imposed on a fragile 
national community that have generated and sustained nationalism in Wales.  
 
The connection between language and national identity goes beyond this rhetoric 
though - members of Cymdeithas went to prison and incurred harsh financial costs to 
demonstrate their commitment to the survival of the language, and Gwynfor Evans 
even threatened to starve himself to death over the issue of Welsh language 
broadcasting. Language was a key component of nationalism in the minds of the early 
European cultural nationalists, such as Johann Herder, and many twentieth century 
nationalism scholars accept that it remains a prominent indication of communal 
difference, and, whilst it is not the only element necessary for a nationalist movement, 
can be an important one.278 Nationalism, however, is not a monolithic concept - no 
two national movements will be completely alike. To the brand of nationalism that 
emerged in Wales, language has been central. That it has survived into the twenty-first 																																																								
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century is remarkable, given the pressures exerted upon it; it arguably, should not 
have. 
 
That said, other factors which merit attention have contributed to the shape of Welsh 
nationalism; the religious cleavage that emerged following the sweeping wave of 
nonconformity, the class-based divisions that have derived from an anglicised Welsh 
ruling class, and finally, a sense that Wales had suffered insensitive treatment. Whilst 
religion may not have provided guidance to Cymdeithas’ generation in the way it had 
to Lewis’s generation, the nature of the protests still followed moral principles set out 
by ‘the Three’. The ‘Fire at Llŷn’ provided a precedent for principled non-violence to 
be used, by the national movement, in defence of the language and the Welsh way of 
life; when the younger generation undertook direct action in the 1960s, it was at the 
direction, and following the example, of Saunders Lewis.  Even the political violence 
undertaken in the name of Welsh nationalism was infused with moral character - the 
individuals involved wanted to make a symbolic protest, not cause harm. Whilst 
religion has lost its saliency as a societal force as a result of the rise of secularism, I 
have argued that the prominent role religious non-conformism played in Welsh 
nationalism shaped both the character of the movement, and the type of activities 
undertaken by those involved.  
 
Another key factor in the moulding of the Welsh national movement has been the 
division between the anglicised ruling class in Wales, and the rest of the country. This 
has manifested itself in a number of ways as the centuries have passed; Hechter 
argues that the social distance between the Welsh gentry and their tenants was as if 
“there had been actual absenteeism”.279 When the industrial revolution took hold in 
Wales, it was English capital and entrepreneurs that drove it, so, the issues of land 
reform, and of workers’ rights were fought along the already established cleavages, as 
an - albeit intermittent - “theme of national protest” in Wales.280 
 
Nevertheless there has been little desire among the national movement to be 
politically separate from the United Kingdom, until very recently. Why has this been 																																																								
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the case? Ultimately, because unionism as a political force, and Britishness as a layer 
of national identity, have been widely accepted in Wales. As I go on to argue, I 
believe that this is because Britishness provided the Welsh people with a social and 
economic utility, and was not incompatible with a Welsh national identity. Whilst 
there can be no doubt that Wales has a distinct ‘political identity’, it is an 
overwhelmingly unionist identity. Electorally, the Welsh people consistently display 
support for unionist parties - even when campaigning for the Welsh Assembly, Plaid 
Cymru struggle to gain more than one fifth of the votes in Wales.  
 
Earlier I posed the question, ‘why is Wales not West England?’ How is it that, despite 
being legislatively bound to England for more than eight centuries, Wales has retained 
a distinct identity? I have argued that the Welsh language has acted as a clear 
indicator of difference, separating the natives from the anglicised ruling class. When 
further cleavages have emerged in Welsh society, whether they have been religion or 
class-based, they have followed the language divide, and given it new salience, 
sustaining the Welsh identity. When this identity was threatened, the national 
movement emerged to defend it, and when the pressure has been most intense, 
members of this movement lashed out at symbolic representations of this cultural 
insensitivity, but only when constitutional methods failed. Yet ‘lashing out’ has 
largely been achieved through principled, non-violent methods that focus on raising 
awareness of an issue. Welsh nationalism has been cultural, not political, and has 
manifested itself as a pursuit of cultural equality, rather that political separation. 
However, some in the national movement viewed non-violent tactics as insufficiently 
viable and sought to escalate the issue through other means. 
 
 
Violent Nationalism in Wales 
 
In this section I examine the emergence of violent nationalist groups in Wales, 
looking at three phases of Welsh terrorism, each relating to a different stage of the 
nationalist campaign. Following that I will examine the violent groups that emerged in 
Wales, looking at Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru (Movement for the Defence of Wales, 
MAC), the Free Wales Army (FWA) and Meibion Glyndŵr (Sons of Glyndŵr, MG). 
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Having done this I look at these groups’ goals, targets and rationales, and finally 
evaluate how ‘successful’ this form of nationalism has been.  
 
 
The Flooding of Tryweryn 
 
In the course of history there are notable events that, in hindsight, precipitated a 
certain course of action. In the case of Welsh militancy, this event was the flooding of 
the Tryweryn valley. A proposal to flood the valley was made in 1955 by the 
Liverpool Corporation, as part of an endeavour to increase the city’s water provision. 
It was a proposal that had some precedent; previous schemes at Lake Vyrnwy and the 
Elan Valley - to provide water to Liverpool and Birmingham respectively - had been 
approved, despite the need to relocate people living on the land.281 Like these 
schemes, the flooding of Tryweryn would require the drowning of a village, Capel 
Celyn, to make way for the reservoir. Plaid Cymru immediately opposed the scheme, 
a ‘Capel Celyn Defence Committee’ was formed, and local councils across Wales 
adopted resolutions that criticised the decision.282 In November 1956, as Liverpool 
City Council prepared to vote on the decision, almost the entire population of the 
Tryweryn valley community marched through the streets of Liverpool protesting the 
plan. Despite this, it was approved and became law on August 1st 1957.  
 
The national movement exhausted all of the constitutional avenues available to 
prevent the flooding of Tryweryn, all to no avail; it was approved despite the 
overwhelming opposition of the majority of Welsh MPs, 283  and the efforts of 
campaigners led by Plaid Cymru. As a result, the campaigners were left without a 
non-violent means of preventing the flooding, and, as I go onto discuss, it is the 
inefficacy of non-violent methods of protest that give rise to more violent forms of 
protest. Plaid Cymru and its leader, Gwynfor Evans, were “met with some hostility” 
for failing to make a stand in the way Saunders Lewis had done.284 After much 
indecision, and a direct challenge from Lewis on the issue, Gwynfor Evans privately 
indicated his support for direct action, only to have a change of heart, and publicly 																																																								
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reject it.285 Dismayed by the inaction of Plaid Cymru, individuals within the national 
movement took matters into their own hands; in September 1962, six months after 
Saunders Lewis’s now famous radio address, a transformer at the construction site at 
Tryweryn was sabotaged, and another attempt to access the site was made a month 
later.286 The perpetrators of the sabotage were apprehended and fined for their actions, 
thus becoming the first Welsh nationalists to be arrested in protest at the Tryweryn 
decision. 
 
Having heard about the Tryweryn proposal whilst working in Canada,287 Owain 
Williams returned home and took it upon himself to make a stand. It was from his 
café that he formed Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru (MAC),288 and planned operations 
against the Tryweryn site.289 Along with two accomplices, Williams proceeded to 
acquire explosive material and, in February 1963, accessed the site, and damaged one 
of the transformers. However, one of his accomplices was identified and sentenced to 
a year in prison. On the day he was sentenced, Williams, along with the other 
accomplice, targeted an electricity pylon in protest. However, both were arrested 
within a week for their involvement in this attack. These acts represented the first 
attacks carried out by MAC.  
 
Aside from slogan daubing, purportedly by the (hitherto mythical) Free Wales Army, 
no further activity occurred before the opening of the dam. As the official opening of 
the dam approached, the Western Mail290 was informed that the FWA intended to 
disrupt the opening, a ceremony that would - it was argued - “make the rape of 
Tryweryn complete”.291 On the day itself, protesters greeted the unveiling delegation 
by damaging cars, disrupting speeches, hurling stones, setting off fireworks, and even 
attempting to burn the British flag.292 Amidst the chaos of the ceremony, three men in 
military uniforms announced themselves to the crowds as representatives of the FWA, 																																																								
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led by Julian Cayo Evans,293 who informed the assembled media that the was the 
Commandant of the FWA.294 Here, before the protesters, stood proof that the FWA 
was more than just a fantasy.  
 
The genesis of the FWA is not clearly outlined in the literature. Thomas claims that 
Cayo Evans (the future leader of the FWA) was inspired to join it when he saw a 
slogan daubed on the wall in Aberystwyth,295 and according to a former member of 
the FWA, Evans was a “natural leader”.296 Despite this, Evans was not the sole 
founder of the group, as Thomas informs us that other wings of the group sprung up 
independently in other parts of the country.  After their grand arrival on the Welsh 
nationalist scene the group became media darlings, conducting interviews with the 
Western Mail, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, Town magazine, and even a televised 
interview with David Frost. In these interviews, Cayo Evans and his second-in-
command Dennis Coslett made a number of wild claims, including that the group had 
seven thousand members,297 trained with the IRA,298 had taught Alsatians to carry out 
‘kamikaze’ attacks299 and had an atom bomb that they would use to destroy the 
Severn Bridge.300 Despite the comical nature of their statements, Thomas claims that 
the group had an “uncanny knack for media manipulation”.301  
 
Whilst the Free Wales Army was taking the battle to the enemy in the media, the 
construction of another dam, this one at Clywedog, had commenced. As with 
Tryweryn, Plaid Cymru and local opposition had been unable to prevent the flooding 
of the valley, and so - once again - MAC sabotaged the building site. This time they 
did enough damage to delay construction by as much as three months.302 This was the 
first attack carried out by the second iteration of MAC,303 although the man who was 																																																								
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to go onto lead the group, John Jenkins, was not involved with this attack. Left at the 
site was a green cap, bearing the insignia of the FWA, deliberately placed by the 
perpetrators as a red herring.304 
 
It was common for the FWA to claim responsibility for attacks carried out in Wales, 
yet despite these bold boasts, the Free Wales Army did not conduct any of the acts 
that they claimed. In fact, Humphries claims that the only attack that the FWA 
attempted was a bombing of a pipeline in the Elan Valley. The device, prepared for 
them by members of MAC, was placed in the correct location, but they had 
accidentally forgotten to attach the detonator.305 The perpetrators fled, the device 
wasn’t discovered until much later,306 and the group attempted no further action. 
Meanwhile, MAC was carrying out further attacks; in September 1967 they blew a 
hole in a Liverpool Corporation pipeline at Llanrhaeadr-ym-Mochnant, once again 
targeting a structure associated with the flooding of Welsh valleys. By now the group 
was under the direction of John Jenkins, a dentist serving in the British Army, who 
had risen to the position of leader due (in his opinion) to his technical expertise.307 
Although two further attacks were carried out relating to Welsh water, by now another 
issue had come to the fore in Wales: one that was to change the focus of both MAC 
and the FWA.  
 
	
The Investiture Campaign 
 
It had been announced in 1958 that Prince Charles, heir to the British throne, was to 
receive the title of Prince of Wales, but by 1967 nothing further had come of this. The 
award of this title, given to the heir to the British throne, had not been always been 
accompanied by a ceremonial investiture, but in 1911 the investiture of Prince Edward 
(later Edward VIII) as Prince of Wales was accompanied by a lavish ceremony at 
Caernarvon Castle, under the direction (and invention) of then Chancellor, David 
																																																								
304 Humphries, Freedom Fighters, 50. 
305 ibid., 6. 
306 There is some disagreement between the sources here, Thomas claims that it was found within a 
fortnight, but Humphries suggests that it was a period of months. (Thomas, Hands off Wales, 146; 
Humphries, Freedom Fighters, 50). 
307 John Jenkins, Interviewed by the author, Ruabon, 5 September 2013. 
	 69 
Lloyd George.308 In February 1967, it was announced that the ceremonial investiture 
of the Prince was also to take place in Caernarvon, on the 1st of July 1969.309 This 
was a proverbial red rag to Welsh nationalism’s bull – the perceived reinvention of 
Welsh history as British history (despite the 1911 precedent) - and was treated by 
militant groups “as an abhorrent imposition of an alien regime”.310 Cymdeithas played 
a prominent role in the public campaign to prevent or disrupt the Investiture, but 
covertly MAC was campaigning against it in their own way.  
 
In November 1967, the Temple of Peace in Cardiff was due to host the first meeting 
of a committee organising the Investiture of the Prince of Wales. The morning of the 
meeting, a device, assembled by Jenkins but delivered by another member of group,311 
exploded hours before the invited dignitaries arrived. This became part of Jenkins’s 
long-term strategy of staging an explosion every time a member of the Royal family 
visited Wales, targeting the Chester Inland Revenue when the Duke of Norfolk was 
visiting,312 and the Welsh Office in Cardiff to coincide with a visit from Princess 
Margaret.313 By this time, MAC was operating a cellular structure, inspired by the 
FLN in Algeria,314 with between four and seven cells operating throughout Wales, 
allowing the group to spread attacks out geographically.315 As the Investiture drew 
closer, further attacks were carried out with increasing frequency, leading to the 
creation of a special unit to bring the culprits to justice, referred to as the ‘Shrewsbury 
Unit’.316 This unit was led by officers from the Metropolitan Police, indicating both 
the authorities’ unease at the continuing campaign by Welsh extremists and their lack 
of faith in Welsh police to apprehend those involved. 
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The creation of this unit, and their investigation that followed led to the arrest of nine 
figures from the Free Wales Army in February 1969, four months before the 
Investiture was due to take place and “widely supposed” to be in anticipation of the 
upcoming event.317 Their downfall was entirely of their own making; the evidence 
used to justify the arrests came largely from the press attention that the FWA had 
actively coveted. The arrests were conducted even though police remained unaware of 
the identities of those behind the bombing campaign,318 and considering that the 
conclusion of the trial of the FWA coincided with the Investiture ceremony, it seemed 
to some of those involved that the timing of the court case was politically managed.319 
 
As a result, the FWA’s campaign against the Investiture was at an end. MAC carried 
on, however, by targeting the new police headquarters in Cardiff in April 1969, 
demonstrating (if any doubt remained) that the bombing campaign was not the work 
of the Free Wales Army. In the week before the ceremony was due to take place, a 
bomb was positioned at Mackenzie Pier, where the Royal Yacht Britannia was to 
meet Prince Charles following the Investiture. However, the device failed, and the 
individuals involved were arrested within 24 hours.  
 
On the 30th of June 1969, the day before the Investiture, two men (both allegedly 
members of MAC) Alwyn Jones and George Taylor320 died in Abergele, when the 
device Jones was preparing to place at a government office in the town detonated 
prematurely. Abergele had supposedly been chosen since the train carrying the Royal 
family was due to pass through the town on the way to Caernarvon the next day. The 
two were later described as ‘martyrs’,321 and were the only people to die as a result of 
Welsh political violence. The Investiture ceremony passed off without note, although 
a bomb placed at the bottom of the Chief Constable’s garden did detonate to coincide 
with the 21-gun salute.322 Thomas alleges that the explosion was heard by Prince 
Charles, who remarked that it was a “peculiar royal salute”, and the Duke of 
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Edinburgh, who gave a wry smirk.323 Whilst the ceremony took place, the defendants 
in the case of the FWA were being sentenced; the two leaders Cayo Evans and Dennis 
Coslett received fifteen-month sentences, jailed alongside another defendant, Gethin 
ap Iestyn.  
 
Following the events at Abergele, another tragedy was to result from MAC’s efforts; 
on the 5th of July, after the media circus had left Caernarfon, a young boy was badly 
injured when he accidentally activated a device that had failed to detonate. In 
subsequent interviews, Jenkins has displayed remorse for the two deaths in Abergele, 
and the injury caused by his actions.324 After the Investiture, the rate of attacks 
decreased, and only two more were to follow before John Jenkins was arrested, along 
with another key figure in the group, Frederick Alders. How exactly the authorities 
came to suspect Jenkins and Alders is, “the case of considerable conjecture in Welsh 
militant circles”, and various former girlfriends of the group members are blamed for 
passing information about the pair to the police.325 Regardless, within three days of 
their arrest, a member of the group, presumably acting on contingency plans, 
destroyed the remaining equipment.326 For their involvement in the campaign, John 
Jenkins received ten years imprisonment, and Frederick Alders received six years; a 
sentence reduced after he agreed to testify against Jenkins.327 This brought to an end 
the most sustained violent nationalist campaign in Welsh history; a period that had 
seen twenty explosions, as well six failed attacks, and had tragically left two men 
dead. This last point - the loss of two husbands, brothers, sons and fathers - should not 
be forgotten.  
 
 
The Cottage Arson Campaign  
 
Despite the imprisonment of Jenkins and Alders, and the presumed demise of MAC as 
signalled by the destruction of their remaining munitions, the campaign of violent 
nationalism in Wales had not ended. The name Meibion Glyndŵr (The Sons of 																																																								
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Glyndŵr, the last native Prince of Wales) had been evoked during the MAC bombing 
campaign, when a letter was sent to the Birmingham Corporation, threatening to bury 
bottles of poison at the site of the proposed Clywedog reservoir.328 Nothing more was 
heard of it until 1979, when a fire at a holiday cottage in the Llŷn Peninsula was 
attributed to the group.329 The fire was the first of approximately 200 attacks against 
Welsh holiday cottages, predominantly English-owned, and English estate agents 
involved in the sales of holiday properties in Wales.330 
  
Those behind the campaign believed that the process of anglicisation that followed the 
arrival of holiday homeowners was having a highly detrimental effect on the way of 
life in these communities. They, and others across the spectrum of Welsh nationalism, 
argued that it priced locals out of the property market, meaning that the younger 
generation were forced to look elsewhere to live, thus breaking up language 
communities. A further issue was the temporary occupancy of these properties, 
resulting in the creation of ghost towns during the quiet periods of the year. Eric 
Hobsbawm, writing from personal experience of affected areas, suggests “the 
community of incomers lived side by side with the indigenous Welsh, but divided 
from them, not only by language, but perhaps even more, by class, lifestyle and the 
growing separatism of the locals.”331 The locals, he argued, “turned inwards because 
they felt themselves to be in that most desperate situation, that of a beleaguered, 
hopeless, and permanent minority.”332 
 
Initially, the devices used a crude time-delay technique that involved wax and 
sulphuric acid, but as the campaign progressed so did the sophistication of the 
incendiary devices.333 Interestingly, the Provisional IRA was reportedly using a 
similar form of improvised device: Oppenheimer refers to it as “the Durex bomb” and 
suggests that it originated from Derry.334 The inspiration for this device may have 																																																								
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come from an earlier form of ‘balloon bomb’ used by the IRA in the 1930s, which 
Dillon reports were primarily used in Liverpool and London.335 Considering the 
similarities between the devices, it is possible that militants in Wales were drawing 
inspiration from the Provisional IRA, but this cannot be substantiated.  
 
The geographical spread and simultaneous nature of the attacks led police to believe 
that the campaign was perpetrated by a number of discontinuous, well-organised cells, 
similar to the structure used by MAC, and it later suggested that the attacks were 
carried out by 12 people.336 In a communiqué, MG justified their attacks as “an act of 
despair”, at the economic situation in rural Wales that inflated the property market to 
such an extent that local people couldn’t afford to buy into it.337 The spate of arson 
attacks led to a famous parody on Not the Nine O’Clock News338 of an advert from the 
British Coal Board, whose slogan had been “come home to a real fire”, to which the 
comedians added the suffix “buy a cottage in Wales”. Humphries claims that those 
involved in the cottage arson campaign “won widespread public support by defending 
Wales’s cultural identity” in a way that those involved in the bombing campaign 
never had.339 The campaign spawned copycat attacks, with a group called the Workers 
Army of the Welsh Republic responsible for attacks on Conservative Clubs and the 
home of the Welsh Secretary. These attacks had little to do with the Welsh housing 
market and more to do with the overthrow of the state.  
 
The cottage arson campaign perturbed the authorities sufficiently that, in March 1980, 
the police initiated ‘Operation Tân (Fire)’, 340 arresting scores of known Welsh 
nationalists. Not one of those arrested was involved in the campaign, although 
evidence acquired during the sweep did later lead police in the right direction. Even 
so, the only individual caught and imprisoned for the campaign was Dafydd Ladd, an 
anarchist that John Jenkins had befriended whilst in prison, and the campaign was to 
continue for more than ten years after this. Another man was jailed for sending letter 
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bombs linked to the cottage arson campaign,341 police were unable to make any 
further arrests. The case was re-opened in 2004, but no further arrests were made.342 
As the campaign entered the 1990s, it fizzled out, and (according to Humphries343) the 
last attacks took place on the 1st of November 1992. It was reported that in October 
1992 a number of English property-owners in North Wales received letters - in Welsh 
- warning “the families to leave Wales by St David’s day… or be burned out”.344 
These acts, occurring just a little over thirty years after the first attack on Tryweryn, 
were the last acts carried out by militant Welsh nationalists.  
Over thirty years those who claimed they were defending the ‘Welsh way of life’ 
waged a campaign of sabotage, symbolic violence, arson and propaganda. The 
methods of attack varied little, and the targets could all be described as symbolic. The 
campaign spanned Wales, and attacks were even carried out in England. Despite the 
efforts made by police to identify those involved, only a handful of those responsible 
for the bombing and arson campaigns were identified. In the next section I discuss the 
groups involved, consider their structure and preferred method of attack, targets, 
rationales, aims and the extent to which they achieved success. For the purpose of 
clarity, I will treat MAC, the FWA and MG as separate entities, despite the overlap in 
personnel between some of these groups. 
 
 
Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru  
 
Conceived by Owain Williams in his café in Pwhelli, MAC went on to commit twenty 
successful attacks over the course of ten years, targeting pipelines, construction sites, 
pylons, government offices, and locations connected with the Investiture and royal 
visits. Yet, it was not as a continuous entity. John Jenkins, who helmed the group 
during the Investiture campaign claims that there have been four stages of MAC: the 
first was under the direction of Owain Williams, and the second was during his own 
time in charge; the third stage of MAC in fact being, Meibion Glyndŵr, a group that 
included former members of MAC; and the fourth and final stage is yet to come. 																																																								
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Jenkins is convinced that it will emerge once a flashpoint, like Tryweryn or the 
Investiture, occurs, although he believes “it’s going to be a long time before they give 
us another”.345 When you take this into account, the vast majority of attacks attributed 
to Welsh nationalists can be traced back to MAC cadres.  
 
The first iteration of the group, headed by Williams, was likely only one cell, 
comprised of three or four individuals, and by the time Jenkins had taken over, the 
group had adopted a geographically dispersed cellular structure. Humphries attributes 
the move to this network to Jenkins, and even speculates that the Provisional IRA 
borrowed this innovation from MAC.346 This development helped the group in two 
respects: by increasing security, which Jenkins suggests was lacking before his 
arrival,347 and by giving the group a wider geographical reach. This latter feature 
allowed the group to carry out simultaneous attacks - a signature aspect of the cottage 
arson campaign - demonstrating the sophistication of the group. Additionally, MAC 
employed quartermasters - members of the group whose sole role was to hold on and 
maintain equipment - throughout Wales to ensure their munitions weren’t stored in 
the same location.348 Jenkins claims he was the only person who knew the cell 
leaders, and this ensured that he could not be given up if a cell member were to be 
arrested.349 Overall, at the height of its activities MAC probably consisted of between 
twelve350 and fifteen activists.351  
 
This sophisticated cell network allowed MAC to operate unobstructed at a time of 
heightened security around the Investiture, to the extent that a special unit had to be 
set up to apprehend those involved. The sophistication - both in structuring the group, 
and with explosives - was likely the result of Jenkins’s military background; Jenkins 
was serving as an army dentist whilst involved in the MAC campaign. Frederick 
Alders, another key member of the group, also had experience as a Territorial Army 
cadet. As I go on to show, key figures in Scottish and Welsh militant groups often had 
military experience, and whilst it is difficult to judge the extent to which this 																																																								
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experience directed the individuals towards militancy rather than more constitutional 
nationalism, it is worthy of further consideration, considering the proportion of 
leaders of these groups who had such experience.  
 
MAC’s preferred weapon of choice was the bomb, employing explosives in every 
attack conducted under the MAC name. Owain Williams, who had some experience 
of explosives, constructed the devices for the first MAC campaign, against Tryweryn, 
and John Jenkins became the group’s principal bomb-maker after joining the group. 
The vast majority of the explosives used were acquired by stealing from quarries. The 
targets of the attack varied with the times, but there was a common thread to the 
choice: the exploitation of Wales, and the threat to its culture. The attacks against 
Tryweryn and Clywedog construction sites, as well as water pipelines, were in protest 
at the insensitive treatment of the Welsh communities that were displaced to allow for 
their construction, and the perceived ‘theft’ of Welsh resources. The attacks during 
the Investiture campaign against government buildings were symbolic attacks against 
physical manifestations of the British state in Wales, and attacks around or during the 
ceremony itself were directed at the imposition of a non-native Prince on Wales, and 
the inherent cultural insensitivity. All of these attacks were against threats to Welsh 
culture, and the Welsh way of life.  
 
It is often forgotten in the era of mass-casualty attacks that many terrorist groups 
operating in the twentieth century often tried to avoid casualties. The now famous 
statement, “terrorism is theatre… terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of 
people dead”,352 applies to the actions of MAC. Throughout its various iterations, the 
group maintained a policy of avoiding casualties at all costs, operating late at night or 
creating diversions to ensure that explosions would not cause harm. This leads to the 
question, how different was MAC to those involved in the ‘Fire at Llŷn’ and 
Cymdeithas? Ultimately they shared very similar ideological beliefs, and both 
believed non-violent protest was the only way to publicise the insensitive treatment of 
the Welsh way of life, and influence decision makers. Arguably, the main difference 
between these two forms of nationalist protest was that MAC operated covertly, used 
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explosives, and those involved were not prepared to step forward to take 
responsibility for their actions. 
 
It is, however, worth noting that suggestions were made in MAC circles that the 
campaign would need to be escalated if it was to be successful. Thomas records that 
Jenkins proposed escalating the campaign, and even discussed buying guns and 
crossbows.353 In response, Jenkins claimed that he was a moderate and prevented 
more radical measures being adopted by MAC.354 If we only consider attacks that 
took place, it is clear that MAC did not escalate their campaign in terms of lethality, 
even though potential clearly existed for more deadly form of militancy. In the 
conclusion of his work, Thomas argues that had MAC been controlled by a man 
“lacking [John Jenkins’] scruples” the consequences “do not bear thinking about”.355 
However, it is worth remembering that the use of explosives will always carry an 
unavoidable risk, and two men died and a child was seriously injured as a direct 
consequence of MAC’s actions.  
 
The group hoped that their campaign would achieve a number of goals. Owain 
Williams stated that the Tryweryn attack was intended to “do something about the 
situation… at least show that the spirit of Wales was still alive”.356 Jenkins’ intention 
was that “Wales would never again be taken for granted”.357 He wanted to “change 
the nature of the Investiture”, in the way that the FWA had at the opening of 
Tryweryn, to “present it to Wales, and the World, as an armed camp”.358 The 
Investiture was targeted as “an imposition… [by] a mighty state flaunting its 
power”.359 Jenkins hoped that through his choice of target, the authorities would 
overreact and this would “undermine both the prestige of the Investiture among 
‘ordinary’ people and lead formally ambivalent members of the Welsh community to 
support his cause”.360 Interestingly, Jenkins later claimed that he never intended to 
stop the Investiture, just to disrupt it.361 To what extent this was a post facto 																																																								
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justification, we cannot be sure, but it is clear that the actions of Jenkins and his 
accomplices did raise some form of external awareness about opposition to the 
ceremony by some within Wales.  
 
Both Williams and Jenkins acted out of a belief that their actions would give Wales a 
voice, and restore some of the agency they believed had been eroded. Jenkins also 
spoke of his affinity for the national identity of Wales, which “was not only being 
threatened, but was in the last stages of survival”.362 The goals and rationale of these 
two key MAC figures mirrored sentiments expressed by other actors in the Welsh 
nationalist scene who adopted direct action. Like these groups, Jenkins cited the 
failure of constitutional options as a reason to turn to militant tactics.363  
Yet Williams and Jenkins also attribute the emergence of Welsh militancy to the 
failure of Plaid Cymru over Tryweryn,364 with Jenkins suggesting that “Plaid Cymru 
were so backward, unresponsive and insensitive to what was happening in Tryweryn, 
[that it] led to the birth of the FWA and the rebirth of MAC… without Plaid Cymru 
being like they were, toothless and gutless there would have been no need for us”.365 
There can be little doubt that the constitutional path advocated by Plaid Cymru with 
regards to Tryweryn (and the bombing school at Penyberth previously) had proved 
inefficacious. I propose that it was the lack of a viable non-violent political alternative 
that encouraged actors within the national movement in Wales to adopt more violent 
methods. Had the state demonstrated a willingness to acquiesce to the protesters 
concerns it is possible that the violent campaign would not have taken place.  
 
 
Wyn Thomas traces the birth of Welsh militancy to Gwynfor Evans’s refusal to adopt 
direct action when the Tryweryn proposal was first made public.366 Evans, leader of 
the party at the time, bears the brunt of militant frustration with Plaid Cymru, despite 
the non-violent action he personally took in 1980. Although he displayed sympathy 
with those arrested and claimed that the British state was to blame for the bombing 
campaign, he was unwilling to come out in support for non-constitutional methods for 																																																								
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fear of losing votes. Somewhat ironically, Plaid Cymru won a greater share of the 
votes, and their first seat, during the first period of sustained Welsh militancy,367 and 
Thomas claims that Gwynfor Evans privately admitted that Plaid Cymru had 
benefited from the militant campaign.368  
 
Jenkins’s enemy, he claimed, was both the state and the apathy of his countrymen,369 
and not the English as a race; his issue was not with incomers per se, but with those 
who were unwilling to assimilate, imposing their own culture and damaging the 
Welsh way of life in the process.370 MAC’s militant campaign was borne out of 
frustration: frustration that constitutional methods to protect the Welsh identity were 
fruitless; frustration that Plaid Cymru was unwilling to change their approach, despite 
overwhelming evidence that it had failed, frustration that Welsh culture and national 
identity were being eroded. Was Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru successful? The group’s 
leader, John Jenkins, believes that it was. He claims that as a result of MAC’s 
campaign, the British authorities “would never again take [Wales] for granted” as they 
had in the past, and would not ignore further “efforts to try and stop them 
constitutionally".371  
 
A further indicator of ‘success’ was the lengths that the security services were forced 
to go to in their pursuit of Jenkins and his colleagues. The establishment of a special 
unit demonstrated Westminster’s lack of faith in the Welsh police to apprehend the 
perpetrators themselves, but also suggested that they were taking the threat posed by 
MAC seriously. Furthermore, along with Cymdeithas and others, they were able to 
raise awareness of a number of issues affecting Wales during the period, in a way that 
Plaid Cymru’s brand of constitutional nationalism was unable to. The actions of 
MAC, combined with the non-violent action adopted by Cymdeithas, helped to 
politicise the Welsh identity, and the language, in a way that it hadn’t been before, as 
demonstrated by a surge in support for Plaid Cymru in the decade that followed.  
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However, MAC was unable to prevent either the construction of dams at Tryweryn 
and Clywedog, or the ceremonial Investiture of the Prince of Wales. Ultimately, they 
failed in their primary objectives. The most they were able to achieve was to disrupt 
these events and send a message that they would treat any further impositions on 
Wales in the same manner. What MAC did achieve was to make life difficult for the 
authorities in Wales during the 1960s, causing disruption and making the security 
services look weak. Even though the drowning of Tryweryn and the Investiture went 
ahead, their actions demonstrated to Westminster that there were those in Wales who 
would not stand idly by if their culture, or way of life, was threatened again. 		
The Free Wales Army 
 
During their campaign, spanning from its emergence at Tryweryn to the incarceration 
of its leaders on the day of the Investiture in 1969, the FWA, carried out no successful 
attacks. The only attack they even attempted failed because they forgot to attach the 
detonator: a mistake so elementary one wonders whether this failure was deliberate.372 
The targets they claimed they were going to attack, such as the Severn Bridge, fitted 
the symbolic pattern of attacks carried out by MAC. If MAC’s weapon of choice was 
the bomb, the FWA’s weapon of choice was the reporter’s notebook.  
 
Helpfully for students of Welsh militant history, the FWA released a statement 
detailing the rationale and aims of their group.373  Its objectives, the text proclaims, 
were to “safeguard the freedom of the homeland” from foreign interference and 
“defend and fight for Wales” when threatened as it had been at Tryweryn.374 They 
also include the statement that it would “not tolerate any sort of aggression or 
authority upon the Welsh nation and people by alien rulers and native quislings”.375 
They include the establishment of an independent Welsh republic, and maintaining 
the Welsh heritage, language, traditions and interests.376 Missing from this statement, 
but expressed elsewhere was a desire to prevent the exploitation of Welsh resources, 																																																								
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such as water, compared, by Humphries, to Scottish oil.377 On an individual level, 
Dennis Coslett joined the FWA because “the future of the Welsh language and nation 
looked bleak… there was no possibility of achieving a free and independent Wales by 
constitutional means… it was for this reason we turned to a violent extreme 
nationalism”.378 Cayo Evans, inspired into action by his fascination with the Irish 
nationalist history of the early twentieth century, wanted to be involved in the 
“militant resurgence of the Welsh soul”, and spoke passionately of the paradox of 
Wales’ vast resources (both cultural and physical), yet lack of a nation.379  
 
The group craved media attention, making louder and brasher claims every time a 
new media outlet offered them a podium. Their interaction with journalists wasn’t 
limited to interviews; the group invited the media to observe training exercises, 
demonstrating their knowledge of weaponry, and the ability to throw grenades.380 The 
FWA’s members did their best to live up to their name, acting as though they were a 
real army by wearing military-style uniforms in public,381 styling themselves with 
military titles, and even creating a political wing, the Patriotic Front.382 Interestingly - 
given the correlation between the Welsh language and nationalism - they chose to 
adopt an English language name, and most of the Army’s members were English-
speaking.383 Like MAC, they also had former military personnel among their ranks in 
Cayo Evans, who had spent time in Malaya during his National Service.384 They 
modelled themselves on the IRA, who it is claimed they had links with,385 and the 
most notable moment of the group’s existence came when they were invited by the 
IRA to take part in a march to commemorate the Easter Rising in Dublin. Marching 
alongside groups such as the IRA gave the group an air of equivalency, elevating its 
status far beyond what its members’ actions justified. Those actions, their bold claims 
and their comic value - Humphries highlights one particularly amusing episode when 
a note was found on a car at a proposed meeting point stating “FWA: Gone for a 																																																								
377 Humphries, Freedom Fighters, 201. 
378 Coslett interviewed in Clews, To Dream of Freedom, 64.  
379 Cayo Evans interviewed in Clews, To Dream of Freedom, 46-47. 
380 Humphries, Freedom Fighters, 54. 
381 Uniforms were adopted both “for propaganda purposes” but also, it was claimed, to ensure fair 
treatment under the Geneva Convention (Clews, To Dream of Freedom, 72).  
382 The Patriotic Front had about 80 members, 30 of who could be described as activists (Gethin ap 
Iestyn interviewed by the author in Swansea, 7 October 2013). 
383 Gethin ap Iestyn interviewed by the author in Swansea, 7 October 2013 
384 Clews, To Dream of Freedom, 44. 
385 Gethin ap Iestyn interviewed by the author in Swansea, 7 October 2013. 
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drink”386 - ensured that they were never short of an outlet through which to air their 
views. They were skilful propaganda artists who never missed an opportunity to raise 
their favourite issues.  
 
In this regard, the FWA did play a significant role, both in the national movement, 
and for MAC. By constantly taking credit for MAC’s actions,387 the FWA were able 
to provide something of a smokescreen, which Jenkins and his cohorts used to their 
advantage,388 although he claims that this was not a deliberate ploy.389 MAC had 
adopted entirely the opposite approach to the media,390 and was prepared to let the 
FWA take credit for their endeavours, with Jenkins calling the FWA “gnats on an 
elephant’s back”.391 Conversely, the FWA were totally reliant on MAC to continue 
their campaign, to give weight to their claims.   
 
Although their claims grew in absurdity, the FWA stuck rigidly to the tactic of 
propaganda. Yet there are claims that members of the group wanted to escalate their 
activities: one member of the group, Vivian Davies, who was seen as extreme even 
within the FWA, made troubling statements; 392 and Dennis Coslett, who had made 
comments during an interview about shooting traitors and the merits of Adolf Hitler’s 
ideology,393 was regarded by the police as a violent man.394 Speaking decades later, 
Coslett claimed that - although he wished the FWA had been able to carry out an 
attack395 - the group’s threats were merely rhetoric, “not violence, but hostilities… it 
was propaganda”,396 and even suggested that Jenkins’ actions were overzealous, and 
put innocent lives at risk.397 The FWA eventually fell foul of the law of diminishing 
marginal returns, as they were forced to make more elaborate and controversial 
statements to gain the media attention they so desperately sought. Additionally, they 																																																								
386 Humphries, Freedom Fighters, 51. 
387 It is suggested in letters between Gethin ap Iestyn and Cayo Evans that the FWA were unsure who 
exactly were behind the bombing campaign (Humphries, Freedom Fighters, 98).  
388 Thomas, Hands off Wales, 374. 
389 ibid. 
390 Although MAC did, very carefully, hold a ‘press conference’ with a handful of journalists on one 
occasion (Thomas, Hands off Wales, 201).  
391 Jenkins interviewed in Thomas, Hands off Wales, 375. 
392 Thomas, Hands off Wales, 218-219. 
393 Humphries, Freedom Fighters, 55. 
394 ibid., 49. 
395 Coslett interviewed in Thomas, Hands off Wales, 373. 
396 ibid., 376. 
397 ibid., 373. 
	 83 
had to hope that the MAC bombing campaign would continue to give the group an air 
of authenticity.  
 
The common themes of protecting a threatened culture, protesting against cultural 
insensitivity, and taking a more direct approach when constitutional methods fail, link 
the FWA with Saunders Lewis and Cymdeithas. Earlier, I compared MAC to the likes 
of Cymdeithas, and proposed that what differentiated one from the other was the 
covert nature of MAC’s operations. Conversely, the FWA acted in the open, to the 
extent that they invited the nation’s press to witness as they played out their military 
farce. What’s more, apart from one botched attack, the group did not actual commit a 
single act of violence. One must therefore ask: why is it that the FWA has been 
treated as a terrorist group? The answer to this lies in their statements; the dramatics 
they employed to advance their ambitions of restoring the nation to former glory. 
Their possession of firearms, exhibited as if they were commonplace, contributed to 
this reputation. 
 
It was this reputation that was to be their undoing; like Icarus, the FWA fell to earth 
after reaching too far. Such was a fear that Gethin ap Iestyn had expressed to Cayo 
Evans in letters later found by police;398 within these he reminded Evans “the FWA is 
living on a legend of news-paper cuttings” and warned “the past will catch up with 
use one day and then we are going to look like complete idiots”.399 Thomas argues 
that when the FWA did face a trial, it was “due to an inability to resist media 
attention, rather than as the result of an astute police investigation”.400 The downside 
of claiming responsibility for the illegal actions of another group was that it left the 
FWA open to accusations of illegality. That the trial happened to strengthen the image 
of the security services in the run-up to the Investiture, and ensured the FWA could 
not disrupt the ceremony were probably seen by the authorities as a welcome bonus, 
as the continued ability of MAC to evade detection raised questions about the ability 
of the security service. Jenkins suggests that the FWA “were arrested because the 
pressure was on the authorities to arrest somebody”.401  
 																																																								
398 Humphries, Freedom Fighters, 98. 
399 Letters reproduced in Humphries, Freedom Fighters, 98.  
400 Thomas, Hands off Wales, 270.  
401 Jenkins, interviewed in Thomas, Hands off Wales, 375.  
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To what extent could the campaign of the FWA be described as a success? The 
answer would seem obvious, when asking if a militant group modelled on the IRA 
were successful despite their failure to carry out a single attack. Yet, there can be little 
doubt that their skilful manipulation of the media raised awareness, although one 
could argue that it simply raised awareness of their colourful personalities, and 
ludicrous conspiracies. That they could capture the media’s attention was definitely 
beneficial to other elements within the militant wing of Welsh nationalism; Thomas 
argues that they were able to draw attention away from MAC, and towards the 
uniform-wearing gun-toting rebels, helping Jenkins and his colleagues remain 
undetected.402 Jenkins himself was less convinced that they acted as an effective 
smokescreen, suggesting that they didn’t fool many people.403 
 
There is also a strong case to be made that the publicity they received cast them - and 
the national movement by association - in a negative light. The interview with David 
Frost was seen, within the FWA, as having brought ridicule upon the group,404 and in 
his letter to Cayo Evans, Gethin an Iestyn claimed that Dennis Coslett was “making 
the Army look stupid”.405 Prominent figures throughout the national movement also 
condemned them: Emyr Jones, president of Cymdeithas during the FWA’s campaign, 
described the group as a “Dad’s Army farce… [who] had brought shame and ridicule 
on the nationalist movement”;406 Gwynfor Evans wanted nothing to do with the group 
professionally and told Thomas that they “brought ridicule upon the Welsh national 
movement”.407   
 
With hindsight, it is very difficult to treat the FWA as a serious terrorist group. At the 
time, with a bombing campaign underway and no idea who was behind it, the group 
that claimed responsibility and adopted aggressive rhetoric seemed possible suspects. 
Certainly, one can understand why so many descriptions of the militant campaign in 
Wales attribute the actions of MAC to the FWA; as a publicity machine they were 
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403 Jenkins, Interviewed by the author, Ruabon, 5 September 2013/ 
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405 Humphries, Freedom Fighters, 98. 
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very successful,408 but the attention they received was often at the expense of their 
credibility, as well as the larger national movement in Wales.  They did not achieve 
their goals of liberating Wales, and they did not prevent the Investiture that they 
campaigned against, but they did highlight Welsh opposition to institutional 
insensitivity. The existence of the Free Wales Army is probably best summed up by a 
quote from a Western Mail journalist, who described them as a “comic opera 
affair”.409 Despite this, it would be wrong to conclude that they didn’t play a role in 
the Welsh nationalist fringe at the time. 
 
 
Meibion Glyndŵr  
 
The final group I will discuss, Meibion Glyndŵr, only came into existence ten years 
after the campaigns of the FWA and MAC had ended. We can learn a great deal about 
this group from their decision to name themselves after Owain Glyndŵr. The choice 
of the last native Prince of Wales, who rose up against the English and brought a 
sense of sovereignty back to Wales, is echoed in what the group hoped to achieve. To 
John Jenkins they were the third stage of MAC, and considering that they operated 
with a similar cellular structure, and exhibited similar covert techniques to those used 
by MAC under Jenkins’ leadership, it is likely that there was at least some overlap in 
membership, although police have never apprehended those behind Meibion Glyndŵr.  
The principal targets of MG were English-owned holiday cottages in rural Wales; 
later, the perpetrators switched targets, towards businesses serving the tourism 
industry, and the premises of estate agents in England who were selling Welsh 
properties as holiday homes.  
 
The group’s modus operandi was apparent from their actions; the selective targeting 
of English-owned properties communicated a very clear message, both to the owners 
of the property, but to prospective owners as well: they wanted to discourage the 
purchase of Welsh rural properties as second homes. Whether these attacks are 																																																								
408 Sufficiently successful that the Free Wales Army recently featured in an episode of the American 
animated spy parody Archer: however once again the FWA were attributed with attacks carried out by 
MAC, indicating that the group’s embellished renown lives on (Adam Reed & Mike Arnold. "Achub Y 
Morfilod" Archer, series 6, episode 11, aired 19 March 2015. (Irving, TX: FX, 2015), television 
broadcast.  
409 Patrick Hannan quoted in Humphries, Freedom Fighters, 51.  
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evidence of Anglophobia is unclear; even though it is plainly obvious that it was the 
property owner’s English nationality that was fundamental to the targeting of their 
property, the attacks were not directed at the English simply because they were 
English. Instead it is because they were incomers, perceived to be damaging the rural 
way of life in these parts of Wales. It was not any particular feature of the incoming 
social groups that was the cause of these attacks - it was their supposedly destructive 
actions.  
 
Another potential factor in the emergence of MG according to Humphries was 
disaffection resulting from the failure of the devolution referendum in 1979.410 Given 
the timing of the resumption in militant activity, it is possible that the rejection of 
devolution was the kind of ‘flashpoint’ that John Jenkins believed was necessary to 
incite militant activity in the national movement. Certainly in Scotland it is the case 
that militancy increased as a direct result of the manner in which the 1979 referendum 
on home rule failed.411  
 
Similar to MAC, Meibion Glyndŵr did not seek out publicity in the manner of the 
FWA, allowing their actions to communicate its message. Throughout the campaign, 
it was never front-page news outside of Wales, operating as it did against the 
backdrop of the far more lethal terrorist groups in Northern Ireland, as well as the 
miners’ strikes and the Falklands War. Yet, they, like their militant predecessors, were 
able to raise awareness of the issue the campaigned over, in large part because of the 
BBC sketch show Not the Nine O’Clock News, and the slogan they coined: “come 
home to a real fire: buy a cottage in Wales”, a clever parody that will be their epitaph. 
However, this did not immediately arrest the increase in the number of Welsh rural 
properties purchased as second homes; Humphries reports that registrations of Welsh 
houses as second homes increased despite the arson campaign.412 Thus, again like 
their predecessors, while they were unable to achieve the change they desperately 
sought, their actions did draw attention to the damage they believed was being done to 
the Welsh way of life.  
 																																																								
410 Ibid.  
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Welsh militancy: A success?  
 
This section has covered the three main groups operating on the militant fringe of 
Welsh nationalism between 1960 and 1992. These three groups overlapped in 
personnel, rationale and aims, but they differed with regards to methodology: one 
group focused on attaining the maximum possible publicity for their cause, even if the 
only way they could achieve this was to behave in an outlandish and comical fashion; 
another operated covertly, conducting a bombing campaign against symbolic 
representations of England’s cultural insensitivity and exploitation of Wales; the final 
group drew on the techniques of their predecessors, but focused instead on the 
damage that was being done to the Welsh way of life by inflation of the rural property 
market by English holidaymakers. Their use of political violence was primarily 
defensive; those involved were not seeking personal gain, but cultural equality.  
 
Overall, whether one judges Welsh militancy as a success depends on how you 
measure it. In simple terms, the groups universally failed in their goals – they did not 
stop the flooding of Capel Celyn or Clywedog, the Investiture of Prince Charles, or 
the transfer of Welsh property to English holidaymakers - yet, John Jenkins himself 
admitted they were not realistic goals, and that on their own, MAC could not hope to 
stop the Investiture, just disrupt it.413  
 
When you take into consideration the size of the groups involved, it is not at all 
surprising they failed to change the minds of the British government. What they were 
able to achieve was publicity; all three groups were able to raise awareness of issues 
affecting Wales by conducting (or at least claiming to conduct) a campaign of 
symbolic violence against representations of the state throughout the country. 
Publicity has been highlighted as a key strategic goal of terrorist groups; Bruce 
Hoffman writes: “for the terrorist, success is… most often measured in terms of the 
amount of publicity and attention received… in this respect, little distinction or 
discrimination is made between good and bad publicity”.414 Along with the likes of 
Cymdeithas, the direct approach taken by the militant groups raised the profile of the 
national movement at a time when Plaid Cymru was stationary. There is also an 																																																								
413 Jenkins, Interviewed by the author, Ruabon, 5 September 2013. 
414 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 247.  
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argument that the direct approach was beneficial to the constitutional approach to 
Welsh issue, demonstrating to Westminster that if they weren’t prepared to deal with 
the silk glove of Plaid Cymru, the mailed fist of Welsh militancy would be waiting in 
the wings. Arguably the most important impact that Welsh militant groups had was as 
a pressure group.  
 
They also played a role in the elevation of Welsh language, culture and identity to 
political issues in a way that they had never been before. By demonstrating their 
willingness to fight for Wales’ cultural ‘soul’, they raised the issue throughout Wales, 
and inspired others to demand change. Militancy has not been a feature of Welsh 
nationalism for more than twenty years now, and since the establishment of the Welsh 
Assembly has given Wales the authority to safeguard its language and culture, it is 
unlikely that the militant campaign will resume in the near future.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I examined Welsh national identity, the national movement that 
emerged to safeguard this identity when threatened and the violent wing of the 
national movement who were spurred into action by injustice. I have argued that 
Wales as a concept has a long history, and key to maintaining the sense of difference 
between Wales and her neighbours has been the Welsh language; for more than a 
millennium, the linguistic cleavage identified Welsh-speaking natives from the other. 
I discussed the importance of the Protestant Reformation for the maintenance of the 
language in Wales, as well as the role this played in harnessing the survival of Welsh 
to the chapels, as well as the important role religious non-conformism played in 
shaping Welsh national identity in the nineteenth century. The growth of liberalism in 
Wales was also touched upon, and it was from three strands of the nineteenth century 
Welsh experience - nonconformity, liberalism and language - that the national 
movement was born.  
 
That movement emerged as a result of the threat posed to Welsh culture and the 
language. It has been at its most defensive when legislation or decisions have been 
imposed upon Wales without Welsh consent and at odds with Welsh culture. 
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Examples of this include the ‘Treachery of the Blue Books’, the construction of the 
Penyberth bombing school, the flooding of Capel Celyn in the Tryweryn valley, and 
the Investiture of the Prince of Wales. When one considers the cultural insensitivity of 
these acts, one can understand why the belief developed that Welsh culture - and by 
extension Wales itself - was being mistreated. 
 
Today’s Welsh national movement operates in an entirely different socio-political 
environment: religious non-conformism - even religion in general - has lost its 
saliency; the Liberal Party is no longer the party of Wales; threats to the primacy of 
the language have meant that Welsh is only spoken by roughly one in five living in 
Wales today. The modern Wales is overwhelmingly English-speaking, Labour-voting 
and unionist. These are less than ideal conditions for political nationalism to operate 
in, as the strength of Britishness in Wales can be attributed to the continued electoral 
strength of the Labour party and other shared institutions, and it has been the 
integration of the Welsh into Britain that has prevented the national question from 
achieving greater political salience. Instead I have argued that Welsh nationalism is of 
the cultural variety, focused on preservation of difference within the United Kingdom, 
as opposed to the secessionist ambitions of movements in nearby nations. The rise of 
Plaid Cymru was discussed, as were notable incidences of direct action undertaken by 
those in the national movement who felt that Plaid Cymru was impotent. I argued that 
when the members of the national movement have undertaken direct action it has been 
as a reaction to cultural insensitivity, and as a last resort. Finally, I have considered 
the emergence of nationalist militancy in Wales, the issues that motivated those 
involved and the demise of these groups as the 1960s drew to a close.  
 
The militant fringe of Welsh nationalism during the 1960s was something of a 
paradox: on the one hand, there were some very capable individuals conducting a 
covert bombing campaign, operating a sophisticated cellular structure, making the 
authorities look feeble as they continued to evade capture; on the other hand, a 
theatrical troupe was masquerading as a vicious band of guerrilla warriors, threatening 
to overcome the perfidious English with thousands of IRA-trained fighters and some 
unfortunate Alsatians, yet unable to successfully assemble an explosive device. 
Nevertheless, the two groups somehow complemented one another perfectly. The re-
emergence of MAC cadres under a new name as the 1970s drew to an end served to 
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remind Wales, and Westminster, that there were those who would not sit idly by if 
they perceived their culture to be threatened again. In the end, this has been the legacy 
of Welsh militancy: a reminder that culture and identity are the soul of a nation, and 
there are those prepared to fight to preserve it.  
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3. Tartan Terrorism? - Scottish Nationalism and Political Violence 
 
Without bombs or bullets, riots or rampage (a few rammies maybe), 
in four days we will decide our future with pencils and a few million 
ballot papers. We should be proud of that, not afraid. We should be 
proud, nervous, excited but, above all, hopeful.415 
 
This headline greeted Scottish voters just days before they headed to the polls on the 
matter of independence from the United Kingdom in September 2014. Conveyed by 
this headline is a sense of pride that Scots had been able to achieve peacefully a 
process that had rent other countries asunder with conflict, as well as a sense that 
Scotland was setting a precedent that others may follow. In the end, the nationalists 
achieved a most typically Scottish result: defeat, but only after they had been given 
hope of success in the form of opinion polling.416 That the margin of defeat was less 
convincing than early opinion polls had predicted the year before 417  (although 
nowhere near as close as was predicted by opinion polls), gave nationalists hope that 
this result represents only a misstep on the road to independent statehood, rather than 
a dead end.   
 
It will not have escaped the attention of nationalists across the Irish Sea that without 
firing a shot, their Scottish counterparts came far closer to achieving the goal of an 
independent state than they did to reunifying Ireland.418 It is this phenomenon that my 
research examines, and in this chapter I will discuss how such a scenario has arisen, 
by focusing on the growth of the nationalist movement in Scotland, the successes of 
political nationalism, and the futile attempts of violent nationalists to make their 
voices heard.  
 																																																								
415 Sunday Mail, 14 September 2014.  
416 Two opinion polls in the run-up to the referendum put the Yes campaign ahead (The Sunday Times 
by a score of 51:49, 7 September 2014; and the Telegraph by a score of 54:46, 13 September 2014); 
and the majority of polls (UK Polling Report, 2015) put the result within the margin of error, but on the 
day 44.6% of Scots backed independence against 55.4% supporting the retention of the union (just over 
two million Scots).  
417 One poll had the Yes campaign polling 32 points below the No campaign (“UK Polling Report”, 
accessed 2 April, 2015, http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/scottish-independence-referendum). 
418 English notes that support for reunification with Ireland has decreased in the North. By 2010, fewer 
than one in six people (16%) in Northern Ireland supported reunification and interestingly, only 33% of 
the province’s Catholic population supports the measure (English, Armed Struggle, 399).  
	 92 
To do this, I concentrate on the development of Scotland as a distinct national entity, 
and how key events in its history have shaped modern Scotland and Scottish identity 
and thusly what ingredients the Scottish national movement has had to work with. I do 
not intend to reiterate what others have already thoroughly covered and delve too far 
back into Scottish history,419 but it is important to understand how Scottish identity 
and the Scottish nationalist movement have been shaped by important junctures in the 
country’s past. Additionally, I establish why Scots were receptive to the British 
identity that developed following union between Scotland and England.  
 
Once I have established this, I discuss the growth of political nationalism and the 
emergence of the SNP as a political force in Scotland in the 1960s, as well as looking 
at the ‘civic’ form of nationalism that the SNP have advocated; this section examines 
the political options that have been available to Scottish nationalists, and assesses 
their viability. Having achieved this I examine the use of non-violent protest by 
Scottish nationalists, and why those at the forefront of the Scottish nationalist 
movement have largely shunned these methods. Finally, I discuss the use of political 
violence for the cause of an independent Scotland, covering the apparent multitude of 
groups that emerged during the 1970s, including the most notable of those: the 
Scottish National Liberation Army. For this final section I consider the goals, 
rationale, target selection and the extent to which the actions of violent nationalists 
could be described as successful. I conclude by examining what impact, if any, they 
had on the wider national movement.  
 
 
The Concept of Scotland 
 
Scottish history before 1000 “[focuses] on the question of the 
‘making of the kingdom’, the complex process by which a cluster 
of different people - Britons, and even some Scandinavians as well 
																																																								
419 For more on the history of Scotland: Houston and Knox’s edited volume, and Lynch’s Scotland 
provide detailed historical accounts of Scotland; T. M. Devine’s The Scottish Nation, focuses more 
narrowly on Scotland’s ‘modern’ history - from 1700 onwards ((Michael Lynch, Scotland: A New 
History (London: Pimlico, 1991); R. A. Houston and W. W. J. Knox, The New Penguin History of 
Scotland: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day (London: Penguin Press, 2001); Devine, The 
Scottish Nation). 
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as Picts and Scots - came in the ninth and tenth centuries to owe 
allegiance to a single king, ‘of Scots’.420  
 
Legend tells us that the first holder of this grand title – ‘King of Scots’ - was Kenneth 
MacAlpin, who came to power between 839 and 844.421 Houston and Knox argue that 
a more accurate reflection of MacAlpin’s role was that of “the founder of the dynasty 
of the king of Scots”, and point out that the ‘Scotland’ that he governed was far 
smaller than the geographical entity that it is today.422 For our purposes, however, this 
allows us to situate a notion of Scotland as a coherent unit as early as the ninth 
century CE.  
 
This may have created Scotland as a geographical expression, but what created 
Scotland - as a nation - was the “centuries-old struggle to defend the kingdom from 
English aggression”.423 In popular culture, the Scottish Wars of Independence are 
often treated as the zenith of Scottish military achievement, such as the tale of 
William Wallace’s Scotland, given a global audience by the Hollywood epic 
Braveheart,424 and pitting the Scottish David against an English Goliath. For Colin 
Kidd, this period of Scottish history was crucial to establishing a “Scotic identity of 
the nation”425 and even future generations of unionists boldly claimed that the success 
of Wallace and Bruce was actually a positive outcome for Scotland - as it “allowed 
Scotland to join with England as an equal”, rather than through subjugation.426 It was 
the success of King Robert that ensured Scotland was not forcibly incorporated into 
the English fold in the way that Wales was during the same period. Kidd opines that 
the retention of independence was a vital component in the development of a distinct 
notion of Scottish ubiquity, different from the rest of Great Britain.427 
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Six years after the Scottish victory at Bannockburn in 1320, Scotland formally 
requested acknowledgement of their independence, through the Declaration of 
Arbroath. This document, described by Michael Lynch as the “most celebrated 
document in Scottish history”,428 not only set out Scotland’s independence from 
England, but was also an early form of popular sovereignty:  
 
Yet Robert himself, should he turn aside from the task that he has 
begun, and yield Scotland or us to the English King and people, we 
should cast out as the enemy of us all, as subverter of our rights and 
of his own, and should choose another King to defend our 
freedom.429 [emphasis added]  
 
Whilst one could argue that this was a very progressive concept for the fourteenth 
century, the “we” refers not to the wider population of Scotland, but to a handful of 
noblemen. Nonetheless, this stipulated that the loyalty of the Scottish nobles lay not 
with the man but with the position, implying that Scottish kingship was conditional 
upon the protection of Scottish independence. To what extent could this be described 
as nationalism? Harvie proposes that the wars of independence had “produced a type 
of popular nationalism rarely encountered in Europe before the French revolution”.430 
However, in his work on Irish nationalism, English argues that evidence of pre-
eighteenth century ‘nationalism’ is more likely to be evidence of a ‘proto-nation’, 
rather than of a nation inspired by nationalism.431 What we can say with certainty is 
that the Declaration of Arbroath represents not only an expression of patriotism, but 
more importantly for this study, an expression of difference.  
 
The notion that a Scottish king could be replaced in the event of yielding Scotland to 
the King of England was rendered meaningless with the ascension of James VI of 
Scotland to the throne of England (becoming James I in the process) in 1603, thus 
occupying both positions simultaneously. This ‘Union of the Crowns’ brought 
Scottish and English interests into alignment, and put both parties on the path to 																																																								
428 Despite this Lynch claims that the document lapsed into obscurity thereafter and has only acquired 
its status as a “surrogate Scottish constitution” in the last two centuries (Lynch, Scotland, 111). 
429 Reproduced in Agnes Mure MacKenzie, On the Declaration of Arbroath (Edinburgh: Saltire 
Society, 1951), 19. 
430 Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism, 23. 
431 English, Irish Freedom, 492. 
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formal political union. Alvin Jackson suggests that James himself was an advocate of 
immediate union between his two kingdoms,432 however, James was thwarted by both 
Scottish and English opposition to the plan, and Jenny Wormald claims that in the 
early phase of the union it was “a marriage of distaste and distrust”, further suggesting 
that it was an achievement simply to keep the union together throughout this difficult 
period.433 
 
Regardless of his ambitions, one immediate impact of this union was that James 
moved his court south, shifting the centre of Scottish power from Edinburgh to 
London. By this point, lowland Scotland and England had become very similar in 
character; English was now the common language throughout the Scottish 
Lowlands,434 and, crucially, both had adopted the same faith in Protestantism. The 
Protestant Reformation in Scotland had drawn inspiration from the Reformation in 
England, and Diarmaid MacCulloch notes that John Knox, the central figure in 
Scotland’s Reformation, had been heavily involved in the English Reformation, and 
“never lost his admiration for the forward Protestants of England”.435 Despite this, the 
Scottish Reformation took a different course – led by prominent nobles and relying on 
mob violence, rather than being directed by the Crown as it was in England – and 
ended with a slightly different form of Protestantism: Presbyterianism.436  
 
The success of the Reformation in both countries, despite these ecclesiastical 
differences,437 left the two countries allied against continental Catholic enemies, but in 
spite of these similarities, and of the joint monarchy, the Scottish Parliament pursued 
policies to deliberately provoke their English counterparts. The Darien expedition was 
intended to give Scotland a trading presence in the Caribbean in direct competition 
with the English colonies, and the passing of the Act Anent Peace and War438 in 1703 																																																								
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threatened the Hanoverian Succession in Great Britain, and may even have opened the 
door for the restoration of the Stuarts.439 
 
 
The Act of Union 
 
The situation came to a head in 1705 when representatives of both parties agreed to 
meet (following some prompting from Queen Anne) to discuss a treaty of union, 
which was agreed upon a year later and put into effect in 1707 with the Act of Union. 
This process was carried out without any public consultation and was opposed by 
elements of the population in Scotland, leading to riots in Glasgow and Edinburgh as 
rumours spread that preparations were being made for an armed uprising.440 
 
Despite Robert Burns’ assertion that the Scottish Parliamentarians who had approved 
the union were a “parcel o’ rogues”, who had been “bought and sold for English 
gold”441 the reality of the situation was that the settlement addressed a number of 
pressing concerns faced by both countries. Scotland was in a dire economic position; 
partly a result of English trading aggression, and partly the cost of the failure at 
Darien. The union settlement included modest compensation for the English role in 
the latter, referred to as the ‘Equivalent’.442 Furthermore, it has been claimed that, had 
Scotland retained its independence, English eyes would have been focused firmly on 
Edinburgh in fear of a Stuart restoration, and that a far less complicit union may have 
followed.443 Keith Brown argues that, whilst the decision to accept a settlement was 
less than popular with sections of the Scottish people, it indicated that Scotland had 
reached a “new level of political maturity”.444 Some modern-day Scottish nationalists 
choose to overlook these stark political realities and maintain that the ‘parcel o’ 
rogues’ narrative still has some resonance. 																																																								
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The means by which union was achieved were both underhanded and unpopular, and 
included the loss of the Scottish Parliament, but Scotland did not entirely surrender 
her autonomy; the agreement was only possible because the independence of the 
Church of Scotland (also known as the Kirk), and the Scottish education and legal 
systems was guaranteed. Moreover, it would be naïve to treat the loss of Parliament in 
the early eighteenth century such as we would today’s Parliament; the Scottish state 
was not sufficiently developed that it had achieved pervasive influence on everyday 
life, and in its place a far more important national forum was retained in the form of 
the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. The protection of the Church of 
Scotland was especially important in the development of a distinct Scottish identity, 
and came to symbolise the development of the wider Scottish identity - distinct 
difference within a wider group.  
 
Despite the loss of the Scottish Parliament in 1707, powers over the day-to-day affairs 
of Scottish life continued to reside in Edinburgh. Graeme Morton’s work on unionist 
Scotland elaborates on the role of Scottish ‘managers’ whose role was to “keep 
Scottish MPs and peers in line in the lobbies and keep Scotland itself quiet”.445 To 
achieve this, the Scottish ‘manager’ had a “free hand in the distribution of patronage 
within Scotland”,446 and as a result Scotland was largely self-governing during the 
first century of union.447 The most famous occupant of the position was Henry 
Dundas, who acquired the nickname ‘Harry the Ninth’ due to the almost regal power 
he held.448 Although Morton argues that this system was effective,449 it was not 
always widely popular with the Scottish people; John Brims reports that anti-Dundas 
riots took place in 1792,450 led by protesters demanding political reform. 
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The loss of Parliament had not led to a loss of control for Scotland, and for the first 
century of Union, Scotland was largely run by Scots.451 In areas of Scottish life in 
which the government played no part (e.g. poor relief), the vacuum was filled by civil 
society and by members of the local bourgeoisie.452 One event that did briefly threaten 
the peace, however, was the Jacobite Rising in 1745. Like the Scottish Wars of 
Independence, this event is often misunderstood in popular culture, treated as a direct 
confrontation between the Scots and the English, yet such a narrative entirely 
disregards the internal divide within Scotland and the extent to which this was in fact 
a civil war. A more appropriate way of approaching the Jacobite Rising would be to 
discuss the ‘two Scotlands’ that existed up until that time: Protestant Lowland 
Scotland, which was overwhelmingly anglicised by this point; and Highland Scotland, 
which had largely avoided this process, maintaining its original Gaelic culture and 
Catholicism.453 Whilst Bonnie Prince Charlie was able to attract support in the latter, 
the able-bodied men of the former largely stayed at home and waited to see which 
way the wind blew.454  
 
The eventual defeat of the Jacobites at Culloden in 1745 arguably led to the death of a 
distinct Highland Scotland. Following their victory, Westminster “devised legislation 
to undermine the cultural, political and economic distinctiveness of the Scottish 
Highlands”,455 by outlawing the wearing of Tartan456 except by military personnel, 
banning the playing of bagpipes and diminishing the power of clan chiefs. The 
Highland way of life was systematically dismantled and reimagined in a way that the 
rest of the United Kingdom could accept, and this process was aided and abetted by 
Lowlands Scots; key to the rehabilitation of the Scottish Highlands were Scottish 
cultural figures, led by Sir Walter Scott, whose work helped to make “Jacobitism 
acceptable - and, even more… romantic and appealing”.457 Their work helped to 																																																								
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cultivate a positive image of the Highlands and its inhabitants, but this new vision was 
created for, and by, proponents of the union. One way Highlanders could maintain 
their way of life was to join the British Army, and many chose to do so.458 Devine 
argues that the military prowess and loyalty of the Highlanders was admired and the 
‘rehabilitation’ of the Highlands was aided through their exploits in the imperial 
army.459 The British Royal Family bought heavily into the reimagined vision of the 
Highlands - most famously Queen Victoria who was rumoured to have declared that 
she too was a Jacobite.460 
 
It is often said that history is written by the victors, but in the case of the Scottish 
Highlanders, not only was their history written by the victors, their present was altered 
too; their entire way of life was recalibrated in way that suited Lowland Scotland and 
the rest of the United Kingdom. Two key imperial institutions - the military and the 
monarchy - harnessed the newly created imagery of the once-rebellious Highlands, 
that of the loyal solider and the idyllic scenery respectively, to the unionist cause. The 
Jacobite Rising and the pacification of the Highlands that followed ended up unifying 
the ‘two Scotlands’ and embedding Highland imagery461 into a new pan-Scottish 
identity.  The travails of the Jacobites were reimagined in a way that made them 
glamorous but not threatening to the wider British public, and the most serious 
challenge to the union in the eighteenth century was repackaged as though it had been 
done by Walt Disney: the main figures were glamorised, the revolutionary content 
removed, and the iconography and imagery of the Highlands became the colourful 
merchandise that enthralled the rest of Britain. 
 
The Jacobite Rising of 1745 was followed less than a century later by another popular 
uprising in Scotland, but one that has received far less attention: the 1820 
Insurrection, or the Radical War, a brief period of unrest primarily located in the West 
of Scotland, in Glasgow and Paisley. Involving strike action amongst some members 
of the working class demanding reform, the rising failed when the military were 
called in to deal with the unrest, preventing the protests from spreading. In their 																																																								
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detailed study of the uprising, Berresford Ellis and Mac a’ Ghobainn highlight the 
important role that agents provocateurs played in encouraging some of the activities 
of the Radicals,462 and there is evidence that there were nationalist sentiments to the 
Radical message – some banners with depictions of William Wallace were 
unfurled,463 another carried the message “Scotland Free - Or a Desert!”464 - as well as 
a grounding in republican ideology. Yet Harvie argues that whilst there were “some 
separatist slogans - along the lines of the Irish radicals… [they] were increasingly 
unrepresentative”.465 It seems, that whilst there may have been some patriotic content 
to this message, it was not the primary concern of the Radicals - they were as 
concerned about the treatment of Scotland by other Scots, as they were by the 
treatment of Scotland by the English. Thus, the nationalist content of this rising was a 
secondary concern – an indication that the national question simply was not an issue 
in Scotland at this point. In neither the case of 1745 or 1820 could those leading the 
uprising rouse the support of the wider Scottish population - why this was we cannot 
say for certain, but it could be seen as evidence that Scots were not displeased with 
the union settlement, and the benefits that arose from it.  
 
 
Empire and the First Nationalists  
 
The benefits of union had a huge impact on Scottish identity, and preventing the 
development of Scottish nationalism. As a “junior partner in the new 
Rome”466Scotland thrived.467 Scots founds themselves disproportionately represented 
in the administrative class of the East India Company and the officer class of the 
British Army,468 and “achieved a much greater share of the imperial spoils” than those 
from other parts of the United Kingdom.469 Scotland’s cities were also reaping the 
rewards of Empire: Glasgow and the heavy industries based on the Clyde and the just 
manufacturers of Dundee were exporting products throughout the world. Further 																																																								
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afield, Scottish capital was driving mining, farming and railway projects in the United 
States, Australia and Asia470 and Scotland’s great minds were making medical and 
technological advances in one of the world’s finest education systems.471 
 
As a result, Scotland as a nation was able to punch further above its weight in terms of 
global impact than would have been possible without the union. Scots found 
employment throughout the British Empire, and the Scottish economy boomed. 
Equally, Robert McCreadie argues, a sense of solidarity emerged between the Scots 
and the other Britons, borne by the British labour movement.472 Considering the 
substantial benefits of union it is little wonder that there was little appetite for Scottish 
independence during this time, and when the first ‘nationalist’ movement did emerge 
in the form of the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights 
(NAVSR), the demands were for more union, not less.  
 
Formed in 1853, the NAVSR was a short-lived pressure group whose members 
represented a wide variety of political approaches. The central message of the group 
was that Scotland was not receiving a proportionate share of public expenditure, and 
that the governance of Scotland was being neglected due to Parliament’s focus on the 
Ireland, the insufficient number of Scottish MPs and lack of a Scottish Secretary.473 
Morton suggests that the rise of this movement was also partly the result of the 
centralising tendencies of the British state at this period, a process the NAVSR 
viewed as antithetical to the terms of union.474 Their motives were to ensure that 
powers that were gradually being centralised were kept at the local level, and to 
encourage Westminster to pay more attention to Scottish matters. Although they held 
public meetings and petitioned the Houses of Parliament, without any popular support 
they folded soon after their foundation. The NAVSR are often treated as the first 
‘nationalist’ movement to emerge in Scotland, but politically they were firmly 
unionist.  
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The successors to the NAVSR were the Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA), 
who, though emerging in 1886 during the height of interest in the Irish Question, 
varied from their counterparts across the Irish Sea in their nationalist demands.475 Like 
their predecessors, they fully supported the union and wanted to improve the union. In 
the hope of achieving this, the SHRA sought support for home rule from key figures 
in the Liberal and Labour parties,476 but the group was sidelined as the Liberal Party 
in Scotland chose to ignore it.477 Independently of the rise of the SHRA, the Liberals 
adopted a policy of ‘home rule all round’ under the leadership of William Gladstone, 
who declared that he wouldn’t give Ireland anything “that is not upon equal terms 
offered to Scotland and to the different portion of the United Kingdom”.478 As a result 
Scottish home rule was “carried along in the slipstream of Irish home rule”.479 Harvie 
writes that were it not for the First World War “Scotland would very likely have been 
presented with a parliament”, although, he adds, “whether the Scots knew what they 
wanted to do with it is another matter”.480 
 
Morton has classified the ideology of groups such as the NAVSR and the SHRA as 
‘unionist nationalism’481 - an idea that would have been treated as a paradox during 
the 2014 referendum campaign. There was little question at the time that the union 
was overwhelmingly a positive thing for Scotland, but those involved believed that 
with some minor changes, it could be even more beneficial. It has been argued that 
Scottish interest in home rule was largely precipitated by events in Ireland, yet there 
seems to have been little consideration of adopting similar demands of self-
government for Scotland.  
 
The Union of the Crowns and the Reformation were key factors in the process of 
integrating Scots with the English, advancing the spread of the English language and 
uniting the peoples in, if not a common church, then very closely-aligned ones. The 
union of the parliaments brought Scotland into coalition with England as equal 
partners, whilst institutionalising a subtle sense of difference. History is an important 																																																								
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part of shaping the collective identity of a nation, and in the case of Scotland, a sense 
of difference is evident throughout: United, but distinct. Equally important for Scots, 
however, have been the shared successes that have occurred since the Act of Union, 
both economic and military. Thus Scots were able to complement their national 
identity with a shared sense of Britishness, and this concept was evident in the early 
nationalist movements that emerged in Scotland, as they called for a reformed 
Westminster to ensure Scots were able to take full advantage of the benefits of union. 
 
 
The Birth of the National Party 
 
Following the First World War, with the Irish Question reformulated by the events of 
1916 and the Liberal Party in disarray, parliamentary interest in Scottish home rule 
faded. Although the Labour and Liberal parties remained supportive of home rule, it 
was always a secondary concern and it was left to dedicated nationalist parties to take 
the issue up. The failure of either party to follow through on their lukewarm support 
for devolution led to the emergence of political movements set up to campaign 
specifically on the matter.482 The first post-war movement was, in fact, a revival of a 
previous organisation; the Scottish Home Rule Association had faded into obscurity 
following the deaths of its key figures in the early 1910s, but it was revived in 1918 
by Roland Muirhead.483 In its new form, the SHRA pursued a broad measure of 
devolution for Scotland,484 and to achieve this end, the organisation sought to affiliate 
itself with trade unions and labour movements, distributing manifestos, petitioning 
parliament and holding meetings, but to little reward.485  
 
During these events of the early 1920s, Scotland was going through something of a 
literary revival led by Hugh MacDiarmid, who was vocal in his support for Scottish 
home rule. Hand-in-hand with this cultural renaissance came the development of an 
“increasingly separate political culture… articulated by artists, nationalists and 
journals”.486 From this section of Scottish society sprung another national movement - 																																																								
482 Devine, Scotland and the Union, 15. 
483 Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, 121. 
484 Lynch, SNP, 25. 
485 ibid., 29-32. 
486 Pittock, The Invention of Scotland, 145. 
	 104 
the Scots National League, focusing heavily on Scots Gaelic culture, thus making 
comparisons with elements of the Irish national movement obvious. By the end of the 
1920s, another nationalist grouping was emerging from an entirely different section of 
Scottish society - the Glasgow University Student Nationalist Association (GUSNA). 
Formed in 1927, the GUSNA was fronted by John MacCormick, who was to be vital 
to the movement over the next thirty years.  
 
The common ground brought these groups together (largely by the hand of John 
MacCormick) and, together with other members of the national movement, they 
formed the National Party of Scotland in 1928.487 Formed specifically as a political 
party, the NPS contested their first seat in 1929 (Midlothian and Peeblesshire), 
achieving 4.5% of the vote. When another home rule party was formed (the Scottish 
Party), MacCormick reached out to this new movement in the belief that enticing the 
prominent figures involved would give something the NPS it lacked: gravitas within 
the Scottish political establishment.488 The NPS and the Scottish Party differed on two 
levels: on a political level the former was left-wing, linked to the Liberals and Labour, 
and the latter was aligned with the Unionists; and on constitutional matters the SP 
advocated a less powerful version of home rule.489 Eventually agreement was reached 
despite their differences and the Scottish National Party was formed in 1934.  
 
Following this merger, the cultural nationalists associated with the SNL and Hugh 
MacDiarmid were purged from the party, and ever since the SNP has focused far less 
on the cultural forms of nationalism they espoused, leading cultural nationalists to 
accuse the SNP of neglecting Scotland’s cultural heritage.490 The absence of a cultural 
aspect to their nationalist agenda has shaped the types of policies that the SNP have 
advocated throughout their history, eschewing a focus on language, culture or history 
(as one may expect from a nationalist party) in favour of economic rejuvenation and 
administrative decentralisation. This is crucial to the various forms the national 
movement would take in Scotland.  
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In its infancy, the SNP struggled. Peter Lynch argues that for much of its history it 
battled just to survive and stay relevant,491 and Brand has described the SNP between 
1928 and 1960 as a “fringe party”.492 Arthur Donaldson, chairman of the SNP during 
the 1960s, once claimed that during its early years, the entire ensemble of SNP 
activists would have filled a passenger aircraft - and had it crashed, the cause of 
Scottish nationalism would have been lost for a generation.493 These statements are 
testament to the minor nature of the national question in Scotland during the early 
twentieth century: a direct result of the strength of the union. Furthermore, for much 
of its early existence, the SNP was unclear about what it wanted to achieve and how 
to achieve it: there was disagreement about whether the party should cut across social 
classes or whether it should focus on attracting the votes of the working class;494 the 
party were ambiguous about the form of home rule they were advocating, varying 
between support for devolution or independence within the British Empire;495 and 
MacCormick, a key figure in the SNP, advocated multiple strategies to achieve their 
goals, seeking alliances with other parties as well as contesting elections.496 Part of the 
problem was that members of the SNP did not have to be exclusive, and could join 
other political parties if they so wished.   
 
The culmination of these internal disagreements was a schism in 1942, leading 
MacCormick to leave the party and focus on the Covenant Association. At this time, 
although the Nationalists were in an uncomfortable situation, anxious not to be seen 
as undermining the war effort.497 They were, however, able to make political gains out 
of the war; by disregarding the wartime pact between the major parties not to contend 
by-elections, Dr Robert McIntyre won the 1945 by-election in Motherwell to become 
the SNP’s first MP.498 Despite this success, the SNP was not at the forefront of the 
national movement at this time; John MacCormick’s new venture, the Covenant 																																																								
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Association, had taken that role, with a petition calling for home rule that attracted 
two million signatures, as well as the support of the Church of Scotland,499 and a 
number of prominent figures. 500  Yet as with previous nationalist ventures, this 
endeavour did not result in any measure of constitutional change, and the Covenant 
Association folded upon MacCormick’s death.  
 
MacCormick himself has been described as the founder of modern political 
nationalism in Scotland,501 and his energy and commitment were crucial in getting the 
early NPS off the ground, yet one wonders whether his penchant for employing 
multiple strategies diluted the purpose of the early Nationalist Party away from 
fighting elections, and down avenues that were unlikely to reap any serious gain; it 
has been argued that once MacCormick had left the SNP in 1942, it began to function 
more like a political party than it had before502. Since that time the SNP have 
principally stuck to electoral politics and have left others in the nationalist movement 
to adopt extra-parliamentary means by which home rule could be achieved. 
 
During the 1950s, it would seem that the SNP could take heart from the popular 
expression of nationalism harnessed by the Covenant Association, and from the 
patriotic fervour aroused by the theft of the Stone of Destiny503. Yet the SNP were 
struggling during this period; H. J. Hanham suggests in his authoritative study on 
Scottish Nationalism that it was a great achievement for the SNP to simply have 
survived between 1942 and 1964.504 That they did was testament to the hard work of a 
handful of individuals, and as they entered the 1960s, this hard work was to pay off.  
 
During the 1960s, the hastening economic decline was wiping once dominant 
industries from the map, leaving vast areas of lowland Scotland with little prospect of 
employment. As a result of this, the British Government had to involve itself in the 
Scottish economy to a far greater degree than it had ever needed to in the past, and 
this put pressure on the government to address “Scotland and the needs of 
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Scotland”.505 The continued stagnation of the economy during the 1960s and the 
inability of the Conservatives and Labour to arrest this decline despite numerous 
initiatives fuelled popular discontent with these parties during the 1960s.506 Looking 
back, we can identify this period as the point at which the union was no longer 
providing utility for a section of the Scottish population.507 
 
Meanwhile, the SNP had recovered from their difficult period following the Second 
World War and had begun to grow again. Key to this period of growth were three 
factors: a marked improvement in the organisation of the party; an influx of new 
talents; and a steady stream of income. The vast improvement in the organisation of 
the SNP has been attributed to Ian MacDonald,508 who sold his family farm and used 
the proceeds to tour Scotland, spreading word of the SNP and helping to establish new 
branches. William Wolfe, later leader of the SNP, wrote of him: “history will 
certainly record the value of [MacDonald’s] efforts in building up the organisation 
and strength of the Party throughout Scotland in this crucial period”.509 Alongside 
greater organisation, the SNP were also able to rely on a steady stream of income - 
generated by the Alba Pools, a weekly sweepstake - that funded MacDonald’s 
expansion of the party and allowed the party to fight elections effectively. Finally, an 
influx of personnel who were to take on key roles within the party, such as William 
Wolfe and Margo MacDonald, brought fresh blood and leftist ideas into the party.510  
 
These factors combined meant that the SNP were ideally placed to take advantage of 
the loosening of not only traditional political attachments in the 1960s, but changes in 
the very nature of Britain. Against this political backdrop, the SNP’s breakthrough 
success came in 1967 when Winnie Ewing won the Hamilton by-election, achieving a 
remarkable 38% swing from Labour in the process. Coming only a year after Plaid 
Cymru had achieved their first seat in Wales, these results announced political 																																																								
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nationalism as a force in British politics, and the established Westminster parties 
made serious efforts to counter it. The Conservatives announced a Royal Commission 
on the issue and Labour and the Liberals considered similar measures to attempt to 
relieve the threat to their Scottish seats. In the decade that followed their victory in 
Hamilton, the SNP followed up their initial success with gains at local and general 
elections, achieving one seat in 1970, seven in the February election of 1974, and 
eleven seats in the October election of that year, achieving 30.4% of the vote.  
 
The rise and rise of the Scottish nationalists - aided by the discovery of North Sea oil - 
terrified the established Westminster parties, especially the Labour party whose 
electoral dominance of Scotland was threatened by the SNP. Following the first 
election of 1974, Lynch claims that “Scotland suddenly became very important to 
Labour and Scots voters found themselves lavished with attention”.511 To stem the 
tide, Labour announced support for a Scottish assembly, but this policy was imposed 
on the Scottish Labour party by their superiors in London to widespread anger 
amongst Scottish MPs and members,512 who sought to undermine the passage of the 
legislation.  Marr opines that because the proposals were “born out of weakness… 
devolution was a slippery concept”.513 The tiny majority and internal opposition 
meant that when the legislation was introduced into the House of Commons, the 
government lost control of the bill to its backbenchers and the opposition.514  
 
This allowed MPs of both sides to engage in spoiling tactics to wreck the bill - one of 
the most active of which was Tam Dalyell, “Scots Labour’s most determined 
unionist” who “seemed determined to immolate himself, as well as the Bill, on a pyre 
of amendments”.515 The most famous of the amendments was introduced by George 
Cunningham (a Scottish-born Labour MP who held a seat in London), and was clearly 
not intended to improve the quality of the legislation; it required the Nationalists to 
win not only a majority of the popular vote, but carry the support of 40% of the 
eligible voters in the proposed referendum on the matter, for the final result to be 
valid. The SNP underwent an internal debate on whether or not to accept a measure 																																																								
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that fell short of their preferred option, but reluctantly did so.516 With hindsight, one 
could argue that the Nationalists were naïve to support a process and settlement that 
was so evidently flawed and driven by political motivations. The 40% rule was 
crucial; a narrow majority of Scots voted for devolution (51.6% to 48.4% against) but 
the turnout of 63.7% left the Yes campaign with only 32.9% of eligible voters 
supporting the measure.  
 
It might be strange to suggest such a crushing defeat could represent progress for the 
nationalists, but the truth is that it did. In just twelve years, the SNP had moved from 
winning its first seat to the brink of home rule. Only the internal dynamics of the 
Labour Party and the weakness of party authority in Westminster prevented the 
measure from succeeding.  Additionally, the SNP had made the national question an 
issue of primary importance, and altered popular expectations of how Scotland should 
be governed. Even though the failure of 1979 and its repercussions were to do severe 
damage to the SNP, it did represent an anomalous form of political progress, and 
established the SNP as a serious player in Scottish politics.   
 
The political fallout from the devolution debacle, following a brief but unsuccessful 
‘Scotland Said Yes’ campaign, ended with the SNP bringing down the Labour 
Government, poignantly paving the way for Margaret Thatcher to take power. 
Gallagher suggests the SNP felt “it was double-crossed by a party that briefly stole its 
nationalist clothes on espousing devolution and then was able to avoid the electoral 
retribution” that fell on the SNP.517  The failure of the devolution referendum, and the 
backlash the party received for allowing the Conservatives to take power hit the 
Nationalists hard, leading to internal disputes about how to move forward. This led to 
the emergence of splinter groups: examples being the 79 Group,518 who were small 
but contained a core of personnel who would later occupy key roles in the SNP; and 
Siol nan Gaidheal (SNG - Seeds of the Gael) - a cultural nationalist group who gained 
prominence for some of their perceived ‘militaristic’ activities.519  																																																								
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The consequence of the SNP’s decision to bring down the Labour government was 
that the Conservative Party, helmed by Margaret Thatcher, won the subsequent 
General Election. Thatcher herself was perceived to be antagonistic towards Scotland 
in her policies and rhetoric, and became something of a hate figure in Scotland, 
leading McCrone to suggest that she was “the midwife of Scottish home 
rule”.520David McCrone argues that the new political ideology advanced by Thatcher 
was British nationalism “under a new set of political and economic ideas [that 
were]… distinctly at odds with new alternative variety north of the Border”.521 
Modern Conservatism, he argued “spoke overwhelmingly with a southern English 
voice”.522 Thatcher’s attack on the state, and on aspects of civil society were amplified 
due to the importance of both in Scotland; Michael Keating claims that “this was seen 
in Scotland as an attack on the remnants of informal self-government, and the 
installation of placemen was seen as a return to patronage”.523 Scotland’s response 
was to vote for other parties, primarily the Labour party, but despite consistently 
voting against Thatcher and the Conservatives, the Tories were able to continue on the 
strength of their vote in England, leaving Scotland “doomed to perpetual Tory 
policies”.524 This situation has come to be descried as a democratic deficit, and has 
been a key feature of nationalist arguments in Scotland since.  
 
The dominance of the Conservative Party at Westminster without a democratic 
mandate from the Scottish people led the other parties in Scotland to an “anti-
Conservative consensus which encouraged the SNP to move comfortably to the Left 
and Labour to become more nationalist and supportive of self-government”.525 
Locked out of power by the Conservative hold on England, the Scottish Labour and 
Liberal Democrat Parties began to examine options for a devolved assembly for 
Scotland. Unlike the 1970s, the pressure building in the Labour Party to support 
devolution was coming from Scottish activists rather than the leadership.526 
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With support from other sections of Scottish society - such as the Kirk, local 
authorities, and trade unions - a Constitutional Convention was formed in 1989 from 
the non-partisan Campaign for a Scottish Assembly. Although the SNP were invited 
to participate in the Constitutional Convention, they were reluctant to do so unless the 
independence was considered as a constitutional option, and without this, they 
withdrew to widespread condemnation. It has since been argued, however, that this 
was the correct strategic move, allowing the party to support devolution without being 
bound to its success.527 By this point the SNP had come through their period of 
internal strife and, a year later elected Alex Salmond as leader of the party. This can 
be seen as evidence that the majority of party members favoured Salmond’s gradualist 
approach to independence - one that advocates taking any powers on offer whilst 
working towards full sovereignty. 
 
In 1995 the Convention announced their proposals for a Scottish Parliament that were 
put into effect when Tony Blair and Labour swept to power in 1997. Once again a 
referendum was held on the matter, but this time Labour and the nationalists worked 
together, and the result was a resounding victory for the Yes campaign. The 
(re)convening of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 was tangible evidence of the huge 
progress the Scottish nationalists had made since the 1960s; even though they have 
never directly held power, the nationalists moved the issue of Scottish governance 
from fringe to mainstream by threatening the electoral dominance of Labour in 
Scotland. Still more progress was to be made though and in 2007 the SNP won their 
first election in the Scottish Parliament, forming a minority government.  
 
During this term, the party reneged on the promise to hold a referendum on 
independence and instead focused on establishing the SNP as a party of government. 
At this they were successful; when they won a majority government in 2011, to 
widespread astonishment, they did so by overcoming the electoral system that had 
been designed to prevent just such an outcome, and were able to hold a referendum on 
the issue. Following a two-year campaign, the nationalists were defeated, despite 
seeing support for independence rise from an average of 25% to 45%.528 The election 
of 2011 had already seen the SNP sweep through Labour’s traditional heartlands in 																																																								
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the West of Scotland, and this part of the country now showed some of the highest 
support for the Yes campaign, with the voters of Glasgow bucking the national trend 
and voting for independence 
 
Despite the referendum defeat, membership of the SNP rose to over 100,000 - making 
it the largest political party in Scotland - and the SNP took 56 of Scotland’s 59 
Westminster seats in the General Election of 2015 (a substantial increase on their 
previous high of 11 in 1974), achieving exactly 50% of the vote, and becoming the 
third largest party in the Westminster Parliament. Combined, these factors may signal 
a change in the balance of power in Scottish politics from the Labour to the SNP. Part 
of the reason behind this change has been the SNP’s adoption of left-of-centre policies 
that once would have been the hallmark of the Labour party; thirty years after having 
their clothes briefly stolen by the Labour party, the nationalists have returned the 
favour.  
 
The main reason, I believe, for the SNP’s growth has been their domination of a 
distinct Scottish political arena created by the establishment of the Scottish Parliament 
that has given the party an increased relevance. Even though the Scottish Labour 
Party held power for the first eight years of the Parliament’s existence, the vast 
majority of Labour’s high profile Scottish politicians, the likes of Gordon Brown, 
Alistair Darling, Robin Cook and Douglas Alexander, remained at Westminster. By 
sending their best talents south, the Labour Party has been represented at Holyrood by 
less talented politicians, and accordingly, less talented leaders.  
 
The progress of Scottish nationalism is testament to the viability of constitutional 
politics to such a political movement; it has been this viability, this opportunity to 
effect political change through non-violent means, that has expelled political violence 
to the periphery of the national movement in Scotland. Even though voters rejected 
independence in 2014, the fact that it was achievable at all was sufficient to persuade 
the overwhelming majority of nationalists that constitutional methods were worth 
pursuing. 
 
The rise of the Scottish National Party has been the central feature of Scottish politics 
since the 1960s: their presence has led to a greater attention on the governance of 
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Scotland from Westminster; ensured mainstream support for Scottish devolution; and 
led to a referendum on independence. In response, the Conservatives, Labour, and 
Liberal Democrats have repeatedly sought to accommodate the growth of political 
nationalism with varying measures of home rule. In fifty years, the Westminster 
consensus has moved from a position of rejecting devolution outright to supporting a 
high level of devolution to the Scottish Parliament. This has been achieved despite the 
SNP not holding reins of government until some years after devolution was achieved. 
 
In this section I examined the rise of Scottish nationalism from the aftermath of the 
First World War and the birth of nationalist political parties, to the referendum defeat 
in 2014. The nationalism that has been advanced by the SNP has increasingly been of 
a civic variety,529 with a focus on economics and social democracy at the expense of 
cultural features that are prevalent in other nationalist movements throughout the 
world. During this period there have been arguments about what form of 
constitutional redress the nationalists would accept, but the ‘gradualist’ approach that 
advocates working with the unionist parties on a mutually acceptable solution has 
largely won through. These features of the SNP - a narrow focus on electoral politics, 
a civic definition of Scottish nationality and a pragmatic approach to devolution - 
have shaped the entirety of the national movement and bolstered the attractiveness of 
the SNP to the Scottish people.  
 
Before moving on to discuss other forms of nationalist political activity in Scotland - 
encompassing direct action as well as violent nationalism - I will briefly examine the 
key components of the Scottish nationalist message - considering the importance of 
identity politics, economics, and the democratic deficit.  
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The Core Tenets of Political Scottish Nationalism  
 
Earlier in this chapter, I argued that the Act of Union had a colossal effect on Scottish 
identity. First and foremost, the access it provided to the British Empire afforded 
Scots opportunities both at home and abroad, that they would not otherwise have had. 
Additionally, the union allowed for greater migration throughout the United 
Kingdom, bringing the Scots into closer contact with the rest of the peoples that share 
their island. This migration has been facilitated by a shared language and religion 
throughout Great Britain, and these factors helped to create a sense of commonality: a 
sense of Britishness. This shared identity has been solidified, according to Colley, by 
conflict with enemies from Continental Europe, firstly Catholic France - emphasising 
the importance of Protestantism - and then twentieth century Germany.530 
 
Yet despite these processes, there was no comprehensive assimilation into a single 
British nationality. Whilst the United Kingdom has been able to inspire patriotic 
fervour and loyalty, it has never been able to create a homogeneous national group; as 
Keating points out “the UK, indeed, is one of the few countries in the world which 
lacks an adjective to describe its citizens”.531 Colley supports this, suggesting “no one 
has ever proudly and seriously referred to himself or herself as a ‘UKanian’”.532 The 
most commonly-used term, British, does a better job, but it fails to account for 
Northern Ireland; a somewhat ironic omission given the importance of Britishness to 
the Protestant community in Ulster. In Scotland, a distinct identity was retained, 
closely linked with the preserved independent institutions, and it was this that early 
Scottish nationalism was built on - a sense of difference, a sense that Scots should (at 
least to some degree) control their own affairs.  
 
Identity is a core feature of nationalism; it defines who ‘we’ are, and by extension 
who ‘they’ are. Scholars of nationalism often postulate that it can be built on a shared 
culture, language, or ethnicity, yet modern Scottish nationalism has largely eschewed 
these traditional aspects of identity and focused on what has been described as ‘civic 
nationalism’, based on common values and institutions, shared memories and 																																																								
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territory.533 Why, then, has Scottish nationalism developed in such a way? Primarily 
because modern Scotland largely lacks the social cleavages upon which the binary 
identities of ‘us’ and ‘them’ are based; while one could argue that at the start of the 
twentieth century the sectarian divide so potent in Ireland was resonant in Scotland at 
the start of the twentieth century, it largely diminished as the century progressed.534 In 
fact, there is only one other out-group that Scottish nationalism as a whole could be 
said to have emerged against: the English. 
 
Watson claims that “the dominant theme in Scottish history is the relationship 
between England and Scotland”535 and Devine argues that “Scotland’s emergence as a 
nation out of miscellaneous tribal groupings in the medieval period was in large part 
the result of a centuries-old struggle to defend the kingdom from English 
aggression”.536 As mentioned above, the Declaration of Arbroath, signed in 1320, 
includes a passage that states “if [the King of Scotland] were to abandon this task, 
wishing to subject us or our realm to the King of England or the English, we should 
instantly set ourselves to expel him as the betrayer of his own rights and ours”.537 It is 
therefore apparent that, throughout Scottish history, England has played the role of the 
‘other’.  
 
Since the union of 1707, however, co-operation and migration between Scotland and 
England has largely healed old wounds; Watson notes that English incomers represent 
the largest migrant group in Scotland538 - a claim confirmed by the 2001 census, 
which shows that one in ten Scottish residents were born in England. Watson believes 
that this fact is often overlooked as a result of the ‘invisibility’ of English people in 
Scotland, whose only defining feature is an English accent.539 In his study of the 																																																								
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English migrant community in Scotland, Watson does refer to two anti-English 
migration groups that emerged in Scotland in the 1990s: Scottish Watch and Settler 
Watch. Both of these organisations held meetings and issued anti-English material, 
but the media attention they gained was far greater than their level of public support 
warranted.540 James Kellas reports that the SNP expelled any members who joined 
these organisations,541 and their chief executive took steps to have them closed 
down,542 and Keating argues that any “diffuse anti-English sentiment [that] does exist 
within Scottish society … tends to be aimed at the structures of the British state rather 
than English people as individuals or a race”.543  Despite the sizeable English-born 
population in Scotland, Anglophobia is low; Watson reports that 94% of English 
respondents had not experienced anti-Englishness.544 There are undoubtedly times 
that the Scottish identity has been defined in reference to their southerly neighbours, 
but the evidence suggests that modern Scottish nationalism has not been driven by 
hatred of the English.  
 
Thus the form of nationalism employed by the SNP, certainly since the 1980s, has 
been “more open, more European and progressive… more self-confident and less 
defensive” while earlier nationalists were “nostalgic, defensive and parochial”,545 and 
Scottish nationalists would argue that modern nationalism is based on making 
progress, rather than returning Scotland to a glorious past. In their survey of SNP 
members, Mitchell, Bennie and Johns contend that SNP members “do not so much 
endorse a civic identity as endorse a pluralist conception of belonging” that can 
involve a combination of civic and ethnic factors,546 leading them to conclude that 
“there are many ways of being Scottish”.547 As a result, support for the SNP has not 
been wholly incompatible with Britishness (even if it is incompatible with unionism), 
although SNP supporters are far more likely to reject a British identity than supporters 
of other political parties.548 																																																								
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In place of cultural or linguistic content to stimulate the patriotism of voters, the SNP 
has focused on less emotive topics: how Scotland is governed and who it is governed 
by. Since the 1960s the SNP has focused on the distinct economic needs of Scotland, 
and has made this the centrepiece of their message. The discovery of oil off the north-
east coast of Scotland gave this message added resonance in the 1970s, and the SNP 
have used this discovery ever since to make the claim that an independent Scotland 
would be more prosperous that it could be in the union. The party has based a core 
strand of its economic policy on the ‘strength’ of oil revenues ever since. 
 
Another core tenet of the SNP’s argument has been the democratic deficit; 
considering Scotland’s size and the number of representatives that it sends to 
Westminster, it has always been perfectly feasible for Scotland to vote for one party 
and be governed by another. McCrone argues that as long as Scotland maintained the 
same voting behaviour as England, this was unlikely to be an issue.549 However, in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, voting patterns in Scotland and England began to 
diverge, and Scottish support for the Conservative Party declined. Considering the 
Conservatives were able to win a majority of votes in Scotland in 1955, their rapid 
decline has been as important to the development of a distinct political arena in 
Scotland as the rise of the SNP. 550  
 
Since that point, the Conservatives have primarily targeted English voters, often at the 
expense of their electability in Scotland and Wales, and the notion of ‘democratic 
deficit’ entered the Scottish political lexicon, seized upon by the SNP during the 
premiership of Margaret Thatcher to suggest that she lacked a popular mandate to 
govern in Scotland. A prominent example was the Poll Tax; according to Lynch, the 
																																																								
549 David McCrone, “Scotland Out the Union? The Rise and Rise of the Nationalist Agenda”, The 
Political Quarterly 83 (2012), 73.  
550 Three chapters in T. M. Devine’s edited volume Scotland and the Union, consider key factors 
behind the decline of the Conservative/Unionist Party in Scotland: Cameron tracks important changes 
in Scottish society and suggests the “social and institutional background to their electoral success was 
becoming less secure” by the start of the 1960s. Finlay examines the policies, specifically the 
“unapologetic” economic policies, of Margaret Thatcher and the extent to which Thatcher’s 
government failed to consider a specific Scottish dimension to their actions. Finally, remaining with 
Mrs Thatcher, Miller notes the importance of Margaret Thatcher’s redefinition of unionism in direct 
opposition to Scottish nationalism, allowing opponents to depict the Conservatives as foreign. 
(Cameron, “The Politics of the Union in an Age of Unionism”; Finlay, “Thatcherism and the Union”; 
W. L. Miller, “The Death of Unionism”, in Scotland and the Union: 1707 to 2007, ed. T.M. Devine 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 175-194. 
	 118 
“great symbol of the Conservatives’ democratic illegitimacy to govern Scotland”.551 A 
new charge levied by local councils and trialled in Scotland, based on a fixed rate 
rather than means-tested, the SNP took a prominent role in the popular opposition to 
the introduction of the Poll Tax and it was eventually replaced, but not before further 
damage was done to the Conservatives’ popularity in Scotland.  
 
Central to the SNP’s message since the 1970s has been the economy and political 
legitimacy; rather than basing their argument on emotion, the SNP’s message has 
been focus on economics and administrative issues. However, not all in the nationalist 
movement have eschewed emotive protest, and below I discuss the use of other forms 
of political action by Scottish nationalists, starting with non-violent direct action. 
 
 
Non-Violent Direct Action 
 
One of the most notorious acts of Scottish nationalist direct action was the theft of the 
Stone of Destiny (also known as the Stone of Scone) - a stone used in the coronation 
of Scottish monarchs - from Westminster Abbey on Christmas Day 1950, by a group 
of four students who were members of John MacCormick’s Covenant Association.552 
The Stone was eventually returned to the authorities, but the audacity and symbolism 
of the act and the manhunt that followed gave Scottish nationalists a publicity boost.  
 
Another symbolic act undertaken by Scottish nationalists could easily fall under the 
rubric of violent nationalism as it involved explosives, but as the purpose of the act 
was vandalism it feels more appropriate to discuss it here: following the coronation of 
Queen Elizabeth in 1953, she adopted the royal style of Elizabeth II, and this angered 
some in the Scottish nationalist movement who (correctly) asserted that she was in 
fact Elizabeth I of Scotland, decrying this oversight as an example of how some in 
England treated the United Kingdom as a continuation of English history.553 The 																																																								
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insignia of the monarch was carried on post boxes nationwide, so some Scottish 
nationalists took to vandalising them, even going so far as to use a small amount of 
explosives to destroy them. Again, Harvie says that this type of symbolic action was 
damaging for the constitutional nationalist movement - “these japes unfortunately 
coincided with an IRA offensive [the Border Campaign], and did little to enhance the 
respectability of the home rulers”.554 As I show, the damaging equation of nationalism 
with violence was one that some unionist politicians would publicly espouse when 
future generations of Scottish nationalists adopted similar tactics.  
 
Key to this type of non-violent nationalist activity in Scotland were dedicated 
individuals prepared to pursue it as a means to an end. One such individual was 
Wendy Wood, who, despite being involved with the SNP in its early days, believed 
that electoral activity was unlikely to lead to progress, and claimed that she felt 
“impatient” with the party’s propaganda.555 Instead she took to making symbolic 
gestures; one of the most notable occurring in 1932 when she led supporters to 
Stirling Castle and removed the British flag, replacing it with a Lion Rampant.556 She 
also claimed to be involved with a Scottish Defence Force,557 a small paramilitary 
organisation,558 and later set up her own movement called the Scottish Patriots which, 
according to Gavin Bowd, was largely a “vehicle for her extremely forceful and 
attractive personality and her ability as an open-air speaker”.559 
 
Wood was also allegedly interviewed by the police about the theft of the sword of 
William Wallace in May 1972,560 supposedly carried out by two men who would later 
become involved in more violent nationalist activity. 561 Wood rose to national 
prominence again in December 1972 when she announced she would go on hunger 																																																																																																																																																															
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strike until home rule was delivered, an event that was later cited as motivation for 
explosions carried out by members of a nationalist group, as I shall discuss below. 
After six days of hunger strike, it was announced that the Government would prepare 
a Green Paper on the topic of Scottish devolution, and this was sufficient to persuade 
her to call off the protest.562 However, she was reported to have told a journalist 
“we’ll only get independence if there’s a threat behind it… the SNP is after votes, it 
can’t threaten - that’s why there are others”.563 Her behaviour earned her the respect 
and support of those from the extremist fringe of Scottish nationalism564, and led to 
suggestions that she may have been an agent provocateur.565  
 
Following the referendum defeat in 1979, key figures in the SNP - led by a small 
faction in the party called the 79 Group - advocated a campaign of civil disobedience, 
taking the lead from the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) whose Scottish 
membership overlapped with that of the SNP.566 The first use of the tactic, led by 79 
Group leader Jim Sillars, occurred in June 1981 when members of the party occupied 
job centres in Scotland in protest at high unemployment figures.567 This was followed 
by a rally held on Calton Hill in Edinburgh in October 1981, much to the 
apprehension of the SNP leadership.568 During this event an attempt was made to gain 
access to the Royal High School, which would have been the Scottish Assembly had 
the referendum in 1979 been successful. They were denied access and held a brief sit-
down protest outside instead, but the undeterred Sillars and five other members broke 
into the building and intended to read out a symbolic declaration, but were arrested 
before they could do so. Following this “farce”, the campaign collapsed and another 
bout of infighting began within the SNP.569 Sillars himself says that the conditions 
were never right for non-violent direct action; when asked what he would have 
changed with the benefit of hindsight, he stated that he would not have attempted the 																																																								
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campaign at all.570 Despite the failure of this campaign, the SNP did engage in civil 
disobedience again when faced with the controversial Poll Tax, which had led to 
“suspicions that the Scots were being used as guinea-pigs”.571 The party adopted a 
stance of refusing to pay the charge, although Devine suggests that it was anger in 
England rather than the role of the SNP that ensured the policy was scrapped.572 
 
Despite all this, neither civil disobedience nor non-violent direct action have been 
major features of Scottish nationalist campaigning in the twentieth century. In their 
study of nationalism in Scotland and Wales, Studlar and McAllister express their 
surprise that nationalist groups in both countries did not utilise methods of protest 
more than they did.573 One factor that they identify behind this is the cautious nature 
of the SNP leadership,574 but this alone does not explain why those outside the SNP 
largely chose not to engage in these types of activities. For a variety of reasons, non-
violent protest has largely been overlooked as a means of achieving political change 
by the nationalist movement, but there were still some who viewed non-violent protest 
as insufficient and went further still.  
 
 
Violent Scottish Nationalism  
 
In this section I will discuss the use of political violence by Scottish nationalists, 
covering a litany of groups that sprang up and quickly disappeared. As I discussed in 
the introduction to this thesis, there has not been an objective comprehensive study of 
Scottish nationalist terrorism to draw from, so the primary source for this section will 
be newspaper articles detailing the acts of those involved, as well as court cases of 
those caught. In the previous section I noted that Wendy Wood claimed to be involved 
with a paramilitary group called the Scottish Defence Force in the 1940s, but there is 
no evidence that the group ever carried out any incidents of political violence.  
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The first incidence of a group that did carry out an act of political violence was the 
Scottish Republican Army (SRA), whose name first appears in February 24th 1953 
after an Edinburgh councillor had written to a local newspaper, condemning an attack 
on a pillar-box in the city.575 In response to this, the councillor alleges that he received 
a telephone call threatening that the SRA would “take care of him”.576 Further threats 
were made to a Conservative MP, as well as shopkeepers who sold memorabilia 
displaying the royal insignia of Elizabeth II,577 and the first recorded attack committed 
by the group was a small bomb attack on a shop in Glasgow whose proprietor had 
refused to remove the insignia from his shop window.578 Later that year it was alleged 
that they had stolen guns from a Territorial Army hut,579 and explosives from a quarry 
in Milngavie (although the material was later recovered).580  
 
In November 1953, four individuals were arrested and faced trial at the High Court in 
Edinburgh, during which an undercover police officer claimed he had been asked to 
source explosives for the group, and that their intention was to “blow up all 
communications, railway and road bridges, pylons carrying electricity from Scotland 
to England, and to terrorise the nation”.581 Yet when the individuals involved took the 
stand they claimed that the SRA did not exist, that their actions were a “hoax” and 
that the police officer had attempted to entrap young nationalists.582 At the conclusion 
of the trial, the four accused were each sentenced to one year in jail for unlawful 
possession of explosives, but as police officers left the court they were subjected to 
the anger of a gathered crowd who claimed they were, among other things, 
“traitors”.583  
 
After their imprisonment a journalist from the Times claimed to have met SRA 
members in a café in Glasgow, where he was apparently asked to supply building 
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plans for Glasgow City Chambers and Holyrood Palace.584 Despite this claim, little is 
heard from the group, although the name does appear again in relation to threats made 
to blow up a chemical plant and to send “poisoned pies to an enemy of Scotland”,585 
and the burning of an English flag.586 They were not heard from again.  
 
Following the imprisonment of those involved in the SRA, no group emerged as 
successor and the violent nationalist scene lay dormant for nearly two decades, 
illustrating a complete lack of support for a militant Scottish nationalism at that time. 
It wasn’t until the start of the 1970s, as Scottish nationalism was developing as a 
political force, that a multitude of groups emerged to supplement the electoral activity 
of the SNP; in their study of violent nationalism in Scotland, Scott and MacLeay 
identify the Army of the Provisional Government of Scotland587 as the first group to 
materialise at this time. The aim of this group was “to take over the government of 
Scotland when the majority of the Scottish people decided they wanted to be 
independent”.588 Emerging out of the 1320 Club,589 it was suggested that the group 
was started as one of the key figures involved, William Murray, believed the SNP was 
faltering.590 To arrest this decline, the APG supposedly planned to seize and hold a 
Scottish town in the hope of leading a nationalist uprising.591 To fund this plan 
Murray planned a bank robbery, however police gained wind of the plan and 
intervened before it could take place; Murray and two accomplices were jailed for a 
total of 12 years in 1971.592 
 
Another group who targeted banks to raise funds operating around this period were 
the Workers Party of Scotland (WPS), who came to light after a spate of bank 
robberies in Glasgow in 1972 were traced to the group.593 They were eventually 
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sentenced to a total of 81 years in prison for their actions,594 “putting them in the same 
league as the Great Train Robbers and the worst of the IRA terrorists”,595 intended as 
a deterrent to others with similar ideas. Considering the severity of these sentences, it 
is somewhat surprising that this did not inflame nationalist opinion in Scotland. 
However, the motivation behind these robberies would appear to be the overthrow of 
capitalism, rather than the overthrow of the British state,596 and the nature of the crime 
(armed robbery) was more criminal than political in nature. Thus the actions of the 
WPS sit uneasily alongside nationalist groups, yet they are often treated as part of the 
same category.597 
 
Nine months after the imprisonment of four members of the WPS, another group 
emerged, launching a bomb attack against an electricity pylon in Wamphray, 
Dumfriesshire on 10th December 1972. In a book published online detailing the 
actions and motivations of the two men behind the group, the author (who remains 
anonymous, but claims to have an intimate knowledge of the topic) states this attack 
was carried out in support of Wendy Wood, who was carrying out a hunger strike in 
pursuit of a Scottish assembly at this time,598 with a secondary motivation to prevent 
the export of electricity from Scotland to England.599 Behind it were the individuals 
who had already carried out an act of nationalist protest described above: the theft of 
the sword of William Wallace. The attack was claimed by the Border Clan, but the 
group also used the name 100 Organisation,600 before settling on the name Tartan 
Army.601 
 
The individuals behind this attack followed it up with attacks on a BBC relay pylon at 
Wester Glen, Falkirk in January 1973,602 and multiple attacks against oil pipelines at 																																																								
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Bridge of Earn in August 1973, Bo’ness in July 1974, and two separate locations in 
Perth - Crook of Devon and Kinfauns - in September 1975.603 These attacks were 
allegedly to stop Scottish oil going to England, at a time when the SNP were running 
a high-profile campaign proclaiming ‘It’s Scotland’s Oil’,604 but the extent to which 
the Tartan Army was operating on the back of this campaign is unclear. Members of 
the group were eventually arrested outside the French Consulate in Edinburgh in May 
1976,605 leading to claims that they were to carry out an attack on behalf of Breton 
nationalists.606 
 
In September 1976, five individuals appeared in court charged with involvement in 
the bombings and in a wider conspiracy. However, a large number of the initial 
charges had been dropped, and the jury found two of the five not guilty, with a third 
receiving a non-custodial sentence. 607  Two men, Donald Currie and Gerard 
McGuigan, were found guilty and given prison sentences of five years and one year 
(later reduced to three years and four months) respectively,608 but the judge had 
serious reservations about the case, suggesting that the “army... so far as the evidence 
goes seems to only have one member”,609 and raising concerns about the role of the 
police.610 Furthermore, following the conclusion of the trial it was claimed, “the trial 
produced no convincing evidence of any tight knit para-military group”.611 Once 
again, it was claimed that the police had overstepped the line in the pursuit of violent 
Scottish nationalists; although the group claim that one of their guiding principles was 
that “no-one should be hurt”,612 any use of explosives carries with it a degree of risk 
to human life. They established a pattern of action - targeting oil infrastructure, a 
symbol of the ‘theft’ of Scotland’s material wealth - and though the targets they chose 
undoubtedly had symbolic value to the perpetrators, to what extent the symbolism 
resonated among the people of Scotland we cannot measure.  																																																								
603 Tartan Army, ElectricScotland.  
604 Jim Freeman, “’I helped to steal Wallace’s sword”, Herald, 28 September 1976. 
605 ibid. 
606 Jim Freeman and Ray Duncan, “I caused pipeline blast”, Herald, 25 September 1976.  
607 Jim Freeman, “Tartan Army myth shattered”, Herald, 2 October 1976.  
608 Tartan Army, ElectricScotland. 
609 Tom McConnell, “Judge talks of ‘army of only one member’”, Herald, 1 October 1976. 
610 “It was also a matter of grave concern that the police… perhaps became over-enthusiastic [and]… 
spread the net even further - not only catching the big fish, but any other little fish who happened to be 
swimming about anywhere near the pond where the big fish were” (ibid). 
611 Jim Freeman and George Forbes, “Tartan Army - was it a one-man organisation?”, Herald, 2 
October 1976. 
612 Tartan Army, ElectricScotland. 
	 126 
The perpetrators themselves believed their actions had played an important part in the 
nationalist movement, suggesting that their actions contributed to “the White Paper, 
the referendum and the new Parliament building”,613 but following the trial, the group 
was not heard from again and it is claimed that the individuals went their own 
ways.614 The gaoling of three members of the APG in 1971 meanwhile, had not led to 
the break-up of this particular group; it had continued to exist, planning their next 
move, and in a surprise development, they were able to convince General Idi Amin, 
President of Uganda, to send a telegram to the leader of the SNP in 1974, supporting 
Scottish independence and proposing to support the Scottish cause at the UN General 
Assembly.615 Unsurprisingly, the leader of the SNP chose not to take him up on this 
offer. Another attempt by the APG to publicise their cause was to meet with 
journalists from the Daily Record: announcing plans for a summit of the leading 
Scottish terrorist groups, and revealing logistical support from the Provisional IRA.616 
 
Again, plans were drawn up for another bank robbery to raise funds for APG’s 
proposed actions. The robbery was carried out by a member of the group, Michael 
Fairlie, along with two accomplices who were not involved in the APG, on January 
21st 1975. In total they took £8040, of which £2400 was given to the group,617 but the 
robbery itself is described in farcical terms by Scott and MacLeay, who contend that 
the ineptitude of the criminals (describing it as “one of the most botched bank raids 
ever carried out”) made it easy for the police to apprehend them.618 In addition to 
arresting those involved in the bank robbery, the police also arrested a number of 
other members of the APG on conspiracy charges, leading to two trials in April and 
May 1975. In the first trial, the trio involved in the robbery received a total of 30 years 
in prison, with Fairlie receiving 12 years.619  
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The second trial, on the wider conspiracy of the APG, led to a number of revelations 
about the group’s plans: during the trial it was claimed that they were to raid quarries, 
barracks and banks for weaponry and funds, and would attack an American nuclear 
base and a monument to the Duke of Sutherland.620 This information came from a 
document called “Guerrilla Operations of the Scottish Provisional Government”, 
which also detailed how internal discipline was to be maintained (deserters were to 
face death), and plans to implement a decentralised cell structure.621 It was claimed 
that this document was “a guide to guerrilla operations in the event of a peace-keeping 
operation by the English upon our country”,622 but that the group were only intended 
to be reactive, rather than to proactively advance the cause of Scottish nationalism 
through violence.623 Yet again the counsel for the defence criticised the role of the 
police in the surveillance of those involved, suggesting that the suspects were 
followed for great periods of time in the hope they would commit a more serious 
crime.624  
 
At the conclusion of the trial, five of the defendants received prison sentences 
totalling 34 years, with the longest individual sentence of 12 years, but in his 
concluding remarks the judge commented that the APG were “very loose” if the group 
did at all exist.625 Indeed, even one of the defendants, Major Frederick Boothby,626 
decried the “activities carried out by some of these gangsters under the cloak of 
patriotism”627, and described one of his co-defendants as “illiterate, violent and a 
trained killer”.628 From this evidence it would seem that the APG was comprised of a 
mix of criminals and radical ideologues brought together through perceived mutual 
opportunity. In the wake of these sentences, a member of the APG did release a 
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statement claiming that Scotland “need never doubt its readiness and ability to answer 
the nation’s call”,629 but there is no record of any further action by the APG.  
 
The APG never claimed credit for an act of political violence, but the plans they had 
drawn up for a guerrilla war, and the lengths it went to raise funds and gain publicity, 
mean that it was treated as a terrorist group in the media. As in 1971 their plans were 
thwarted at the fundraising stage, and on both occasions police were well aware of 
their activities, but waited to see what would come of their schemes before taking 
action.630 
 
Following the imprisonment of members of the APG and the Tartan Army, there was 
a three-year lull in violent nationalist activity in Scotland before the next group was to 
emerge; the Scottish Republican Socialist League (SRSL).631 Breaking away from the 
Scottish Republican Socialist Party (a minor extreme-left party), who had arrived onto 
the scene after the unsuccessful devolution referendum in 1979, the SRSL was 
reportedly formed following an SNP rally at Bannockburn in September 1979 and 
aimed to achieve self-government for Scotland through violent means.632 As others 
had done before them, they took to criminal endeavours to raise funds, targeting a 
Post Office on Oxford Road, Glasgow in October 1979 before hitting a £100,000 
jackpot in April 1980 when they raided a Post Office van in the Gorbals.633 Like their 
predecessors, they mishandled both robberies; in the first raid one of the individuals 
was identified when his mask slipped, and in the second the culprits managed to lock 
themselves into the van with the money, although they were able to escape by forcing 
the driver to disable the automatic alarm.634   
 
The group used this injection of capital to rent properties, and buy guns, ammunition 
and bomb-making equipment. To assist with their bomb making preparation, 
members of the group attempted to bug an explosives depot, but accidentally put the 
firm’s phone network out of operation instead.635 Nevertheless, assisted by a copy of 																																																								
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the ‘Anarchist Cook Book’ they were able to build a number of crude devices.636 Two 
members of the group also visited one of the leaders of the APG - William Murray - 
in prison.637 In June 1980, the group decided to blow up the Scottish Assembly 
building638 on Calton Hill, but called off the attack after they caught the attention of a 
group of bystanders.639 Shortly after this, they were apprehended when “a member of 
the group called firemen after a device had burst into flames in a rented Glasgow 
flat”.640 Once again, violent Scottish nationalists faced the High Court for the two 
robberies in Glasgow, an attempted attack on the Glasgow Stock Exchange (for which 
the charges were later dropped641), the attempted attack on the proposed Assembly 
building, and the illegal possession of a “considerable arsenal”.642 Of the nine men 
who were initially charged, six were found guilty, receiving a combined total of 72 
years in prison.  
 
The nationalist agenda featured heavily in Scottish politics in the 1970s, and the 
Westminster parties tried to outbid one another to stave off the nationalist threat to 
their seats. Despite this, a number of nationalists sought to take a short cut to victory, 
and three separate groups emerged to this end. The APG and the SRSL bungled their 
way through robberies to finance their idealistic schemes, and although neither group 
were able to carry out an attack, both acquired finances and weapons, and showed the 
willingness (if not the nous) to use force should the need arise. The Tartan Army were 
a slightly more professional outfit, carrying out six attacks over the space of four 
years, yet they too were eventually apprehended.  
 
The four conspiracy trials (two including the APG) of those involved have a number 
of commonalities: the actions of the accused were always presented as a “farce” or 
“comedy”, whether for their ineptitude or the grandiose plans they had drawn up; the 
suggestion that the supposed terrorist groups did not really exist, or contained one 
solitary member; and concern about the actions of the police in investigating and 
apprehending the suspects. Thankfully, however, despite general incompetence 																																																								
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combined with the use of explosives, the handful of attacks that had been successful 
carried out led to no loss of life. In total, between 1950 and 1980, 18 men received 
154 years in prison for their roles in financing, planning or carrying out acts of 
political violence in the name of Scottish nationalism.  
 
The Emergence of the SNLA 
 
The most serious violent nationalist group to emerge was the Scottish National 
Liberation Army, whose leader had been a member of the Scottish Republican 
Socialist League.643 The genesis of the group, they claim, was the result of the failed 
devolution referendum in 1979, “the final signal that there was no constitutional way 
forward”.644 According to a timeline in Leslie’s profile of the SNLA, the group came 
into existence in December 1980,645 although the group didn’t carry out their first 
official attack until March 1982.646 Thankfully neither this attack, nor any of their 
subsequent acts, led to any deaths. The group’s first attack was a letter bomb sent to 
the Defence Secretary, John Nott - allegedly in response for the announcement of the 
Trident missile programme.647 The group claim that this initial attack was intended to 
“kill or main” the target, but when they learned that the package had been opened by 
an office secretary (who was unharmed) they switched to less dangerous devices.648 
This apparent moral volte-face is early evidence of the inconsistency of the group with 
regard to human life.  
 
They followed up these initial attacks with letter bombs to the offices of the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) in Glasgow, the Queen at Buckingham Palace, the industry 
secretary Patrick Jenkin, and the headquarters of the Conservative Party in London 
and Edinburgh, and claimed to have placed an incendiary device in the Scottish 
Assembly building.649 This pattern continued throughout 1983 with attacks targeting 																																																								
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the visit of Princess Diana to Glasgow, the Prime Minister, Coulport nuclear base, 
Conservative ministers, and the party chairman.650  Leslie writes that the group 
planned to place a bomb at the venue of a talk given by Margaret Thatcher, then 
Prime Minister, but this plan had to be aborted.651 In December 1983, a bomb 
exploded at The Royal Artillery Guardhouse at Woolwich Barracks in London, 
injuring three soldiers. Shortly after it went off, the SNLA claimed credit for the 
attack652 - Scott and MacLeay suggest that the IRA had prepared the device for the 
SNLA and had decided to “let the SNLA claim the ‘credit’”, but were disappointed by 
the behaviour of the SNLA in the aftermath of the attack.653 However, the IRA 
claimed credit for the attack a short time later, calling Scott and MacLeay’s claim into 
question.654   
 
In January 1984 one of the group’s members, Thomas Kelly, was jailed for ten years 
after pleading guilty to making and sending letter bombs.655 The arrest and conviction 
of Kelly was largely thanks to the actions of an associate who offered to report on the 
SNLA and other extremist nationalist groups because he was afraid of the violent 
tendencies creeping into the nationalist movement.656 Once again, the defence tried to 
claim that Special Branch had planted the individual, but in this case the accusation 
carried far less weight than in previous ones.657 By this point, the group’s two key 
figures (and possibly its only members658), Adam Busy and David Dinsmore, had 
absconded to the Republic of Ireland, with Dinsmore facing charges for his role in the 
letter-bomb campaign, and Busby for daubing “Brits out” and “Free Scotland” on a 
Naval lorry.659 In October 1984, Busby was able to avoid extradition back to the 
United Kingdom after a court in Dublin accepted that his actions were “political”,660 
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but Dinsmore absconded again, first to Spain and then to Brazil.661 Busby, who had 
served in the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and was a member of the SNP at a 
young age, before later joining the Scottish Republican Socialist Party, 662 has been 
the key figure in the SNLA since the group’s inception. Throughout the thirty years of 
operations, Busby has been at the centre of the group’s activity - leading Paul 
Wilkinson to suggest that he was possibly the group’s only member by 2002.663 
 
Despite the gaoling of one member and the flight of two key figures, the SNLA 
continued operations, once again targeting a political figure, Roy Jenkins, one of the 
founders of the SDP. Leslie tells the story of the attempted murder of Jenkins, in 
which petrol was poured through the letterbox of his tenement flat and set alight - 
fortunately no one was hurt, and it transpired that the attacker had targeted the wrong 
flat.664 Once again, this style of attack represented an escalation from previous 
attacks: a direct attempt to murder, rather than a letter bomb, though the fact that the 
group’s leaders were awaiting their extradition hearing in Dublin at the time might 
explain why the group deviated from their previous approach. The letter-bomb 
campaign was resumed in November 1984 with another package sent to the Prime 
Minister,665 before the group claimed responsibility for a fire in a disused Ministry of 
Defence building in London in April 1985,666 three letter bombs to the Scottish 
Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind; British Steel and British Airways in April 1986,667 and 
another to Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd,668 in July 1986.669 
 
Between 1982 and 1986, the SNLA were responsible for at least thirty attacks: 
primarily letter bombs against a range of targets, albeit targets usually associated with 
the British state: the monarchy, key figures in Westminster and the military - which 
represented a deviation from the attack pattern of the Tartan Army, who targeted oil 
and energy infrastructure. After this, the group lay dormant until 1989, when they re-																																																								
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emerged to claim a bomb attack on a quarry near Oban that was to be used for nuclear 
waste, 670  although police have firmly rejected this, and said that the fire was 
accidental.671 This period represents the first stage of the SNLA’s campaign, and 
when action resumed in the 1990s, it has been claimed that Adam Busby was 
directing the group’s activities from Dublin.672   
 
In December 1991, the Sunday Mail reported that the group had planted a bomb in the 
grounds of Holyrood Palace (later denied by police673), only for the mission to be 
aborted when the perpetrators were spotted.674 In December 1993, a member of the 
SNLA appeared at the High Court in Aberdeen, charged with a series of letter bomb 
attacks, as well as sending hoax devices.675 It was a source of much amusement that 
the hoax bombs were made from marzipan,676 but they were sufficiently convincing to 
bring Edinburgh “to a standstill”.677 In court it was claimed that he had admitted to 
being a “cell commander” and a “volunteer soldier” of the SNLA, and had targeted oil 
company offices in Aberdeen in protest against the theft of Scottish oil.678 He was 
jailed for 12 years for his actions, but not before the SNLA issued a communiqué 
“through its self-styled commander-in-exile Adam Busby” claiming that their violent 
campaign would continue.679 
 
At some time in the early 1990s, the strategy of the SNLA shifted and they began to 
focus on the disruption that could be achieved through hoax threats.680 To what extent 
this was a strategic decision, and how far it reflected an inability to produce real 
devices is unclear. To this end, a group called “Flame” emerged in early 1994 and 
made a series of hoax threats and menacing phone calls,681 and the SNLA continued 
to make threats - under their own name - against the Scottish Secretary, Ian Lang,682 
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and his Labour Shadow George Robertson;683 “prominent Highland figures”,684 and 
shopping centres in Birmingham.685 In May 1995, the Press Association (the usual 
recipient of their communiqués) received a parcel containing a small bomb - with a 
Belfast postmark, demonstrating that the SNLA had found a way to circumvent 
airport security, and threatened to use this style of device against British aircraft 
unless measures were taken to “curtail English immigration”.686  
 
After this wave of hoax attacks and threats, a number of SNLA personnel were 
arrested and faced trial for these incidents. In August 1995, two men were jailed for 
their role in this campaign,687 having claimed to a journalist that the SNLA “wanted 
Scotland to be free, to be a nation on its own, without the shackles of England and 
without the English being here, having our jobs”.688 During the trial, one of the 
defendants had claimed that Adam Busby directed their actions from Dublin,689 
indicating that Busby was still closely involved in the actions of the group. Busby 
himself was jailed for two years in Dublin in March 1997 for sending death threats by 
fax,690 and the following year, another member of the group received a three-month 
sentence for sending threats whilst imprisoned on another charge.691 In 1999, another 
Dublin-based member of the SNLA received a two year suspended sentence for 
claiming he had left a device on the Kessock Bridge near Inverness.692 Once again it 
was alleged that a SNLA cell in Dublin was “controlled by one man”.693 
 
Throughout the 1990s, the SNLA - seemingly directed by Adam Busby – had been 
responsible for a series of hoax threats against a variety of targets, primarily 
politicians. Following his release from prison in 1999, Busby was once again 
implicated in a hoax threat, this time of a more serious nature: in July 1999 he was 
arrested again after he threatened to contaminate the water supply in England unless 
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“British troops were pulled out of Northern Ireland”;694 a change from the primary 
focus on Scotland, and possible evidence of the impact that time spent in Dublin had 
had on Busby. This threat, precipitated a series of more colourful hoaxes, including a 
number of suspicious packages sent to the University of St Andrews in 2001, when 
Prince William was due to start his studies and said to contain anthrax.695 This was 
followed up in 2002 with their most widely publicised attack: a number of prominent 
political figures, including the wife of Prime Minister Tony Blair, received bottles 
pertaining to be samples of aromatherapy oils, but actually containing caustic soda. 
On this occasion the attack was not a hoax, and in 2003, a 17 year-old pled guilty to 
sending these, and 44 hoax letters, on the instructions of an anonymous ‘handler’ he 
had conversed with via email.696 
 
In terms of publicity, the caustic soda hoax threat was successful in that it yielded the 
group a great deal of media attention, yet they failed to build on it and little was heard 
of the SNLA until 2007. Caustic soda was employed again, this time in miniature 
bottles of vodka, sent to an English councillor from Blackburn and the former Scottish 
Daily Express news editor, accompanied by a letter claiming: “we want to 
demonstrate our intent to kill English people at random and with no discrimination or 
compunction”, unless “the English” completely withdrew from Scotland. 697  In 
January 2008, however, two men were jailed for six years each for their role in this 
latest attack, and during the trial, the court was told that one of the defendants acted 
under instructions “from a man who claims to lead the SNLA”698 - a reference, one 
can assume, to Adam Busby. In June 2009, Busby’s son Adam Busby Junior was 
jailed for six years for making hoax threats against First Minister Alex Salmond699 
and other political figures - which he claimed was to draw attention to his father’s 
plight.700 At this point, Busby Senior was awaiting trial for threatening to target 
transatlantic flights in 2006, for which he was jailed for four years in 2010. At the 
time of writing, Adam Busby is currently facing terrorism charges in Scotland 																																																								
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following his extradition from the Irish Republic, for making threats to attack 
shopping centres, the Forth Road Bridge, near Edinburgh and the Erskine Bridge, near 
Glasgow, in addition to the threat to poison supplies of drinking water in England.701 
It is not clear whether the campaign of the SNLA is at an end, but with the group’s 
self-professed leader in failing health702 and facing further criminal changes, it is 
reasonable to assume that the activity of the SNLA is unlikely to reach the heights of 
the early 1980s again. In summary, their campaign lasted over thirty years and 
consisted of at least forty tangible attacks and hundreds of hoax threats, 703 with their 
attacks coming mainly in two different forms: letter bombs and hoaxes. The first stage 
of the SNLA’s campaign began in 1982, and attacks were at their most frequent 
between 1982 and 1985; it was during this period that the vast majority of the group’s 
actual attacks were carried out, and the lull in attacks after this point is likely a result 
of the flight of the group’s two principal figures to the Republic of Ireland. Although 
sporadic letter bombs continued until the early 1990s they were less frequent, and it 
would appear that sometime in the middle of that decade the group adopted a new 
strategy, intent on causing maximum disruption. Since that point the vast majority of 
the group’s activities have been hoaxes, but the genuine threat posed by some of their 
actions - most recently the caustic soda packages - means that their threats cannot be 
idly dismissed.  
 
The targets of their attacks varied to some extent, but the vast majority had a direct 
connection with the British state, with Adam Busby stating, “we believe it's necessary 
to overthrow the British state so that the people themselves can achieve state 
power.”704 The principal victims of their actions have been politicians, either in 
positions of authority, or English-born MPs of Scottish constituencies. Additionally, 
threats or attacks were carried out against the military - barracks, the Ministry of 
Defence and recruiting offices - another symbol of the British establishment, and the 
British monarchy; letter bombs were sent to Buckingham Palace, timed to coincide 
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with Royal visits, sent to protest against Prince William’s education at St Andrews, 
and the group even claimed to have broken into Holyrood Palace.  
 
A secondary, far more general target has emerged for the SNLA since the late-1990s: 
the English. Threats to poison water supplies of England, demands for a halt on 
English immigration, and a claim that English people were to be targeted at random 
indicate that elements within the group perceived the very presence of English people 
in Scotland as a further cause of Scotland’s subjugation. In his work on the 
experiences of English people in Scotland, Watson discusses anti-English migration 
groups Scottish Watch and Settler Watch, and reports that whilst some English 
migrants faced some nuisance, the vast majority of his interview subjects had not 
suffered from Anglophobic abuse.705  
 
Another noticeable pattern in the activity of the SNLA has been the imitation of other 
terrorist groups; in the early 1980s their attacks were similar to those of the IRA, and 
the SNLA have played up suggestions of collusion between the two groups although it 
is unclear whether there was any genuine connection. Additionally, in the last decade 
they have made threats against transatlantic flights, which play on the fears created by 
the attacks of September 11th, 2001. These have ensured that the group’s words 
resonate more strongly, even if they cannot deliver on the threats themselves.  
 
It would appear that the SNLA has survived for as long as it has due largely to the 
continued endeavour of Adam Busby. Following a failed extradition attempt in 1984, 
police in the United Kingdom have had their hands tied in their attempts to deal with 
Busby, although Busby himself claims that no effort was made to extradite him at 
all, 706  leading to suggestions that he was “deliberately left there, watched but 
unharmed, because his antics were damaging to the image of Scottish nationalism”.707 
However, Court testimony of SNLA members based in Scotland shows that Busby 
has been able to keep the SNLA active by convincing others to carry out attacks in the 
United Kingdom in his absence. Indeed, his status as a political refugee allowed him 
to operate relatively undisturbed until the mid-1990s. Altogether, considering Busby’s 																																																								
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drive to keep the group going, and ability to convince others to undertake illegal 
action, we can identify in him some of the traits of a ‘terrorist entrepreneur’, as 
suggested by Petter Nesser in his work on the structure of Jihadi terrorist cells.708 
When the group emerged it was in response to the handling of the 1979 devolution 
referendum, yet the successful referendum of 1997 did not seem to dissuade them 
from carrying out further attacks. The threats have continued primarily because little 
effort has been made to stop them. I believe it is likely that the group will cease to 
exist when the group’s leader is no longer able or willing to continue it.  
 
It is important, however, not to exaggerate the importance of the SNLA: whilst they 
have been by far the most active and professional violent Scottish nationalist group, 
the bar was set very low by the group’s predecessors. Despite brief flashes of 
publicity the group have struggled to maintain relevance (assuming they ever had it), 
and Freeman argues, “without the media, without propaganda coups, they simply did 
not exist other than on Special Branch intelligence files”.709 Their actions have swung 
from supposedly earnestly threatening mass murder to deliberately restricting their 
actions to hoax threats, but they have always focused on a narrow range of targets.  
 
Thankfully, during their violent campaign nobody was killed, and the greatest harm 
done was a handful of minor injuries. Before concluding this chapter, I examine the 
impact of these groups, how their actions have influenced the SNP, the similarities 
between the groups and finally the extent to which their actions have been successful 
by their standards. 
 
 
The Impact of Violent Scottish Nationalism 
 
Historically averse to non-electoral forms of politics, the SNP was always unlikely to 
support political violence in any form, keen to avoid any association between their 
brand of constitutional nationalism and violent acts that would dissuade unconvinced 
potential voters. Nationalist parties in other countries have used violent campaigns as 																																																								
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way to exert power on the state they are campaigning against, presenting themselves 
as the moderate option the state can negotiate with. The SNP have not taken this 
route; instead, they have continually rejected the actions of violent nationalists: in the 
wake of the jailing of five members of the APG in 1975, Margo MacDonald 
condemned those involved as “a loose group of disillusioned, over-emotional, 
misguided men… [with a] very warped version of how the national movement in 
Scotland was likely to progress”;710 following the trial of the Tartan Army an SNP 
spokesman “condemned… any form of non-constitutional action in the pursuit of the 
aim of Scottish independence”711 after Gordon Wilson, then party leader, had declared 
the group “Scotland’s enemies” during their campaign; 712  finally, and most 
equivocally, following the wave of caustic soda packages in 2002, John Swinney 
(then SNP leader) said “every right-thinking person will unreservedly condemn this 
pathetic attack… these people have no interest in Scotland or the welfare of the 
Scottish people… they are not nationalists; they are criminals plain and simple”.713 
 
Despite their vehement denunciations of political violence, the SNP’s opponents have 
nevertheless attempted to link them to actions of violent nationalists. In a sitting of the 
House of Lords following a pipeline bombing by the Tartan Army in 1975, Lord 
Kirkhill, then Minister of State for Scotland suggested, “the Conservative and 
Unionist Association, the Liberal Party, and the Labour Party - are in no way 
involved”714 making the SNP notable by their omission. More recently in 1995, a 
memo written by George Robertson (later Lord Robertson) was leaked to the press 
suggesting that the Labour Party could make political capital out of the “darker side of 
nationalism”,715 and indeed opposition politicians have, at times, attempted to present 
the violent nationalist groups and the SNP as two branches of the same tree. In recent 
years, the actions of ‘cybernats’,716 which have included anonymous abuse and violent 
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threats to opposition politicians and activists, as well as journalists, have allowed the 
SNP’s opponents to renew these claims.717  
 
Interestingly, the SNLA themselves believe that their actions actually benefited the 
SNP; in the journal of the Scottish Separatist Group, who have ties with the SNLA, it 
is suggested that the “spectacular publicity” the group are able to elicit highlights 
Scotland’s plight.718 However, their denunciation of the SNP in the same journal leads 
one to suspect that this was not intentional. It certainly has been the case that 
members of the SNP have also been active participants in violent nationalist groups; 
Adam Busby was a member during his youth, and the SNP launched an internal 
inquiry in the wake of the Tartan Army trial amidst party fears about the increase in 
violent nationalism.719 This is no real surprise - it is natural for a Scottish nationalist 
to be a member of the SNP - but the overlap between the two cannot be taken to 
demonstrate any sort of established connection. Throughout their history, the SNP 
have remained as far removed from violence as possible, and have repeatedly 
vocalised their rejection of political violence.  
 
In this chapter, I covered the actions of five violent nationalist terrorist groups: the 
Scottish Republican Army in the early 1950s; the APG in the early 1970s; the Tartan 
Army (also Border Clan; 100 Organisation) in the early 1970s; the Scottish 
Republican Socialist League in the late 1970s; and the SNLA from the early 1980s to 
the present.  
 
There are a number of similarities between the groups in terms of target selection, 
choice of weaponry and the methods of financing their operations, but one particular 
parallel that emerged during the course of this research is particularly noteworthy: the 
military background of many of those involved. Some of the foremost figures from 
violent nationalist groups had served in the British military before they turned their 
acquired talents against the state; at least one of the four defendants in the SRA case 
in 1953 was an army reservist; of the six men found guilty in the APG trial in 1975, 
three had military experience; two men convicted of SNLA offences in the 1990s had 																																																								
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also served in the army;720and finally and most significantly Adam Busby had 
experience in the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. Furthermore, considering that 
the majority of violent nationalists group operated in the 1970s is it likely that some of 
those involved had undertaken national service. Though it is difficult to prove, it is 
possible that these individuals held the belief that political change would only be 
delivered as a result of military struggle, and thus viewed the SNP as inadequate.  
 
Of further interest is the manner in which a number of the groups employed military 
terminology: of the five groups I referred to, the name of four include the word 
‘army’; the APG employed military ranks to refer to one another and spent a great 
deal of time discussing “saluting, the provision of honour guards and exhaustive 
systems of military discipline”;721 the SNLA have also adopted military ranks: the 
trial of Andrew McIntosh heard that he referred to himself as a “volunteer soldier” 
and “cell commander”722 and in a subsequent communiqué from Adam Busby he 
referred to himself as the “commander-in-exile”.723 
 
The adoption of military structure and terminology is relatively common for terrorist 
groups seeking to present themselves as a legitimate authority, as they attempt to ape 
the state they are fighting against. However none of the groups studied could 
genuinely present itself in such a manner, so the adoption of army ranks and protocol 
was purely an aesthetic decision, likely made to engender a sense of camaraderie 
among group members. The adoption of military terminology by many of the groups 
covered does lead to accusations that those involved were taking part in a “military 
fantasy”,724 but I believe there is an interesting correlation between the emergence of 
violent nationalist groups and the military history of those involved. 
 
Another interesting pattern to emerge during the course of this research has been the 
role of the police in deterring, pursuing and arresting those involved in violent 
nationalism; in the case of SRA in the 1950s, the APG in 1971 and 1975 and the 
SRSL in 1980, the police were either aware of the groups’ plans, or received 																																																								
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information about the group’s plans from an internal source. Only in the early 1980s 
were a violent Scottish nationalist group able to mount a sustained campaign against 
the state, and even that was cut short by the intervention of the police in 1983. Since 
1984, their ability to deal with the SNLA has been mostly hampered by the protection 
afforded to Adam Busby by the Republic of Ireland. 
 
As a result, the police were able to ensure that most of the groups operating at this 
time were unable to get off the ground, but persuading group members to give 
evidence against their colleagues led to accusations that the police had placed agents 
provocateurs in these groups.725 In the trials of the APG in 1975 and the Tartan Army 
in 1976 there were also concerns about the role the police had played, and the extent 
to which they had tried to entrap defendants, although it could be argued that these 
were simply gambits made by defence lawyers. In both trials, a number of the charges 
were dropped due to insufficient evidence, and three of the five defendants in the 
Tartan Army trial were found not guilty. The police in Scotland have clearly played 
an important role in preventing the outbreak of violent nationalism, but there are 
questions to be asked about their infiltration of nationalist groups in Scotland during 
the 1970s. 
 
Have the actions of violent Scottish nationalist groups reaped any reward? Violence 
has had no directly observable impact in the successes of the nationalist agenda in the 
last 50 years, but assessing the direct impact of terrorism is often difficult, unless it 
reaps instant policy changes.726 However, in the case of Scottish nationalism, there 
have been no political developments that correspond with a campaign of political 
violence.727 A secondary demand of actors who employ political violence is publicity 
for their chosen cause, but there can be no question that Scottish nationalism did not 
need publicity at the time these groups were operating; the Scottish nationalist agenda 
was already front-page news. On the contrary, it is plausible that the actions of violent 
nationalist groups were more likely detrimental to nationalist progress; operating at 
the height of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, any association of Scottish nationalism 																																																								
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with the type of political violence displayed by the IRA was only likely to deter non-
nationalists from the cause.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Scottish nationalism developed as a force when the effects of union began to lose their 
utility to Scots in the second half of the twentieth century. At this point, Scotland’s 
distinct identity and specific needs became politicised. Since their emergence as a 
serious political contender in 1967, the SNP have shaped Scottish politics, often 
indirectly, into the distinct political sphere that they dominate today, and while this 
would not have been achieved without the change in outlook of the Labour Party, the 
SNP can take the credit for bringing Scottish nationalism into the mainstream. 
Nationalists would argue that the majority SNP government at Holyrood, the party’s 
success in the 2015 General Election, and the resonance the Yes campaign had during 
the independence referendum campaign validates their claim that the SNP is now the 
central force of Scottish politics, and the level of support for independence now 
means it plausible that it will happen in the not-too-distant future.  
 
The successes of primarily non-violent Scottish nationalism are in direct contrast with 
nationalists around the world who have taken up arms and achieved far less. This is 
not to say that Scotland should be a model for other regions - unique societal and 
political conditions in Scotland have made this possible. The success of the No 
campaign, however, demonstrates that the British identity that served many Scots so 
well still has resonance among the Scottish people. There can be no doubt that while 
Scots are less likely to self-identify as British,728 Britishness and support for the union 
remain powerful political forces in Scotland. As I will go onto discuss, I believe that 
the strength of this British identity, as well as the viability of the political process in 
Scotland have been central to the inconsequential role political violence has played to 
Scottish nationalism.  
 
When violent nationalist groups did emerge they failed to win any popular support 
and brought condemnation from all sides of the political spectrum. Some of the 																																																								
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groups displayed comic ineptitude in their actions, and others who have been able to 
maintain low-level campaigns have, for the most part, caused little more than 
disruption, nuisance, and a handful of minor injuries. We can be thankful that there 
has been no loss of life throughout this campaign, but that is not through lack of trying 
in some cases. Of all the groups to emerge, the SNLA demonstrated the greatest 
resilience, but the group’s longevity should not be mistaken for aptitude.  
 
The last two years in Scotland has demonstrated that non-violent electoral politics can 
deliver the kind of political progress that ethno-nationalist terrorist groups in other 
countries could not hope to achieve. Now, more than ever, with a broad nationalist 
political movement in Scotland, there is simply no space that a violent group could 
occupy.  
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4. The Bulldog that Didn’t Bark - England and Nationalism 
 
I am a great admirer of the Scots. I am quite friendly with the Welsh. I 
must confess to some sentiment about Old Ireland. But there is a 
forgotten, nay, almost a forbidden word, which means more to me 
than any other. That word is ‘England’…. Today we are scarcely 
allowed to mention the name of our country. Winston Churchill729  
 
 
In previous chapters, I considered how Scottish and Welsh nationalism arose out of 
the distinct national identities that had been retained despite union with England, and 
the extent to which these identities and subsequent national movements were shaped 
by contact with Britain and a shared British identity. This chapter focuses on English 
national identity and English nationalism, and the extent to which the English have 
been able to maintain a distinct sense of themselves in the face of the pervasive 
development of Britain and Britishness. England’s political and numerical domination 
of Britain has led to assumptions that the two terms are virtually synonymous. As we 
see below from two recent cultural examples, the overlap of the two terms has made it 
difficult to distinguish between the two: 
 
Britain. We may be a small country, but we're a great one, too. The 
country of Shakespeare, Churchill, the Beatles, Sean Connery, Harry 
Potter. David Beckham's right foot. David Beckham's left foot, come 
to that.730 
 
This passionate defence of Britain comes from arguably the most popular Prime 
Minister in recent times, as portrayed by Hugh Grant in the romantic comedy Love 
Actually. One can find clear evidence of the confusion between Britain and England 
in this list: William Shakespeare is England’s national poet; the Beatles are associated 
with Liverpool; Winston Churchill may have been the Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom, but it could be argued that he is more associated with Englishness than any 																																																								
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other twentieth century figure; and David Beckham was the captain of the English 
national football team. No more need be said.   
 
Perhaps the only fully un-English inclusion on that list is Sean Connery, a Scottish 
actor who portrayed another British cultural icon: Ian Fleming’s James Bond. In the 
most recent (at time of writing) film starring the iconic British secret agent, Skyfall, 
the protagonist engages in a game of word association, during which Bond is asked to 
respond immediately to a series of single-word prompts. When prompted with the 
challenge “country?” Bond declares proudly “England”.731 This answer is problematic 
because James Bond is not canonically English;732 he is the son of a Scottish father 
and a Swiss mother, travelled extensively as a child, and spent only a brief spell of his 
childhood in England. Moreover, he works for the British state and (due to the nature 
of his work) rarely lives in England.  
 
I have included these two references to popular culture to emphasise the extent to 
which the confusion of the two terms has become part of everyday life. Much of the 
misunderstanding derives from the fact that England is the largest nation in the United 
Kingdom, with 84% of its population, and 53% of its land mass, but also because 
many English people have, until recently, treated the concepts as interchangeable. As 
I discuss, the use of one term as equivalent to the other has been described as a bad 
habit, but one that tells us a great deal about the confusion surrounding English 
national identity. This chapter is shorter than the previous two, largely because there 
has been no political English nationalism733 and resultantly there is very little to write 
about with regards to the emergence of a violent component of such. Instead of this, I 
examine the development of English national identity and consider some of the 
arguments about why English nationalism has yet to emerge, but why it may be about 
to do so. Additionally, I cover separatist movements in English regions, looking 																																																								
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specifically at the case of Cornwall. I start by examining the history of the territorial 
unit that is England, examine the point at which English national consciousness 
emerged, consider the importance of neighbouring groups to English national identity, 
and conclude by examining the relationship between English and British identities.  
 
 
England and National Identity 	
The early history of England is a series of invasions, followed by a long period of 
relative stability; the Roman, Vikings, Anglo-Saxons and Normans all crossed the sea 
at various points in history to claim modern-day England. The unification of England 
occurred around the tenth734 or eleventh century,735  although the English monk 
Bede736 wrote of the English as a unified people as early as the eighth century,737 prior 
to which, the territory had been split between a patchwork of kingdoms.738 Norman 
Davies argues that unified England was the “resultant fusion of the Danish and of the 
Wessex-led Anglo-Saxon elements”, and stresses that the Viking invasions were as 
vital for the creation of England as the Anglo-Saxon invasions. 739 Colin Kidd 
examines the modern-day national myth that has developed around the creation of 
England and highlights the popular tendency to focus on the Anglo-Saxon heritage, 
despite the importance of the ancient Britons to the Church of England.740 The 
invasion of William the Conqueror in 1066 “put the seal on the unification of 
England” and by the end of the eleventh century the English state was “one of the 
most, if not the most, integrated and centralized states in Europe”.741  
 
Following unification, it becomes a little more difficult to separate English from 
British history. By the 13th century England had conquered Wales and had nominal 
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control of Ireland, which was formally added to the fold in the mid-16th century,742 
and in 1606 England entered into a regal union with the Scots, with full political 
union following in 1707. Even the story of the ‘English’ Civil War cannot be told 
without drawing attention to the important roles played by both Scotland and Ireland 
in the conflict, and these factors combine to make it difficult to mark clearly where 
English history ends and British history begins.  
 
Although we can situate the emergence of England as a distinct territorial unit in the 
11th century at the latest, this did not necessarily equate to the emergence of an 
English national identity at the same time. In his work on English national 
consciousness, Krishnan Kumar examines various claims from the literature that 
evidence of English national consciousness has been found as early as the eighth 
century, and in almost every century that followed.743 He argues that, despite the 
emergence of an English state in the 11th century, there is no clear evidence of an 
English nation at the same point, especially when one takes into account the continued 
use of French as the court language in the centuries that followed the Norman 
invasion.744 
 
Kumar himself situates the emergence of an English identity in the 14th or 15th 
centuries, and argues that contact with England’s nearest neighbours was crucial in 
the development of a separate unified identity. 745  Liah Greenfeld, meanwhile, 
contends that the emergence of England, as a nation rather than just a territorial 
expression, took place in the early 16th century.746 Her thesis situates the emergence of 
an English national consciousness parallel to the English Reformation, and asserts that 
the concepts of rationality and individualism advocated by Protestantism were deeply 
embedded in the construction of English nationality.747 Furthermore she posits that the 
translation of the Old Testament into English provided the “language in which… the 
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novel consciousness of nationality” could be expressed, and helped inspire literacy 
and the spread of English literature.748 
 
In the chapters on Scotland and Wales, I examined the importance of interaction with 
the ‘other’ to identity formation, and argued that, for the pre-modern Welsh and Scots, 
their primary ‘other’ was the English. However, it is less clear who or what England’s 
‘other’ was during the same period. Floriane Reviron-Piégay suggests that the primary 
candidates are “the Continent, Catholicism, the Celtic fringe, Empire, [and] the 
colonies”.749 The ‘Celtic Fringe’ of Wales, Scotland and Ireland are certainly the 
closest geographically, and English national identity has undoubtedly been shaped by 
centuries of close contact with the British nations. However, I don’t believe any of 
these could be considered England’s primary adversary at any point, as they were far 
smaller and key sections of their ruling elites were either English or heavily 
anglicised. However, one could argue that the Catholic Irish represented a potential 
‘fifth column’ that continental Catholic powers – specifically France and Spain - 
could attempt to draw upon during a potential invasion of England, and this fear has 
been cited as one of the reasons behind the 1801 Act of Union.750 
 
France and the other continental powers represented more serious opponents, and 
performed the role of primary strategic rivals in the centuries following English 
unification. Reviron-Piégay opines that “the Continent is the main entity against 
which Englishness developed and still does”, 751 a point of view supported by 
Kenny752 and Kumar.753 In a similar vein, Linda Colley argues that, following the 
Reformation, Catholicism acted as the primary ‘other’ for England, helping to solidify 
the relationship between the Protestant English, Welsh and Scots, and uniting them as 
“Britons”, 754 against both the French and Irish. 
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Krishnan Kumar proposes that if English nationalism has existed, it has been in the 
form of what he terms, “missionary” or “imperial” nationalism,755 suggesting that 
English identity was bound up in their civilising mission to “educate and elevate the 
human race”,756 and argues that “empire offered an identity that lifted them above 
‘mere’ nationalist self-glorification”757. For Kumar, the English were the Staatsvolk of 
the British Empire who were “careful not to stress their ethnic identity; rather they… 
stress[ed] the political, cultural or religious mission to which they have been 
called.”758 Whilst Scottish and Welsh national identities were formed in relation to 
one primary ‘other’, English identity formed in reference to a variety of ‘others’.  
 
Kumar’s hypothesis - namely that the English identity was an inclusive national 
identity - would help to explain the success of the British Empire, which was 
predicated on creating an identity that allowed those involved to take ownership of a 
joint endeavour. The emergence of a British national identity was a state-led 
endeavour that constrained national identities in favour of the shared ‘British’, even 
going so far as to refer to Scotland and England as ‘North Britain’ and ‘South Britain’ 
respectively.759 In her influential study on the ‘creation’ of Britain, Colley argues that 
British identity was “superimposed over an array of internal differences in response to 
contact with the Other, and above all in response to conflict with the Other”.760 This 
bond was strengthened through shared institutions, such as the monarchy and the 
army,761 and in service to the British Empire. Yet, despite official efforts to promote a 
shared British identity, the national minorities in the United Kingdom were also 
allowed to retain their individuality and encouraged to adopt a dual identity. Colley 
argues that Britishness was not just the imposition of English culture on the Celtic 
periphery, and that British identity developed in such a way as to be compatible with 
other identities.762  
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Previously I discussed the institutions, both political and cultural, that acted as 
incubators of national identity in the face of the pervasive spread of Britishness in 
Scotland and Wales. It is however, less clear to what extent the English were able to 
retain a distinct identity during this time. Some would argue that an English national 
identity was suppressed as energies were poured into the creation of a homogeneous 
British identity for purposes of unity and stability.763 Kumar suggests that the English 
were conscious about labelling their achievements as such, as they feared that “by 
stressing English superiority, and reminding the other British peoples of their more 
dependent role, it would have threatened the unity and integrity of the very structures 
that the English had so painfully constructed”.764 As a result, English identity had to 
“find objects other than the English nation on which to fasten”,765 and the British state 
refrained from celebrating events associated with England, such as St George’s Day, 
instead opting to promote key British institutions and fly the British flag. For the 
English, the banal nationalism766 they were exposed to was the iconography of union. 
 
Tellingly, as Aughey points out, it was poor form not to treat the Scots, Irish and 
Welsh as distinct nationalities, but it was bad manners to treat the English as a race 
apart,767 and yet this delicate balancing act is not always well received by the national 
minorities in the United Kingdom; indeed these endeavours are often viewed as 
patronising and even subconsciously antagonistic. The English did not expect that the 
peoples of the other nations would renounce their own identities and assimilate into an 
English or British identity,768 yet it seems that despite providing a level of cultural 
autonomy for the national minorities to define themselves distinctively, there was 
little consideration for how they should define themselves outside of the context of 
Britishness.  
 
An alternative narrative tells us that Britishness and Englishness were two sides of the 
same coin to many English people. The literature on English national identity 
highlights the frequency with which the terms are misapplied,769 and Kenny argues 																																																								
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that this has led to confusion about where Britishness ends and Englishness begins;770 
something that Colley suggests is due to the lack of official definitional clarity about 
the two terms.771 Bernard Crick suggests that this problem arose because the English 
“infused ‘everything that is English into the common property of Britishness’”;772 and 
thus the distinction between Englishness and Britishness became blurred,773 making it 
more difficult for the English than other Britons to retain what made them 
distinctive.774 One potential reason that the English were unable distinguish between 
their own identity and a British identity was that England and Britain were governed 
almost identically up until devolution in 1997, and as a result England’s political 
institutions were also Britain’s political institutions.775 Scots had the Kirk, the Welsh 
had their language, but there was no institutional bearer of English identity.   
 
For some, Englishness and Britishness represented the same thing and there was no 
need to celebrate or sustain a separate Englishness, or even think about what either 
entailed. As the staatsvolk of Britain, they took the lead in shaping this identity, and 
thus were not alienated by its content. For those in the Celtic Fringe, Britishness 
(however close to Englishness it may have been) presented almost no barriers to 
entry776 and offered opportunities that Welshness or Scottishness alone could not at 
that time. But as the British Empire began to falter, both at home and abroad, 
Britishness, even Britain itself, began to lose its appeal, and those in the Celtic Fringe 
slowly began to shift their principal allegiance from British to their national identity. 
It is only as the other nations in the United Kingdom began to organise politically 
around their national identity in an attempt to “escape from the final stages of a 
shipwreck”,777 that the English began to realise that they have paid scant attention to 
theirs.  
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The promotion of Britishness, both instead of and as a surrogate for, Englishness has 
severely restricted the growth of the latter. For the English, this was of little concern, 
and the remained content to champion Britishness, often treating the two identities as 
the same. However, after three hundred years of not dwelling on the differences 
between Englishness and Britishness, there are signs that the English have begun to 
take their identity seriously. In the next section, I will examine English nationalism, 
why no political movement has emerged to represent it, and consider to what extent 
that has changed since the 1990s.  
 
Nationalism in England 
 
The phrase “English nationalism” is something of a paradox, Kumar noting that it has 
become commonplace to query English nationalism, and to deny that such a thing 
exists.778 Nationalism, he argues, is something that others have:779 the French, the 
Germans, the Irish, eventually the Scots, but not the English. In this section, I will 
discuss the emergence (or absence) of English nationalism by considering why it did 
not develop at the same time as it was emerging as a political force in Scotland and 
Wales, and evaluate claims that it has finally emerged in the past two decades.  
 
The emergence and growth of Welsh and Scottish nationalisms have led to a 
modification of the constitutional arrangements and political system of the United 
Kingdom. As the SNP and Plaid Cymru moved rapidly from lost deposits, to by-
election victories, to parliamentary kingmakers in the mid-1970s, it is somewhat 
surprising that no English equivalent emerged to add to the nationalist threat to the 
two (and a half) party system. I believe that there are three primary reasons behind 
this. Firstly, as I have already discussed, the degree of overlap between English and 
British national identities meant for many English voters, the relevant nationalism was 
British nationalism, represented by the mainstream political parties. There are two 
further reasons that prevented the emergence of English nationalism: that England 
simply didn’t need a national movement, and that there was no single England that a 
national movement could coalesce around.  
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Nationalism does not emerge out of a vacuum; it is a reaction to a perceived threat to 
a minority national grouping from a larger group within the state, however such a 
threat did not emerge for the English, nor were they even a minority in the first place. 
Neither did they suffer oppression,780 or occupation by a foreign enemy, or face any 
attempt to extinguish their national culture.781 In the period following the English 
Civil War up until the present day, the British state has been remarkably stable. 
Unlike France, England did not suffer a popular revolution, and the British Isles have 
not been militarily occupied by a foreign power. Additionally, there has been 
noticeable absence of militarism/political violence on mainland Britain, and when 
political violence has been adopted it was rarely carried by British actors, for example 
whilst the suffragette movement did make use of political violence and sabotage 
tactics alongside their political and civil resistance campaigns,782 and communist 
agitation was notable by its absence.783 Andrew Thorpe argues that British success in 
the First World War, geographic dislocation from Europe and the (relatively) strong 
economy were all factors behind this,784 and additionally, is convinced that there is a 
“decency” about the British public that makes them unreceptive to political 
violence.785 Regardless, the stability of the British state has ensured that the official 
bearers of British national identity have remained in place without significant upset, 
ensuring there has been little consideration of what a British identity stood for.  
 
A common complaint among Welsh and Scottish nationalists was that their interests 
were not adequately represented at a Westminster-based Parliament that was 
mismanaging the governance of their respective countries. Yet the English did not 
perceive England as a political unit in the same way, nor could they claim to be 
underrepresented at Westminster, so similar concerns could not have arisen. Put 
simply, the conditions for nationalism have not emerged in England; English voters 
had no need for a nationalist alternative as they were not threatened, and saw no 																																																								
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potential utility in the devolution of governance to a sub-national level. As Kumar 
points out, the emergence of an English nationalism would have been somewhat 
extraordinary when you consider there was no threat to English identity.786 
 
The final factor precluding the emergence of a single unified English national 
movement is that there was no single unified England. The level of divergence 
between competing visions of England by the time nationalism was emerging as a 
political force in Scotland and Wales meant that it was unlikely they could be 
reconciled into a single political entity, with a cleavage not of language or religion, 
but of class. One vision of England was based heavily on the romantic imagery of the 
countryside, and the rural lifestyle associated with country living; Kenny argues that 
for some, the “spirit of England lies in the countryside”,787 and Colls suggests that 
England has often been depicted as a garden, even if just a small plot of grass on an 
allotment.788 The countryside represented a defence against the relentless onslaught of 
modernisation, industrialisation and urban dwelling,789 an idyllic refuge from the 
stresses of modern life, albeit one that has been heavily strained in the last century. 
Bound up with this identity were a number of institutions associated with rural 
England: the Church of England, the foxhunt, and the Conservative Party.  
 
This portrayal of England chimed with the upper class, as well as those who aspired to 
join them, but this form of Englishness has not been readily accessible to those who 
live outside what would be called ‘Middle England’; namely the residents of ‘the 
North’ and those of London. The rapid expansion of London in size, importance, and 
the insularity of the quasi-city-state have led to the creation of a distinct London 
identity “imaginatively disconnected from the rest of England”.790 London has come 
to represent the antithesis of the Middle England ideal - it is progressive, secular, 
diverse and urban.  
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As for the North,791 Colley argues that disparity between the North and South of 
England has existed for centuries, and attributes the neglect of the North to 
“metropolitan mental distancing”.792 Aughey even goes as far as to propose that parts 
of the North have come to fulfil the role of England’s “internal other”.793 In Dave 
Russell’s thorough examination of the North in British popular consciousness he 
argues “the North of England has ultimately held a marginal and often problematic 
place within the national culture”,794 but that “only the North with its large ensemble 
of supposed characteristics and associations, has been imagined on a grand and 
complex enough scale to generate something close to an alternative or, probably more 
accurately, a complementary Englishness”.795 
 
Traditionally, this region has been heavily associated with industry and 
manufacturing, as well as the institutions that accompany these sectors; the trade 
unions and the Labour Party.796 With the dismantling of much of Britain’s heavy 
industry, and the decreasing political power of the labour movement, the perception of 
the North of England has shifted away from the traditional working-class image 
towards what Kenny describes as ‘chav’ culture - “a pejorative embodiment of the 
venality, vulgarity and criminality associated with the poorest strata of the working 
classes”.797 Increasingly this vision is correlated with the politics of immigration. 
Following the Second World War, due to a shortage of labour, the British government 
adopted an ‘open-door’ policy on immigration, and since that point, authors like Tom 
Nairn have suggested a link between the issue of immigration and political 
Englishness.798  In 1968, Conservative MP Enoch Powell delivered a, now infamous, 
speech in which he claimed that mass immigration was “like watching a nation busily 
engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre”.799 																																																								
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Powell was not alone in vocalising these opinions: the previous year, in February 
1967, the National Front had been established through the union of a number of 
smaller right-wing parties. 800  This group proclaimed a strongly anti-immigrant 
message that matched the mood of a certain element of the population in England, and 
the tension that built up between the ‘natives’ and the migrant community often 
erupted in riots, especially in working class areas in the 1970s and 1980s. Race riots 
in Oldham and Bradford in the mid-1990s fuelled fears that parts of the North were 
becoming increasingly associated with right-wing anti-immigrant politics.  
 
Thus three competing incompatible versions of English exist, and Kenny argues that 
notions of Englishness that were until recently defined in relation to traditional 
‘Middle England’ have increasingly shifted towards the working-class English 
identity associated with the North.801 Overall, English nationalism has not emerged 
because there has been no need for it, nor is there a conceptual English national and 
political identity around which it could mobilise popular support. The continued 
salience of a British identity, which prioritises defence of the Union, is a further 
inhibiting factor. The majority position of the English within the British state has 
negated the need for sub-national governance, and the perceived lack of a threat to 
national identity or culture mean that the conditions for nationalism simply do not 
exist in England.  
 
 
The Arrival of Englishness as a Political Force 
 
There is widespread agreement in the literature on English national identity that 
something changed in the 1990s.802 It was as if English national consciousness 
suddenly awoke from a long, deep slumber, disturbed not by the end of winter or the 
immediate threat of danger but by the Three Lions of the England national football 
team. It was football, we are told, that reminded the English that they are a nation too. 
In this section I consider the emergence of Englishness as a political identity, the 
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impact of devolution on England and the correlation between Englishness and the 
simultaneous rise of far-right political parties in the United Kingdom.  
 
Association football is one of the few institutions in the United Kingdom organised 
along national lines. As a result, Wembley Stadium was one of the only crucibles in 
which the national identity celebrated was English, not British; after all it was 
England that won the 1966 World Cup, not the United Kingdom, and as the European 
Championships were held in England in the summer of 1996, there were claims that 
football was ‘coming home’. Many commentators on English identity situate the 
emergence of a new English consciousness around the tournament: Clive Aslet 
describes it as “exceptional as a moment when almost all the nation… were doing the 
same thing at once: following the match”, 803  recalling the kind of imagined 
community that Benedict Anderson proposed.804 Kenny reports that “flags festooned 
with the Cross of St George became ubiquitous, and the Union Jack, the traditional 
symbol of national pride, all but disappeared from view”.805 This explosion of passion 
was undoubtedly helped by the (relative) success of the English team, as well as the 
fact that England faced off victoriously against the ‘Auld Enemy’, Scotland. For 
many, this moment sparked the arrival of Englishness as a collective identity that was 
socially acceptable.  
 
The sudden adoption of St George’s Cross was seized upon by the tabloid press and 
retailers who quickly jumped on the bandwagon and began to celebrate this new 
Englishness.806 The flag emerged as a symbol of national pride807 and the associated 
iconography took a prominent role, with the celebration of St George’s Day 
increasing in popularity. A further example of the changing mood of the English 
public was the unprecedented and unexpected outpouring of grief in the wake of the 
death of Diana, the Princess of Wales. Aughey notes that, for some commentators, it 
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was the death of Diana and the public’s rapid canonisation of the ‘people’s Princess’, 
that sparked a shift in national consciousness, rather than the football.808  
 
The political backdrop against which this ‘new Englishness’ had emerged was the 
final death throes of Conservative rule, and the ascension in their place of Tony Blair 
and New Labour. Central to their political platform was devolution to Scotland and 
Wales, and some have argued that it was, in fact, devolution that created Englishness 
as a political identity;809 commentators often touch on two key idiosyncrasies of 
devolution - the West Lothian Question810 and the Barnett Formula811 - as evidence 
that the English received a raw deal from the home rule settlement. The passage of 
controversial legislation on the casting vote of Scottish MPs led to increased anger 
about the constitutional arrangements, as did the prominence of many Scottish MPs in 
the cabinets of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, who himself was the subject of ire as 
he sat in a Scottish seat.812 Arthur Aughey has suggested that the West Lothian 
Question is now the “England in Britain question”, and argues that the future stability 
of the United Kingdom depends greatly on the way the issue is resolved.813 Polls have 
shown that English voters are increasingly dissatisfied by the constitutional 
arrangements and the apparent institutional bias demonstrated towards Scotland and 
Wales.814 
 
One potential solution to the West Lothian Question is a policy often described as 
‘English votes for English laws’ – excluding all non-English MPs from voting on 
matters that are devolved to the devolved assemblies. Polls show that there is a 
popular support for such a measure,815 although a number of concerns have been 
raised about the concept. Harding et al. argue that if the policy was enacted it would 																																																								
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create a Parliament within the current Parliament and might discourage Scottish and 
Welsh MPs from attending,816 and Bogdanor points out that it could lead to the 
situation where the government of the day found itself in the minority on devolved 
matters due to their electoral strength in the devolved regions.817  
 
The rise in support for a constitutional rebalancing in favour of England is evidence 
that English voters are increasingly aware of their governance,818 and that Englishness 
has taken on a new political salience in British politics.819 Yet in the short term, it 
seems unlikely that a nationalist party will emerge to contest elections on these issues, 
and the party best placed to engage and benefit from this phenomenon is the 
Conservative Party. As Kenny shows, the by-product of Conservative electoral 
success in England is that the party is more in touch with English issues than their 
rivals,820 and Kumar argues that, out of necessity, they have increasingly sought to 
portray themselves as an ‘English Party’. 821  Considering the potential electoral 
benefits of this strategy, Hayton, English and Kenny suggest that the lure of English 
nationalism may prove too strong to a Conservative Party increasingly squeezed by 
others on the right-wing of British politics.822 It is these relatively new parties who 
represent the best-placed challengers to the Conservatives’ monopoly on the politics 
of Englishness.  
 
The emergence of English nationalism, such as it is, has in the past been associated 
with support for the far-right. In his influential and controversial study on the 
‘collapse’ of the United Kingdom, Tom Nairn declared that Enoch Powell was the 
father of an English nationalist movement he believed took “the obscene form of 
racism”,823 which had developed in response to an internal enemy: “the foreign body 
in our own streets”.824 In recent years, the supposed connection between political 																																																								
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Englishness and right-wing politics has re-emerged with the rise of anti-EU, anti-
migration groups, the most prominent of which - the British National Party, the 
English Defence League and the UK Independence Party - Kenny has examined in 
depth.825 The EDL are the only one of these groups to actually identify with England 
officially, but they are not a political party; the BNP - the ideological successors of 
the National Front - latched onto popular discontent with state-led multiculturalism 
policies, and took an aggressive anti-immigration stance that won the party both 
publicity and seats in the European Parliament in the mid-2000s, but struggled to 
expand beyond their core voters and were eventually pushed out by the rise of the 
UKIP.  
 
Unlike the BNP and the EDL, the primary concern of UKIP was not migration, but 
European integration and the perceived relentless erosion of cultural and political 
power by the expansion of the EU’s remit. Their profile has been strengthened by the 
defection of two Conservative MPs to UKIP in 2014, and the rising profile of the 
party leader, Nigel Farage, however in the 2015 General Election they received nearly 
four million votes (12.6% of the total votes cast), but only won one seat. Polls show 
that a strong correlation has emerged between an English identity and voting for 
UKIP has emerged,826 and their lack of popular support in Scotland and Wales has 
meant that, like the Conservatives, they have crafted their political message to appeal 
to an audience in England. 
 
The increased interest in issues of migration and European integration has been 
scathingly described as a “retreat into the defensive laager of whiteness”,827 and the 
“last-ditch stand of Little Englanders”. 828  Yet there can be little doubt that 
multiculturalism has not been wholly successful in England; the race riots in the 
1970s and 1980s were a precursor to similar riots in Bradford and Oldham in the 
1990s. In the wake of the latter, a report suggested that white and ethnic minority 
communities led separate lives, and claimed that there was a lack of a common civic 
identity.829 Additionally, the lack of public consultation about the transfer of power to 																																																								
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the EU has raised concerns that crucial decisions about the governance of the country 
are being taken without public consultation. Kenny proposes that the association 
between English nationalism and this stable of issues has arisen because Englishness 
has served as a suitable vehicle and language for popular mobilisation.830 These issues 
have become entangled with what Kenny describes as the “vernacular of populist 
grievance”831 on issues surrounding devolution, the result being that the arguments 
against both issues emanate from the same band of the political spectrum, and are 
often articulated by the same voices.  
 
To clarify, I do not accept the argument that the rise of a populist right-wing agenda 
represents the emergence of English nationalism simply because this political 
movement is based in and aimed towards England. Firstly, these groups have only 
gained popularity among a certain spectrum of English voters, and they have not 
restricted their campaigning to English constituencies. As Richard English points out, 
the anti-EU vote has gone, not to English nationalists, but to British nationalists. 832 
Whilst there is clear evidence that the English are increasingly political aware of their 
national identity, this is not necessarily evidence of the emergence of English 
nationalism, and without this there has been no English nationalist political violence 
to study. In the next section, I examine a region of England that has experienced the 
emergence of a national movement, and the attempts by individuals in this movement 
to adopt violent methods. 
 
Cornwall  
 
Cornwall, or Kerno in the Cornish language, is somewhat unique in the United 
Kingdom as, despite having a long, rich heritage distinct from England that stretches 
back to the Ancient Britons (like Wales, Ireland and Scotland), it is widely seen as an 
English region. Cornwall is the only part of England’s ‘Celtic Fringe’ that was ever 
wholly subsumed into England, and to some extent it is therefore not surprising that a 
national movement has emerged there.  
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The River Tamar, separating Cornwall from the rest of England, acts as a physical and 
psychological frontier,833 and meant that Cornwall remained a Celtic kingdom long 
after the Saxons had conquered the rest of England;834 even by the start of the 13th 
century remaining an “overwhelmingly Celtic society”.835 The Cornish language, 
derived from Brythonic,836 was still widely spoken in the 16th century.837 When it was 
finally ‘absorbed’ into the English fold Cornwall was made a Duchy, recognising the 
distinct character and history of the territory and marking it out from other parts of 
England. Additionally, Cornwall retained its ‘Stannary Parliament’ and was made 
exempt from central taxation, in recognition of the importance of the mining 
industry.838  
 
It was the revocation of these privileges that sparked one of the most notable periods 
in Cornish history; the popular uprisings in 1496/7 and 1548, which Stoyle argues 
were as important to the development of Cornwall as the Jacobite risings of 1715 and 
1745 were to the Scots.839 In 1496, the powers of their Parliament and the exemption 
from taxation were rescinded resulting in popular revolt.840 Led by Michael Joseph, 
who acquired the nickname An Gof (Blacksmith), 2,000 men were rallied and 
marched on London, but were defeated and the leaders executed.841 Half a century 
later Cornwall revolted again, this time against the imposition of the English language 
Prayer Book. The rebels demanded the right to continue to use Latin prayer books, 
which Davies argues was a mechanism to protect the use of the Cornish language.842 
Once again the revolt failed and with it went the “chance of bolstering the Cornish 
language with official policy”.843 The Cornish had failed where the Welsh succeeded; 
the translation of the Bible into Welsh may explain why that language did not die out 
whilst Cornish did.  
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With Cornish supplanted as the language of everyday life, its utility and coverage 
began to decline. By 1700 it was restricted to a string of coastal towns,844 and by the 
end of the 18th century the last native Cornish speaker had died.845 Despite this, the 
language has lived on in placenames and a sense of Cornish distinctiveness continues 
to exist. Key to this was the significance of tin and copper mining and the pervasive 
influence of these industries in Cornish daily life and local economy.846 Furthermore 
Methodism, widely adopted in Cornwall, led to a sense of “collectivist solidarity”,847 
and a natural affinity toward the Liberal Party.848 The importance of these two 
institutions leads to natural comparisons between Cornwall and Wales, and to a large 
degree the national movements that have emerged in both have taken a similar path.  
 
At the start of the twentieth century, following the lead set by other national 
movements, Cowethas Kelto-Kernuak (CKK - Celtic-Cornish Society) was 
established. This organisation was primarily focused on the revival of the Cornish 
language, but also sought to preserve local architecture and provide support for local 
entertainments.849 Rather than use the term ‘nationalist’, they adopted the term 
‘revivalists’,850 a move partly explained by the fact that the CKK did not advocate 
home rule for Cornwall; instead they focused on maintaining and promoting Cornish 
culture, again in parallel with the national movement in Wales. It took another fifty 
years before a Cornish movement advocating home rule emerged in 1951, and even 
then, when Mebyon Kernow (MK - Sons of Cornwall) was established, home rule was 
not initially included on the group’s agenda. In the early years of the group’s 
existence they were unable to act as an effective pressure group for the Cornish 
national movement, hamstrung by limited membership and the lack of a clear sense of 
direction.851 
 
The group’s first political success occurred in 1967 when they won a council seat for 
St Day & Lanner. This victory was to MK what Hamilton and Carmarthen were to the 																																																								
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SNP and Plaid Cymru respectively.852 However, unlike their counterparts, MK were 
unable consolidate their success and have struggled to poll more than 4% at 
Westminster elections. One of the primary factors behind their electoral plight has 
been the dominant role the Liberal Party have played in Cornish politics. As a result, 
many within MK maintained close ties with the Liberal party with dual membership 
common (despite measures taken by MK to limit this) as the Liberals were seen as a 
more viable conduit for achieving political progress on Cornish issues.853  
 
The efforts of groups such as MK have led to a resurgence in the use of Cornish as a 
spoken language - as many as 2,000 people are able to speak it today854 - and have 
raised the profile of issues affecting Cornwall. Despite the aforementioned campaign 
against the construction of housing to handle London ‘overspill’, immigration from 
other parts of the United Kingdom has been responsible for a 26% rise in the 
population,855 and the sale of Cornish property to the second- and holiday-home 
market has priced the locals out, leading to a “more vigorous rhetoric of 
‘Cornishness’”.856 Having lost its staple industries, the Cornish economy now lags far 
behind the national average857 and there have been complaints that Cornwall pays far 
more in taxes than it receives in benefits.858 Despite these issues, MK has not been 
able to make any political progress, and this has led some in the national movement to 
adopt non-constitutional tactics.  The first modern case of Cornish political violence 
was something of a false start. In 1974, a communiqué was issued by a hitherto 
unknown group called the Free Cornish Army, claiming to have conducted training 
exercises with as many as 40 members in preparation for a violent campaign,859 a 
message that received great media attention, but was revealed to be a student prank 
rather than the start of an armed insurrection.860  
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In 1980 an explosion at a courthouse in St. Austell marked the first use of force by 
Cornish nationalists. This attack was claimed by a group adopting the moniker An 
Gof, in tribute to the leader of the 1496 revolt, who warned that attacks targeting 
symbols of ‘English imperialism’ would continue, and over the course of the decade 
took credit for two acts of arson, the harassment of members of MK and others in the 
national movement, and even claimed to have placed broken glass under the sand at 
Portreath beach.861 Key figures from MK, such as chairman Richard Jenkin, viewed 
the group as a “hindrance”,862 declaring that the individuals involved were “anti-
Cornish vandals, not nationalists”.863 Following this episode the group were not heard 
from again, although their reputation and name lived on, sprayed on walls throughout 
Cornwall.864  
 
In 2007, a second generation of violent Cornish nationalists emerged, calling 
themselves the Cornish Republican Army (CRA).865 Their arrival was announced 
through threats made to celebrity chefs Rick Stein and Jamie Oliver, both of whom 
had restaurants in Cornwall,866 and were targeted because they were seen as incomers 
who had alienated locals.867 Additionally, in an interview with the group published on 
an online forum, they claimed that they firebombed an old brewery, set property 
showrooms in Truro and Penryn alight, damaged cars displaying the English flag, and 
removed flags bearing St George’s cross from campsites around Cornwall.868  
 
The justification for these attacks was that the message conveyed by moderate 
Cornish nationalists was being ignored by Westminster, and that violent action was 
the necessary next step; a justification adopted by a number of groups in this study. 
Like their predecessors,869 MK denounced the new group; the party’s leader, Dick 
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Cole, described the group as “pseudo-terrorists”870 and decried the attention given to 
“couple of misguided individuals with access to a computer and a penchant for 
graffiti” by the British press.871 Another activist from the national movement took a 
slightly different tone: condemning the threats as “outrageous”872 but suggesting that 
the underlying causes behind the outburst needed to be addressed.  
 
The CRA claimed to operate a two-man, decentralised cell structure, have contacts 
with the ‘Welsh Republican Army’ as well as members of ETA, upon whom their 
organisational structure was modelled, and be financially secure.873 In a statement 
placed on an open-access web source claiming to be from the group, the CRA 
announced that they had a member “prepared to pay the ultimate price in the battle for 
Kernow”,874 yet also said they wanted to avoid injury and limit any damage caused.875 
They tore down and destroyed English flags, then claimed they were not racist, but 
simply campaigning for parity and self-government.876 Like the Free Wales Army, it 
would be fair to suggest that the CRA were publicists rather than terrorists, yet they 
have been unable to present a consistent message.   
 
Later that year, the group announced that they were shifting operations away from 
threatening Stein and Oliver, to focus on English-owned property in Cornwall,877 yet 
no further attacks were carried out by the group. Two years later, the group (or at least 
the name) re-appeared in a series of anti-student slogans daubed on the walls of 
Falmouth during an open day for the local university.878 The message “Penryn has had 
enough of students”, signed by the group, expressed their anger at the construction of 
new property for the student rental market. The principal concern of the CRA was the 
damage done to Cornish culture and society by the sale of Cornish properties to non-																																																								
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permanent residents, and the creeping anglicisation that accompanied this. As in 
Wales, this process is viewed in highly detrimental terms by nationalists, who argue 
that it is damaging to the small, rural communities that act as a stronghold of local 
culture and language.  
 
The emergence of the CRA was met with bemusement and parody; the group were 
described as “political freaks”,879 likened to the revolutionary organisation in the Life 
of Brian,880 and were nicknamed the “Ooh-Arr-A” and “Farmer bin Ladens”.881 Yet 
the local community took the issues they highlighted very seriously and it cannot be 
denied that their actions gained the sort of attention that MK had been unable to. 
Many parallels can be drawn between the cases of Cornwall and Wales, most notably 
with regard to targeting holiday homes. These attacks sparked a highly exaggerated 
level of publicity and raised the ire of MK who viewed their actions as an unhelpful, 
even damaging, distraction. The two Cornish physical force organisations studied 
committed a handful of acts that would typically be categorised as vandalism. There is 
no evidence of widespread support for either group, or to back up the wild claims 
made by the CRA. Like the Free Wales Army, it is difficult to judge the extent to 
which An Gof and the CRA can be accurately described as terrorist groups without 
devaluing the term. 
 
The limited nature of violent Cornish nationalism reflects the limited impact of 
Cornish nationalism overall as a political force. For most of the twentieth century the 
national movement in Cornwall focused on maintaining and promoting Cornish 
language and identity, in the face of the pervasiveness of Britishness and British 
culture, and this has led to accusations from some within the national movement that 
MK and Cornish nationalism was obsessed with the past.882 As MK matured as a 
political organisation they began to highlight a number of issues that were detrimental 
to Cornwall and Cornish society, and Deacon et al. propose that there has been “some 
seepage from the cultural to the political spheres”,883 but in spite of encouraging signs 
for the group, they cannot claim to have been an effective political party beyond 																																																								
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council level. When members of the national movement have adopted more direct 
methods, it was claimed that MK’s ineffectiveness was central to their decision to 
escalate matters; the emergence of these groups represents the frustration felt by some 
within the Cornish national movement, but they too achieved little success and even 
less public support.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Few states could be said to have influenced the course of human history as much as 
England has, certainly since the War of the Roses. The position of the English 
language as the global lingua franca is testament to this, yet for much of recent 
history the successes of England were the successes of Britain. The spoils of Empire 
were shared amongst the peoples of Britain and the English were comfortable in 
allowing the national minorities to retain their own culture, language and institutions. 
When the Empire began to wane and the usefulness of Britishness as an identity 
diminished, the Scots and Welsh sought refuge in their own national identity and 
began to organise politically along national lines to petition Westminster for self-
government. Even regions within England sought to highlight their distinctiveness as 
a gradual process of anglicisation eroded their culture and way of life.  
 
In these distinct areas of the United Kingdom this process led to the emergence of 
nationalist movements, elements of which adopted violent methods to achieve 
political change. England, however, lacks a national movement and subsequently 
there has been no nationalist political violence. Accordingly there is little to be gained 
from comparing England to the other cases in this study in the next chapter. That no 
national movement, violent or otherwise, has emerged in England is the direct result, 
in my opinion, of the strength and stability of the British identity and its utility to the 
English, just as Britishness delayed the emergence of Scottish and Welsh nationalism. 
However, devolution for Scotland and Wales demonstrated to the English the benefit 
of a national movement, and has led to greater interest in the construction of English 
national identity. It is widely agreed that the 1990s saw the birth of a new form of 
Englishness, and since then voices calling for a redress of the constitutional balance in 
favour in England have become more audible. The foundations for an English national 
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movement have been laid in recent years, but there is as of yet no political vehicle to 
build on this.  
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5. Inhospitable Conditions for Political Violence 
 
In Silver Blaze, Sherlock Holmes and his companion Dr Watson are summoned to 
investigate the disappearance of a renowned racehorse and the murder of the horse’s 
trainer. Holmes is quickly able to deduce that the stolen racehorse has not been taken 
by a stranger, but the culprit must in fact have been a person known to frequent the 
stables. When he comes to explain his reasoning to the police, he draws their attention 
to “to the curious incident of the dog in the night-time”, namely that “the dog did 
nothing”.884 Drawing on the case of Holmes’ dog, MacCulloch argues,  
 
“Conan Doyle reminds us that often one of the most significant scraps of 
evidence to illuminate a particular historical question is what is not 
actually done or said… silence, then, is a vital part of what is missing in 
history, a necessary tool to help us make sense of the written and visual 
evidence that we possess”.885 
 
In comparison to national movements for whom political violence has been a key 
strategy, the national movements in Scotland, Wales and England have been notable 
by their allegorical silence: they are the dogs that didn’t bark. Having recognised the 
absence of noise, the task it now to follow Holmes’ example and deduce why.  
 
Thus far I have examined nationalism in Scotland, Wales, and England, while 
considering the emergence of the national movements in these countries, and the use 
of political violence by militant elements in these groups. Building on this, the next 
step is to examine the reasons why there has not been further political violence. As I 
said in the conclusion to my previous chapter, the case of England will not feature in 
this chapter as there has been no English national movement to become violent. 
Instead I focus on the cases of Scotland and Wales, both of which have seen vibrant, 
but slightly different, national movements emerge in the last century. To achieve this, 
I compare the case of nationalism in Ireland, which I have yet to examine in detail, 
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and consider the differences between the three cases to understand how they 
contributed to the discrepancy in the level of nationalist political violence. 
 
In this chapter, I consider the validity of a number of potential reasons why political 
violence was a marginal feature of nationalism in Scotland and Wales, but first I 
examine the historical development of the national movement in Ireland, to 
demonstrate the key factors and trajectories in the proliferation of political violence 
by nationalists there. I focus on the period between the lead-up to the Act of Union in 
1801 and Easter Rising in 1916, and also the period between partition of Ireland in 
1921 and the start of Troubles in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s, allowing me to 
draw on the lessons on Irish history and compare them directly to the cases of 
Scotland and Wales. Following on from this, I consider the validity of a number of 
potential reasons why political violence was a marginal feature of nationalism in 
Scotland and Wales. I consider the reaction of the British state, the importance of 
societal cleavages, the construction of national identity, the role of non-violent 
alternatives and the importance of a precedent for political violence.  
 
 
Nationalism in Ireland 
 
Part of Britain’s ‘Celtic Fringe’, the conquest of Ireland began in 1169, although it 
was not until 1199 that the Irish and English states were formally linked.886 Even then 
the conquerors did not wield power over the entire island, as the natives governed 
much of the territory.887 This led to the arrival of a number of English settlers, who 
seized lands and maintained English rule in Ireland. In 1541, Henry VIII designated 
Ireland a Kingdom,888 and the ideology of the Protestant Reformation that was 
underway in England was exported to Ireland in order to sever the connection 
between the Irish  - both the natives and the English settlers - and Henry’s enemy at 
the time, Rome.  The Reformation failed to take hold in Ireland, however, and with its 
failure Catholic Ireland became aligned against the Protestant British mainland and 
her representatives in Ireland.  																																																								
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In his extensive examination of the Protestant Reformation, Diarmaid MacCulloch 
remarks that its failure in Ireland - and the success of the Counter-Reformation - is 
curious; “in no other polity where a major monarchy made a long-term commitment 
to the establishment of Protestantism was there such a failure”.889 Richard English 
states that the failure of the Reformation can be attributed to four factors: “a lack of 
will, a lack of power and resources, a lack of sufficient guile, and a distinctive 
religious setting against which to work”. 890  Unlike in Scotland, where the 
Reformation was perceived to be an indigenous movement led by a Scot, the Irish 
Reformation was placed in the hands of planted allies who were seen as “alien, 
hostile, foreign and negative” by the locals, and attempts encouraged by Elizabeth I891 
to spread Protestantism in Gaelic, were “too late and too feeble”.892 This was a 
complete contrast from the Reformation movement in Wales, which operated in the 
native tongue.  
 
Since that point, Ireland has been a country divided, comprising two races and two 
religions, on one island.893 Power was concentrated in the hands of the much smaller 
Protestant community, with Catholics (as well as some Protestant sects) discriminated 
against, and religion operated as a dividing line between the Protestant community - 
whose dominance in Ireland was closely tied to the power of the English - and the 
Catholic community who fought against the Protestant ascendancy. Marianne Elliott 
argues that the political divide in Ireland between unionist and nationalist was a 
consequence of this religious divide, not the cause of it,894 and Timothy Wilson claims 
that the roots of the conflict in Northern Ireland can be traced to the failure of the 
Reformation.895 The failure of the Protestant Reformation in Ireland is a key juncture 
in British history, and we cannot understand the rise of nationalism in Ireland without 
understanding the reasons the Reformation failed and the social processes it 
unleashed. Equally important was the consolidation of power in Ireland in the hands 
of the Protestant community; it was this power imbalance that made the religious 
cleavage in Ireland so contentious.  																																																								
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During the Glorious Revolution that swept the Stuarts from power in Britain, Ireland 
became an important battleground between the Protestant supporters of William and 
the Catholic supporters of King James II. The Siege of Derry and the Battle of the 
Boyne in the late 17th century (both triumphs for the Protestant army) have taken on 
colossal historical importance to Ireland’s Protestant population. A century later in 
1798, with limited political progress achieved in the pursuit of equal rights for 
Catholics, and with the popular revolutions in America and France fresh in the 
world’s collective memory, a popular uprising to seize control of Ireland began. The 
uprising - led by the United Irishmen, (co-founded by Theobald Wolfe Tone, who 
became, in the words of Richard English, “a nationalist hero in Ireland of almost 
unrivalled stature”896) and the Defenders - was able to draw on a great deal of popular 
support,897 but were defeated despite French assistance. The failure of the rebellion 
was “a devastating experience – a short but bloody civil war, which involved the 
explosive release of pent-up economic and sectarian pressures”,898 and led directly to 
the formal incorporation of Ireland into the United Kingdom with the 1801 Act of 
Union.  
 
The mechanism that bonded Ireland to Britain was similar to the political project 
undertaken between Scotland and England a century previous, but Alvin Jackson in 
his comparison of these two unions argues that the Irish union was mishandled. 
Union, he claims, “was identifiable with impoverishment, religious persecution and 
slaughter”,899 and unionism was associated with “an alien nationality, alien interests, 
an alien history, and alien religious convictions”.900 In Scotland, the union bargain had 
left key institutions untouched in local control, and these institutions were crucial in 
shaping Scotland’s sense of self as part of the United Kingdom. Similar institutions in 
Ireland, meanwhile, were “in the hands of the ‘enemy’”,901 giving the impression that 
the union was intended to maintain the Protestant ascendancy. Just as damaging was 
the failure of those negotiating the union to include Catholic emancipation in the 
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measure,902 and further evidence of the status of the Catholic community as second-
class citizens was to come in the perceived inaction of the British state regarding the 
Irish Potato Famine of the 19th century, although Richard English argues that this 
perception is unfounded.903 
 
This is not to say that the Irish didn’t take advantage of the British Empire; Jeffery’s 
edited volume considers the various ways the Irish served in the Empire, as well as 
how it Empire was represented in Ireland,904 and Rafferty writes that the Catholic 
Church in Ireland made great use of the international connections and British support 
for their missionary endeavours throughout the world.905 Jackson records that the 
British army recruited extensively in Ireland, but suggests that, for Irish soldiers, 
“taking the King or Queen’s shilling certainly did not automatically induce 
loyalism”.906 Colley opines that these benefits “helped to render the Union rather 
more palatable”.907 Although Catholics were prepared to engage with (and benefit 
from) the British Empire, this did not automatically translate into acceptance of a 
British identity or love for the British state and monarch.  
 
As discussed earlier, Linda Colley argues that British identity was bound up closely 
with Protestantism,908 and the Catholic Irish represented an out-group to the peoples 
of Scotland, Wales and England in a way that these three national groups never saw 
each other because of their shared faith.909 Britishness, as an identity, was unlikely to 
be adopted wholeheartedly by the majority of Ireland’s population, in the same way as 
the Scots and Welsh had.  
 
This is a vital difference between Ireland and Scotland or Wales - the rejection of a 
British identity and othering of those who accepted it by, what would become, the 
nationalist community. For many among the Irish, the British were the other, and even 																																																								
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(at times) the enemy; for the majority of the Scots and Welsh, the British were part of 
their in-group. They were ‘us’. As I go onto discuss, this difference is crucial in 
helping to explain why political violence was far less of a feature of Scottish and 
Welsh nationalism.  
 
Britishness - and as a result unionism - was enthusiastically adopted by the Protestant 
community in Ireland, especially those in Ulster (a result, partly, of the 19th century 
industrialisation of Ulster910), and became an important part of their identity. In an 
article examining the importance of British identity to Ulster Protestants, Neil 
Southern claims that Irishness was neither accessible - attached as it was to “political, 
religious and cultural positions which Protestants feel to be not only alien but 
rivalrous”911 - nor was it desirable. In its place they have “treasur[ed] their Britishness 
as an alternative to the embarrassment of their Irishness”.912 Furthermore, English 
argues “the fear of betrayal, the sense of being under siege, and the dread of massacre 
- the legacy of their seventeenth-century experience” explain the “sense of insecurity 
characteristic of the Protestant community in Ulster”. 913  Moloney echoes this 
sentiment, claiming, “unionism was an ideology that thrived on a sense of siege… 
fear of retribution from their downtrodden and disenfranchised Irish Catholic 
neighbours was possibly the most potent single factor in their political makeup”.914 
Thus for many in the unionist community, Britishness was a guarantee of liberty and 
security in the face of the latent Catholic existential threat.915 
 
At the start of the 19th century, progress on the issue of Catholic emancipation was 
painfully slow, but although immediate change was not forthcoming, the gradualist 
approach of Daniel O’Connell and his colleagues reaped some rewards with the 1829 
Catholic Relief Act, which extended the voting franchise to propertied Catholics. 
However, there were elements within the Catholic Irish population for whom 																																																								
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constitutional methods were unacceptable, the very act of engaging in British 
parliamentary democracy being a tacit acceptance of British authority. A collection of 
groups, commonly classified under the umbrella label of the Fenians (from the Gaelic 
Fianna, legendary warriors of Irish mythology916),917 applied new technology and an 
alternative strategy that came to be described as ‘skirmishing’, but would be 
considered terrorism today.918  
 
The most important of these groups - the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) - 
emerged in 1858 but remained a clandestine conspiratorial society. McGarry and 
McConnel contend that Fenianism differed from constitutional nationalism in the 
belief that Ireland’s geography919 and unique culture meant that its natural condition 
was to be united and free, going on to suggest that Fenians saw England as motivated 
by ill-will, and nationalist politicians as self-serving and morally corrupt.920 The IRB 
believed that Ireland’s freedom would be achieved through armed insurrection and 
were not persuaded of the alternative strategy of skirmishing advocated by Clan na 
Gael. Townshend writes that they became “accidental terrorists” when they 
inadvertently destroyed a tenement building whilst attempting to rescue Fenian 
prisoners from Clerkenwell jail in 1867.921 The influence of the IRB, McGarry and 
McConnel argue, has been substantial: “by shaping popular perceptions of the Irish 
nation and how its struggle for independence from Britain should be conducted it 
influenced not only political developments but notions of national and cultural 
identity”.922 
 
As the 19th century drew to a close, the Irish Question had become the most pressing 
issue in British politics. A further extension of the voting franchise had allowed Home 
Rulers, led by the “darkly charismatic” Charles Parnell,923 to capture the vast majority 																																																								
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of Westminster seats in Ireland (peaking in 1885 when they won 85 out of 103), and 
the strength of this bloc gave the nationalists a considerable voice at Westminster. 
Demands for Irish home rule found a sympathetic ear with William Gladstone, who 
committed his Liberal party to achieving this goal, believing that the measure would 
lead to “the reconciliation of Irish nationalism to the British state”.924 As the prospect 
moved closer to reality, the Protestant Unionist community in Ireland began to fear 
that home rule would result in their abandonment by the British, drawing them 
together in a “defensive stand against what was perceived to be a threat to their way 
of life”.925 In 1905, the Ulster Unionist Council was set up to resist home rule and in 
September 1912, 250,000 Protestant men signed a declaration that they would resist 
the measure by force if necessary,926 leading to the creation of the Ulster Volunteer 
Force (UVF) the following year. These are the actions of a community fearful of their 
continued existence: Tom Nairn has compared the Protestants of Northern Ireland to 
the Jewish population in Israel, suggesting that both exhibit the “religiously-based 
national ideology of unusual power, derived from a history of being under siege”.927 
 
Alarmed at this development, the nationalist community responded in kind with the 
formation of the Irish Volunteers in 1913, the group that would later indirectly 
become the IRA.928 Townshend notes that this moved militant republicanism “from 
the sidelines to the centre of events” and “for the first time since 1867, [gave] the 
Fenians… something like an army”, as republicans dominated the executive of the 
new volunteer militia. 929  This development was symptomatic of the tit-for-tat 
relationship that developed between the two communities, whose intransigence was 
based on a fear that any sign of weakness would serve to strengthen their opponent.  
 
With political progress on Irish home rule halted by the outbreak of the First World 
War, a group of Irish rebels took matters into their own hands when they stormed the 
Dublin Post Office in Easter week 1916. Although, the rebellion itself was 
“suppressed with some efficiency”, as the British military took control of the situation 
within a day, it was the events that followed that ensured the rebels’ actions were 																																																								
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significant; the summary trials and executions of those involved in the rebellion, 
carried out under martial law, were seen as an unnecessarily strict punishment. John 
Dillon, the deputy leader of the nationalists, condemned the executions in the 
strongest possible terms; the actions of the British military in Ireland, he said, were 
“washing out our whole life work in a sea of blood” and “poisoning the mind of 
Ireland”.930  
 
Jackson argues that there is a consensus that “it was these executions, rather than the 
rebel action, which nudged public opinion from outright hostility towards a degree of 
sympathy for the insurgents and their idealism”.931 The sympathetic response they 
generated ended the possibility of a constitutional settlement on the Irish question, and 
instead a bloody conflict followed,932 leading to an agreement creating the Irish Free 
State, at the expense of the partition of Ireland. This measure was grounded in the 
strength of opinion in Ulster, as well as from their supporters in Westminster, but the 
immediate impact of the settlement was an increase in sectarian violence in Ulster, 933 
as well as a bloody civil war between those who were prepared to accept partition and 
those who were not in the new Irish state. 
 
Conor Gearty writes that “the borders of [Northern Ireland] were determined not by 
history, tradition or geography, but by the imperatives of sectarian demography”,934 
and English argues that Ulster’s unionists “built a state largely in their own image” in 
which Catholics were made to feel unwelcome.935 This was made possible by the 
removal of proportional representation in local government elections in 1929, 
consolidating Unionist strength and ensuring their monopoly of political power in 
Northern Ireland.936 Stormont - the devolved assembly tasked with running Northern 
Ireland - “institutionalised the relative powerless-ness of Nationalists” and “served the 
short-term and local purposes of a Unionist elite”.937 
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When the apparatus of local government was established in Northern Ireland, the 
proportional representation voting method was adopted for elections to Stormont. Yet 
by achieving a majority, the Unionists were able to remove this, and with some skilful 
gerrymandering, and by convincing Protestant voters voted in a uniform manner, they 
were able to secure a permanent Unionist majority in the assembly. This allowed the 
unionist community to ensure that the Protestant community, or at least Protestant 
areas, received favourable treatment and a disproportionate share of local government 
spending; Frank Wright records that  “government ministers in Northern Ireland 
delivered public speeches encouraging and legitimising systematic discrimination 
against Catholics”.938 The Catholic community in Northern Ireland was heavily under-
represented in skilled labour sectors, reliant on construction and agriculture;939 were 
under-represented in the senior ranks of the civil service and all ranks of the police;940 
had a median income 15% below that of the Protestant community, with twice the 
level of unemployment;941 and were “frequently and seriously disadvantaged” when it 
came to the allocation of housing.942 The true nature of discrimination has been 
examined by John Whyte; he studies the various claims and counter-claims about the 
issue and contends that whilst there can be no doubt that imbalances in Northern 
Ireland were “systematic and deliberate” the level of discrimination has been 
exaggerated.943  
 
Following the creation of Northern Ireland, the Catholic minority largely refused to 
accept the legitimacy of the new state, an attitude that helped feed Protestant beliefs 
that “this was ‘our’ state, tolerating an ‘ungrateful minority’”.944 Despite this, Rose 
suggests that there was little appetite for violent rebellion in Ulster, as the majority 
were keen to avoid a repeat of the violence of the early 1920s,945 although that did not 
prevent the IRA from launching further campaigns in the North as it became clear that 
partition was not a temporary measure.  
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Faced with certain electoral defeat, and unwilling to formally accept the legitimacy of 
the Northern Irish state, the nationalist community treated local government elections 
with a mixture of abstention and resignation; in many seats the representative of the 
dominant community ran unopposed, and when nationalist candidates did win they 
refused to accept the position of official opposition in the assembly. Non-sectarian 
parties did contest elections but they were never able to challenge the dominance of 
the two major positions. Northern Ireland’s Catholics were effectively excluded from 
politics and reacted to this by refusing to engage with the entire process. As John 
Schwartzmantel has argued, it is this exclusion from democracy that can incite the use 
of political violence.946  
 
The other democratic body that Catholics could appeal to was the Westminster 
Parliament, which technically retained jurisdiction over the province. However, the 
same principles applied to Westminster that applied to Stormont; the nationalist 
representatives were too few to make an impact and had no desire to grant 
Westminster the legitimacy they vociferously maintained it did not have in any part of 
Ireland. For many walking the halls of Westminster, the creation of Stormont had 
absolved MPs of responsibility for a region that had caused their predecessors much 
grief. The knock-on effect of this attitude was that the British government failed to 
adequately oversee the actions of Stormont, allowing the discrimination of the 
Catholic community to proceed unchecked. 
 
At the start of the 1960s, there were signs of a shift in the mood in Northern Ireland. 
Bob Purdie argues that the historic feud between the communities was dying out and 
efforts were being made by both sides to reach across the sectarian divide and work 
together.947 The Catholic community, Elliott notes, was “abandoning decades of 
negativity” in response to the changed climate,948 and Moloney suggests that a 
growing Catholic middle class showed willingness to participate in a political system 
they had long rejected. 949  More importantly, Jackson records, “the [nationalist] 
community was growing, was better schooled and, in the context of world-wide civil 																																																								
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unrest in the 1960s, was able to exploit an international language of protest”.950 
Evidence of the increased involvement of nationalists in the Stormont political system 
can be found in the decision of the Nationalist Party to take up their position as the 
opposition in Stormont, effectively an act of recognition.  
 
Across the political divide, Prime Minister Terence O’Neill demonstrated a public 
willingness to reform Northern Ireland and improve conditions for the Catholic 
community. As a result, O’Neill was able to gain the support of some of Northern 
Ireland’s Catholic middle class, but faced problems from elements within his own 
party. Coalescing around ‘ultra-Loyalists’ like the Reverend Ian Paisley,951 Unionist 
opposition to O’Neill’s reform was based on the zero-sum calculus that any measure 
that strengthened the Catholic community was detrimental to theirs. For Purdie, the 
growth of Paisley’s brand of ‘not an inch’ intransigent unionism had two effects: it 
limited O’Neill’s options with his own party and constituency, and it undermined trust 
in O’Neill among those in Catholic community seeking reform.952  In the end, O’Neill 
was faced by a Catholic community concerned that his reforms were insufficient to 
alleviate the inequality in Northern Ireland and a vocal element within the Protestant 
community who regarded his actions as a sell-out to Popery. Even though some 
significant reforms were achieved surrounding housing allocation and local 
government, it would cost him his premiership. 
 
Concerned by the slow progress of political change, and inspired by the American 
civil rights movement, a number of non-violent direct action groups emerged in 
Ulster, the foremost of which was the Homeless Citizens’ League, who adopted 
squatting as a tactic to raise awareness of housing and homelessness problems in the 
province. 953  Out of this group and others the Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association (NICRA) grew, whose political message differed from nationalist 
movements that had come before it in that it wasn’t seeking Irish unity, but instead 
made the case that - if the Catholic community were British citizens - they should 																																																								
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enjoy British rights like their Protestant counterparts.954 NICRA, acting as an umbrella 
body for an array of civil rights groups in Northern Ireland,955 organised a protest 
march from Coalisland to Dungannon to raise awareness of their campaign in 1968.  
 
A second march was held in Derry on October 5th 1968 in direct defiance of Stormont 
who had banned the march.956 As the march got underway, protesters were attacked 
by the police, who drew them into the Bogside area of Derry (a heavily Catholic area), 
initiating a running battle with locals. The importance of this development was 
magnified exponentially due to the television coverage it received, raising awareness 
of this civil rights movement worldwide, and demonstrating to the British government 
the necessity for reform in Northern Ireland. This reaction “probably did more to 
politically mobilise large sections of the Catholic community than did any of the other 
grievances”,957 and many Catholics joined NICRA as a result. Furthermore, the event 
placed the unionist community - and their conduct in Stormont - under a spotlight. 
Bowyer Bell argues that the unionist reaction to Catholic ‘agitation’ had been 
perfected over the years: use the police to suppress the rioters with force and blame 
the unrest on the IRA.958 In NICRA’s case, the Unionist leadership found that “the 
RUC could not beat it into the ground or Paisley intimidate it or O’Neill placate it - 
and given the nature of the Unionist machine, compromise was out of the 
question”.959 
 
Aspects of the Protestant community viewed the civil rights movement with intense 
suspicion; Roy Foster argues that for many Protestants “civil rights demonstrations 
meant that the republican fifth column was on the march again”.960 For Ian Paisley 
and his acolytes, the reforms proposed by Terence O’Neill were already an outrageous 
betrayal of the loyal people of Ulster, but O’Neill dismissed Paisley and his 																																																								
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movement as “a fascist organisation masquerading under the cloak of religion… 
deluding a lot of sincere people… hell-bent on provoking religious strife in Northern 
Ireland”.961 For the ultra-loyalists, the movement was seen as a cover for the IRA,962 
and the marchers were “treated like the rebels that they had always been told 
about”.963 Whilst, it is clear there were members of the civil rights movement who had 
previous connections with the IRA, but they in no way directed the campaign.964 
Elliott writes that many unionists simply refused to believe that the Catholic 
community was disadvantaged in any shape or form, and viewed “every overdue 
reform… as Popery closing in”.965  
 
Following the ‘success’ of the Derry march, more followed, despite regular police 
mistreatment, and these allowed Paisley to adopt a leadership position in the counter-
demonstration movement that followed the nationalist street demonstrations 
everywhere. In January, a student group within the civil rights movement, People’s 
Democracy, announced a march between Belfast and Derry, in direct defiance of 
NICRA. 966  There can be no doubt that the route taken by the marchers was 
deliberately provocative and led those taking part through strictly Protestant areas, 
where they were regularly attacked, most infamously at the Burntollet Bridge near 
Derry. Here they were engaged by a waiting Protestant mob - as well as by members 
of the police force (drawn almost exclusively from the Protestant community) - who 
used this as an excuse to go on a rampage in Derry, attacking shoppers, breaking 
windows and singing sectarian songs.967 For the nationalist community, the attacks on 
marchers confirmed suspicions that the security apparatus in Northern Ireland was a 
repressive instrument controlled by the unionists,968 and following these events, the 
“police had been more seriously compromised that ever before in the eyes of Derry 
Catholics”.969 Paul Bew suggests that, as a result, Terence O’Neill lost the faith of the 
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Catholic community who felt that he wasn’t doing enough to protect Catholic 
protesters from Protestant attack, thus sealing his fate.970 
 
Immediately following the events of Derry, another march was held in Newry and 
again violent confrontation between the protesters and the security forces erupted, 
although Purdie suggests that the instigators may have been the demonstrators in this 
case.971 This pattern continued in Northern Ireland throughout 1969, with brief respite 
for a general election and the subsequent departure of Terence O’Neill, until the 
fateful events of August 12th. On that day, an Orange March through Derry exploded 
into chaos as representatives of both communities clashed violently in the Bogside 
area of the city. The result was the total breakdown of civil society in Northern 
Ireland and descent into inter-communal conflict. The inability of the police to stop 
the violence led both communities to take up arms in defence, thus breaking the 
state’s monopoly of the use of force in Northern Ireland.972 Within days the British 
Army was forced to intervene in an attempt to defuse the situation, but their presence 
and perceived bias only succeeded in turning them into a third party in the conflict.  
 
The eruption of violence ended the possibility of a peaceful mediation of grievances 
and set Northern Irish politics back nearly 30 years. The civil rights movement carried 
on, but it was clear that street demonstrations would achieve little in the face of 
widespread violence. It also signalled the end to the rapprochement between the two 
communities that had been underway and led to a “sudden awareness of the different 
religion of friends, neighbours, girlfriends and boyfriends”. 973  The conflict that 
followed only widened the gap, both figuratively and physically, as Northern Ireland 
saw the “biggest forced population movement in Europe since the Second World 
War”,974 as 60,000 Belfast residents were intimidated out of their homes and sought 
refuge in areas dominated by their co-religionists, including many who left for the 
safe haven of the Republic.975 
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Blame for the breakdown of the civil rights movement must lie at the feet of both 
communities, as well as the Westminster government. Purdie and English both agree 
that reform was possible but “avoidable events” 976 derailed the process. Clearly the 
mistreatment of protesters by the police and security forces, and by Protestant mobs, 
ranks as a key reason the movement broke down. The unionist community simply 
could not trust the intentions of those behind it, nor believe that it wasn’t a Trojan 
horse, but the naiveté or deliberate provocation of key figures in the civil rights 
campaign must also be considered. Purdie concludes that the historical importance of 
marches in Northern Ireland made the model of protest marches implemented in the 
United States unsuitable for Northern Ireland,977 and suggests that NICRA’s claim to 
be non-sectarian was undermined by its origins in the nationalist community,978 an 
assertion supported by Simon Prince who writes, “as had happened during 1798, 
Ireland’s secular revolutionaries found themselves saddled with sectarian 
followers”.979  
 
Additionally, both English and Purdie argue that elements within the movement were 
deliberately provocative; People’s Democracy in their choice of route, 980  and 
individual protesters who threw stones at the police and clashed with loyalists.981 
Finally, the lack of oversight from the British government to Unionist governance in 
the province meant that when they were finally forced to take an interest in the affairs 
of Northern Ireland the chance to achieve reform politically had passed. That being 
said, there is also an argument to be made that reforming the Northern Irish state was 
an impossible task; as Rose points out, there was no possible constitution in Northern 
Ireland that would be mutually agreed upon by the most intransigent (and the most 
powerful) elements present in both communities.982  
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The events that followed started as communal defence rather than violent revolution, 
but the failure of the civil rights movement, and the intervention and missteps of the 
British Government, made the direct methods advocated by the Provisional IRA far 
more acceptable to many in the nationalist community in Northern Ireland. It took 
nearly thirty years for non-violent actors to convince both sides that violence would 
not bring about the change they sought and for the British state to contain paramilitary 
violence. Even now there are dissident Republican splinter groups that reject the terms 
of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, and who believe armed struggle should 
continue.983 
 
 
The Dogs That Didn’t Bark 
 
In Ireland as a whole, and then in Northern Ireland, armed struggle became a central 
feature of nationalist strategy in the 20th century, yet the precedent set by the IRA 
was not followed by nationalists in Scotland and Wales, and in this section I will 
examine a number of key differences that can be observed between the cases of 
Ireland, as well as Scotland and Wales, and assess the extent to which these 
differences can help us account for the differing levels of political violence in these 
territories.  
 
I will consider the perceived mistreatment of Irish nationalists by the British state, the 
existence and salience of societal cleavages, the importance of a unifying 
cosmopolitan identity, the role of constitutional nationalism and historical precedence 
in violent uprising, and assess the extent to which these differences help to explain the 
relative lack of political violence in Scotland and Wales.  
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
983 For further see above, p.17, n. 47.  
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State Response 	
One of the core purposes of terrorist activity, the literature suggests,984 is to provoke 
the opponent into overreacting; in What Terrorists Want, Louise Richardson presents 
the argument that terrorists are seeking “to exact revenge… to acquire glory and… to 
force their adversary into a reaction”.985 They wish to induce a response that validates 
the terrorists’ argument about the state’s illegitimacy or repressive nature, in an 
attempt to generate public sympathy, elicit support for the militant group, and 
weakening support for the state. In her work on clandestine political violence, Della 
Porta claims that one of the “political preconditions identified as explaining high 
levels of political violence is the weakness of the state in terms of repressive capacity 
and even territorial control”. 986  Notable groups have made the pursuit of this 
overreaction central to their tactics; for example, ETA’s ‘action-repression-action’ 
strategy was intended to engage the state in a spiral of violence that would 
demonstrate its brutality to the Basque people and position the group as the legitimate 
defenders of the Basque Country.987  
 
The IRA certainly benefitted from the overreaction of the British government in their 
campaign against British rule; English argues that the repressive response to the 
Easter Rising, intended to undermine the rebel cause “helped to achieve what the 
rebellion itself had not - an intensification of nationalist feeling well beyond the rebel 
ranks”.988 In Northern Ireland, the policy on internment has been described as “the 
biggest political miscalculation of the entire conflict”,989 which “effectively declared 
war on many Catholic areas, aligned British power with union and massively 
increased support for the IRA”.990 Worse still were the events of Bloody Sunday (the 																																																								
984 Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy, 7; Martha Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism: Causes, 
processes and consequences (London: Routledge, 2011), 9.  
985 Richardson, What Terrorists Want, 14.  
986 Donatella Della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), 34. 
987 For further reading on the conflict in the Basque Country see Conversi’s The Basques, the Catalans 
and Spain, Clark’s The Basque Insurgents and Negotiating with ETA and Zulaika’s Basque Violence 
(Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans and Spain; Robert P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-
1980 (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984); Robert P. Clark, Negotiating with ETA : 
obstacles to peace in the Basque country, 1975-1988 (Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press, 1990); 
Joseba Zulaika, Basque violence: metaphor and sacrament (Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press, 
1988).  
988 English, Armed Struggle, 5. 
989 Richardson, What Terrorists Want, 228. 
990 Wright, Northern Ireland, 204. 
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shooting of 14 unarmed civilians by the British Army during a march in Derry on the 
30th of January 1972): Patrick Magee, a member of the Provisional IRA responsible 
for the Brighton hotel bombing in 1984, argues that the deaths caused that day 
“probably led more young nationalists to join the Provisionals than any other single 
action by the British”.991 The British Army tried to defend their actions on that day by 
blaming the IRA for firing first, but, as Bew says, “it is a denial which has never been 
accepted in nationalist Ireland”.992 Events such as these help to explain why one 
member of the Provisional IRA claimed, “the British Army, the British government, 
were our best recruiting agent”.993 As Richardson reminds us, the military is a “very 
blunt instrument when deployed in a civilian context” whose “very physical presence, 
complete with weaponry and armoured vehicles, cannot but instil fear, incite 
resentment, and intimidate”.994  
 
By contrast, the counter-terrorism efforts of the British state in Scotland and Wales 
were far more successful. In the case of Wales, the police may have looked weak in 
the face of a sustained MAC bombing campaign (especially when the Free Wales 
Army were in court), but they were able to apprehend John Jenkins and Frederick 
Alders eventually, and thus prevented the MAC campaign from escalating. In 
Scotland, the police were consistently ahead of the game when fledging Scottish 
nationalist terrorist groups emerged, and have only been thwarted in their attempts to 
prosecute Adam Busby for his involvement in the SNLA because of his escape to the 
Republic of Ireland and the problematic extradition process. In both Scotland and 
Wales, those accused of planning terrorist actions were prosecuted as criminals, 
largely resulting in substantial custodial sentences. The only misstep came in Wales 
when a large number of Welsh nationalist activists were arrested in a concerted 
“round-up” in an attempt to track down those involved in the cottage arson campaign, 
on Palm Sunday 1980.995 There is a marked difference between the approaches taken 
by the British state to violent nationalism in Ireland compared with similar 
phenomena in Scotland and Wales.  																																																								
991 Magee quoted in English, Armed Struggle, 151. 
992 Bew, Ireland, 507. 
993 ibid., 122 
994 Louise Richardson, “Britain and the IRA”, in Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the 
Past, Robert J. Art & Louise Richardson eds. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
2007), 77. 
995 Humphries, Freedom Fighters, 166-170. 
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The repressive actions of the British government with regards to Irish nationalist 
political violence consistently backfired and strengthened a movement they sought to 
undermine. However, we must consider a key aspect of the law enforcement structure 
that differed between Ireland, Scotland and Wales: the extent to which the personnel 
tasked with maintaining law and order were drawn largely from just one community. 
Originally, it was planned that the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC - the lead police 
agency in Northern Ireland) would draw one third of its strength from the Catholic 
community, but despite being able to gain “some grudging degree of acceptance” 
from the Catholic community in the province,996 it remained “an overwhelmingly 
Protestant force” with “strong Orange influences”.997 The Ulster Special Constabulary 
- the reserve police force better known as the B Specials - that operated from the 
establishment of Northern Ireland until March 1970, was also drawn almost 
exclusively from the Protestant community, so overwhelmingly so that Purdie notes 
that “membership of the B Specials in [one area] was roughly co-terminous with the 
status of adult, able-bodied male Protestant”.998 As a result, the two key agencies in 
the Northern Ireland security apparatus were dominated and directed by the unionist 
community and state, a situation with no equivalent in Scotland or Wales. 
 
Can the different approaches by the British state taken in Ireland, Scotland and Wales 
help us to explain the differing levels of violence? Initially, we need to take into 
account that the approaches differed between Ireland and the mainland because the 
contexts in which the state was forced to act were markedly different; the Easter 
Rising occurred whilst Britain was distracted elsewhere by the First World War, and 
the response must be placed within the context of wartime decision-making. 
Furthermore, Townshend reports that the British government was uneasy with the 
executions that followed, and the Prime Minister personally intervened to prevent 
further executions.999 Additionally, when British troops were brought in to quell the 
sectarian tensions ignited by the onset of the Troubles, they were faced with a 
situation that required an immediate and substantial response.  
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999 Townshend, Easter 1916, 279-286. 
	 191 
The more measured reaction of the state in Scotland and Wales reflects the fact that 
the form of political violence they faced in these two countries was far less 
threatening. Compared to the carnage of early 1970s Belfast, Welsh and Scottish 
nationalist political violence was far less of an immediate threat: a police source 
reportedly claimed that “Scottish nationalist terrorism was low on MI5's list of 
priorities with the IRA and foreign terror groups active. Really, on a scale of one to 
ten, it was a two. It was viewed with low-key interest really ... it was a gnat in an 
elephant's ear”.1000  
 
Whilst it is possible to conclude that the missteps of the British state in 1916 and 
during the Troubles increased support for nationalist militancy exponentially, it could 
not be described as the root cause of the violence. At best, it was what Crenshaw 
describes as a precipitant factor, “specific events that immediately precede the 
occurrence of terrorism”,1001 rapidly bolstering support and sympathy among the 
wider population for militant nationalism at the expense of those who advocated non-
violent methods. Although the restraint of the British response ensured that violent 
nationalists in Scotland and Wales did not receive the same sort of boost that the IRA 
did, the absence of this factor in Scotland and Wales does not - by itself - explain why 
the vast majority of those nationalists implicitly rejected political violence. Instead we 
must ask why the situation in Ireland became so heated that the military were forced 
to intervene, and why this wasn’t the case in Scotland and Wales. 
 
Social Cleavages 
 
The construction of identity is central to understanding the causes of political 
violence. In his work on the relationship between identity and violence, Amartya Sen 
makes the case that identity construction is a multi-layered approach, and that one can 
consider themselves members of many different social groups.1002 Violence emerges, 
he claims “by the imposition of singular and belligerent identities on gullible people, 
championed by proficient artisans of terror”;1003 by reducing a whole community to a 
single binary attribute it is far easier to construct a clear line of division between two. 																																																								
1000 Severin Carrell, “A most unlikely terrorist”, The Scotsman, 9 February 1994. 
1001 Crenshaw, “The causes of terrorism”, 381. 
1002 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The illusion of destiny (London: Allen Lane, 2006). 
1003 ibid., 2. 
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The reductionism discussed by Sen is clearly evident in Ireland: the religious cleavage 
is undoubtedly the key feature of the Irish conflict. Therefore, it is necessary to relate 
the existence of a similar ethnic cleavage to the comparative non-violence of the 
Welsh and Scottish nationalism movements. 
 
In Wales, the existence of a separate language, and the need to preserve the language 
and the culture associated with it, was the basis for nationalist mobilisation in the 
early part of the 20th century. However, membership of the Welsh national movement 
was not exclusively limited to Welsh speakers, and English speakers were more than 
welcome. Thus the social boundary between the two communities could be described 
as ‘soft’ - there was no forced choice between the two languages: one can choose to 
speak both English and Welsh. By contrast, what’s notable about the religious 
cleavage in Ireland is the binary nature of the divide: as Wilson observes, one cannot 
be both Protestant and Catholic, 1004 and given the social and political saliency of the 
religious divide it was difficult to adopt a ‘none of the above’ approach. This created a 
division between the two communities that was very clearly demarcated in Ireland. 
 
Scotland also had the same religious cleavage as present in Ireland; from the 17th 
century onwards, Scotland was the recipient of a large number of migrants from 
Ireland, and by the 1930s, 2.5% of the Scottish population was comprised of Irish-
born citizens.1005 Of these incomers, many were Catholics, and tensions emerged over 
the provision of housing and welfare they received. As a result, cleavages within 
Scottish society formed along denominational lines; Clayton argues that “Scottish 
Catholicism has often been seen as the Other which may be compared to and 
exteriorized [sic] by a stable Protestant norm”1006 and Reilly claims, “Scot equals 
Protestant, Catholic equals alien: upon these equations Scotland conducted its 
business”.1007 Furthermore, one of the key institutions in Scotland - the Kirk - publicly 
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decried the threat posed by the influx of Catholic Irish, describing them as a 
“menace”.1008  
 
By the 1970s, the sectarian divide had lost some of its relevance in Scotland, as the 
Irish Catholic population in Scotland began to assimilate. Walker and Gallagher agree 
that the Labour Party was key to the integration of the Catholic community,1009 and 
Finn points to the importance of Catholic schools in Scotland, claiming that they have 
been “one of the main reasons for the advance towards Catholic socio-economic 
equality”. 1010 However, it has been suggested that sectarian violence between the two 
communities was unlikely to emulate the level of violence in Belfast. Mark Doyle 
posits that the different relationships both communities had to the imperial centre 
meant that the “sorts of thing that were capable of causing violence in Belfast - 
evangelical anti-Catholicism, Tory populism, Catholic secret societies, heavy-handed 
policing, even residential segregation - were either greatly diluted or completely 
absent [in Scotland]”.1011 As a result, aside from colourful displays of sectarian 
triumphalism during commemorative marches and in the Old Firm derby, 1012 
sectarianism is far less of a feature in Scottish society than it was less than a century 
ago. Thus, the existence of a religious cleavage by itself is insufficient to generate 
nationalist political violence, and we therefore need to consider what is exceptional 
about the societal cleavage in Ireland, and why it led to a much more violent form of 
nationalism.  
 
There are two aspects that differ between the cases that I believe can explain the 
discrepancy: the uniquely binary nature of the divide between the two communities in 
Ireland, and concentration of power in the hands of one of these two communities in 																																																								
1008 Stewart J. Brown, “Church-state relation in Scotland after the Union” in The Challenge to 
Westminster: Sovereignty, Devolution and Independence. H. T. Dickinson, & Michael Lynch, eds. 
(East Linton, East Lothian: Tuckwell Press, 2000), 79. 
1009 Walker, Intimate Strangers; Tom Gallagher, “The Catholic Irish in Scotland: in Search of Identity” 
in Irish Immigrants and Scottish Society in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Proceedings of the 
Scottish Historical Studies Seminar University of Strathclyde 1989-90, T. M Devine, ed. (Edinburgh: 
John Donald Publishers, 1991), 27. 
1010 Gerry P T Finn, “prejudice! prejudice! prejudice!” In Scotland’s Shame? Bigotry and Sectarianism 
in Modern Scotland, T.M. Devine ed. (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2000), 76. 
1011 Mark Doyle, Fighting Like the Devil for the Sake of God: Protestants, Catholics and the origins of 
violence in Victorian Belfast (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 195.  
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Ireland in a way that it didn’t in Scotland and Wales. It is the existence of a binary 
societal cleavage on which the balance of power is based that is specific to the case of 
Ireland. Thus a situation emerged, as described by Sen, wherein the people of Ireland 
were reduced to a single attribute to determine their ‘loyalty’ to the British state, and 
accordingly, their worth. To reconcile this discrimination, the Catholic Irish turned to 
nationalism, and the correlation between religious identity and support for Irish 
independence was born, creating what Wright describes as the ‘ethnic frontier’: a 
territory consisting of natives and incomers, divided by the national question.1013 An 
irreconcilable societal cleavage developed between those loyal to the British state and 
those loyal to a Catholic Irish identity.  
 
By itself, the existence of a social cleavage in a given polity does not explain the 
emergence of political violence; otherwise, as David Laitin says, we would expect to 
see a great deal more political violence through the world.1014 In Wales, the existence 
of a linguistic divide has been the basis for a national movement, but crucially, 
English speakers have not been excluded from membership. In Scotland, the religious 
divide was the basis for discrimination, but it did not overlap with the national 
question. What Ireland demonstrates is the fusion of communal polarisation with a 
macro-dispute over national sovereignty. One was forced to take a position on the 
national question in Ireland (even unwittingly) in a way that did not happen in 
Scotland or Wales until 2014. Furthermore the religious divide between the 
communities made the conflict all the more bitter; as Richardson says, “once 
grievances are expressed in religious terms the conflict becomes altogether more 
difficult to solve”.1015 Therefore what we need to understand is why a similar binary 
cleavage between those loyal to Britain and those loyal to Scottish or Welsh identities 
did not develop in those two countries. To understand this, we need to consider how 
British identity developed in our three cases.  
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Cosmopolitan Identity 
 
As I have discussed throughout this thesis, as Great Britain began to emerge through a 
series of conquests and unions, those at the heart of the new multi-national state 
sought to create an over-arching pan-national identity that would encourage loyalty to 
the new geographic entity. Central to this new identity was the shared foundation of 
the Protestant faith,1016 and defence against the common threat of Catholicism.  
 
Thus, in Ireland, support for the union and the British identity associated it with it was 
the sole preserve of the minority Protestant community, who had “every incentive to 
discover and then emphasise their Protestantism in a land-grabbing scheme backed by 
Protestant money from the city of London”.1017 The content of both Britishness and 
the union became antithetical to Irish Catholic identity and made a dual British-Irish 
identity less likely. Although there were many in Catholic Ireland who took advantage 
of the British Empire, the emotional connection to the British state was far less strong 
than among the Scots and Welsh. The pervasiveness of symbols of British rule and the 
concentration of power in the hands of the Protestant minority, helped Irish 
nationalism grow as a popular force by fusing Catholicism with nationalism. It is in 
this sort of polarised fractious environment that we commonly find inter-communal 
violence.1018  
 
The divide locked the two communities in a zero-sum game, unable to reconcile their 
differences with one another. During the debate about the future of Ireland’s future in 
the United Kingdom, the uncertainty led the Protestant population to organise a 
defensive militia, an escalation that the Catholic community had to match to maintain 
the balance of power. When violence was initiated in the late 1960s, the spiral of 
reprisal and revenge dragged Ulster into a bloody conflict that lasted 30 years.1019 
 
The development and intensity of unionist identity by Ireland’s Protestant population 
is quite unlike the development of a unionist identity in Scotland and Wales. In fact, 																																																								
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scholars would be unlikely to use the term to apply to advocates of the union in either 
country before the early 1960s, as it would have been applicable to the vast majority 
of the general public, and would thus be meaningless as a conceptual term. As Colin 
Kidd has convincingly articulated, until the rise of the SNP, unionism1020 was so 
dominant in Scottish politics as to be hardly worth commenting upon.1021 As a result, 
there was no need to develop and encourage the spread of unionism in these countries, 
and no need to identify oneself as a unionist. Aside from politicians, there were very 
few self-defined ‘unionists’: it was simply assumed everyone was unionist. The 
national question was thus far less polarising than in Ireland, meaning that individuals 
were free not to express a preference, or to opt for an intermediary approach.  
 
In Scotland, a distinct Scottish identity was retained despite the union with England, 
fostered by its independent institutions and civil society, and this identity was able to 
operate concurrently with a British identity. In Wales, the Welsh language played an 
important role in the retention of distinctiveness, nurtured by the nonconformist 
movement. It cannot be denied that aspects of Britishness have chafed for both the 
Scots and the Welsh, but the majority of both nations’ citizens have accepted 
Britishness as a part of their national identity, even if it not the most important one.  
 
The union allowed the Scots and Welsh to be successful without compromising their 
identity. As a result many adopted a dual identity, with allegiance to their nation but 
also to the British state. This identity has been strengthened through increased 
interaction between the groups, defence from a common threat and shared institutions, 
and the result is a fluid, complex, layered identity that persists in Britain to this day. I 
have argued that Britishness has lost its unifying content in the last fifty years, and as 
a result nationalism - the political expression of national identity - has become an 
increasingly important political force in the United Kingdom. However, as was 
demonstrated in the referendum of 2014, a British identity is still a powerful 
emotional agent.   
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In Scotland and Wales, Britishness was far more malleable and could be mapped onto 
previous allegiances, most notably the Protestant faith.1022 Additionally, Britishness 
did not stifle national identity in Scotland and Wales, although the success of the 
British Empire did help to constrain the development of nationalism as a political 
force in these countries. The long-term impact of this is crucial in understanding why 
members of the Scottish and Welsh national movement never adopted political 
violence to the same extent as their Irish counterparts. The primary impact of the 
acceptance of a shared British identity being that the British state had legitimacy in 
Scotland and Wales in a way that it could never achieve in Catholic-dominated areas 
of Ireland.  
 
The zero-sum nature of the interaction between nationalists and unionists in Ireland is 
quite unlike the same interactions that took place in Scotland and Wales for two 
reasons: firstly, the successful adoption of a British identity by the Scots and Welsh 
meant that they were able to be loyal to the British state, and to their national identity, 
preventing the emergence of a social cleavage on the basis of state loyalty; secondly 
for ‘unionists’ in these two countries, nationalist progress has not been coterminous 
with their defeat, and has actually been encouraged as a means of strengthening or, at 
least, prolonging the political union by unionist parties.  
 
As a result when the national movement did finally emerge in Scotland and Wales, 
society did not polarise into nationalists and unionists. For the best part of the 
twentieth century, this cleavage was less contentious and far less politically important 
than the socio-economic cleavages that have dominated British politics since the 
extension of the franchise. Furthermore, they weren’t even of secondary importance, 
with language and religion being of far greater significance in Wales and Scotland 
respectively.  
 
Additionally, the primary out-group for nationalists in Scotland and Wales - namely 
unionists - was also part of their British in-group. It has only been in the last two years 
that one’s position on the national question has taken on real social saliency in 
Scotland. Even then, in both Scotland and Wales, unionists are not a coherent, 																																																								
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organised group1023 and within the broad pro-union coalitions that nominally exist, 
party allegiance is of greater importance. As such, there was no visible unionist 
community against which the nationalist community could antagonistically contend, 
but more importantly there was no unionist community in whose hands power was 
placed.    
 
Without a unionist out-group to target, Scottish and Welsh nationalists’ violent efforts 
instead targeted instruments of the British state and the positions associated with its 
maintenance. Attacks against the royal family, members of Parliament and pro-union 
political parties were attacks directed at the office they held rather than the individual. 
Further attacks were directed at infrastructure deemed responsible for the subjugation 
or financial mistreatment of these two countries, with water and oil pipelines the 
principal target of this type of violence.  
 
In Ireland, violent actors had a far larger array of targets to consider; Frank Wright 
proposes that many of the victims of the conflict in Ulster were chosen for their 
representative value as members of their community,1024 contending that any member 
of either side could be ‘punished’ for the transgressions of their respective 
demographic. Everyone was a potential target, a situation made possible by the well-
established boundaries between the two communities. In Northern Ireland the 
unionists were a coherent body whose perceived antagonism towards nationalists 
made them a legitimate target. In addition to attacking members of the rival 
community, violent nationalist groups in Ireland would also target actors of the British 
state, perceived by many in the nationalist community as alien and aggressive; most 
notable of these was the British Army following their introduction into Northern 
Ireland, as their actions towards the nationalist community have been widely 
interpreted as inflammatory and sowed suspicions of collusion between the army and 
the unionist community.1025 Conversely, for the vast majority of the Scots and Welsh, 
the British government was their government. Likewise for the key instruments of the 																																																								
1023 Even in the run-up to the independence referendum in Scotland there were divisions with the pro-
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1024 Wright, Northern Ireland, 11 
1025 Cochrane argues that many instances of security can be traced to deep relationship between the 
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state: the British army was their army, and the British royal family was their royal 
family. That the British state was treated as the legitimate authority in Scotland and 
Wales is evidence of the success of the integration of these countries into the concept 
of Britain, and the successful implementation of Britishness as a national identity, and 
thus for the vast majority of Welsh and Scots, the British state was not a legitimate 
target for nationalist violence.  
 
The successful dissemination of a pan-British identity, bolstered by a shared 
Protestantism among those on the British mainland, is central to our understanding of 
why political violence was not a major feature of Scottish or Welsh nationalism; 
whilst those who used political violence in the pursuit of nationalist progress may not 
have accepted such an identity, the wider constituency - whose support these groups 
were attempting to gain - did. The direct result of the unifying power of Britishness 
was that the Scots and Welsh had an emotional connection to both their national and 
state identities, and as such the vast majority of Scots and Welsh did not see 
Westminster governance as illegitimate, in the way that many in Ireland did. This 
deprived Scottish and Welsh violent nationalists of both a plethora of potential targets, 
and also of any sort of popular support or legitimacy. For the general population of 
Scotland and Wales, the principal means of advancing the nationalist agenda was 
constitutional politics.  
 
 
Non-Violent Alternatives  
 
Goodwin writes, “ordinary people joined or supported revolutionary movements when 
no other means of political expression were available to them”.1026 This sentiment has 
given credence to claims that political violence represents the ‘last resort’ of a 
community whose non-violent attempts have been unsuccessful. Louise Richardson, 
discussing the application of this statement by Osama bin Laden, argues that this post 
facto justification is easily refuted, and whilst many groups do attempt political 
change before adopting political violence, they do not always fully exhaust the 
political options available to them.1027 Paul Wilkinson also believed that a non-violent 																																																								
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alternative to terrorism exists, whether that is “moral resistance, civil disobedience 
[or] well-planned concerted economic and political action”. 1028 
 
In their work on civil resistance movements, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan1029 
also critique the ‘last resort’ thesis and reach a similar conclusion, suggesting that 
nonviolent and violent campaigns can coexist: an indication that the nonviolent 
options have not been conclusively explored. The central argument of Chenoweth and 
Stephan’s work is that non-violent movements are more likely to succeed, primarily 
because they can attract more support as there are fewer barriers to participation in 
non-violent movements: whereas violent movements often require new members to 
commit illegal acts as a rite of passage,1030 non-violent alternatives do not, and can 
overcome such dissuasions as fear of legal repercussions and moral apprehension. Jeff 
Goodwin presents a similar case – arguing, “ordinary people joined or supported 
revolutionary movements when no other means of political expression were available 
to them, or when they or their families were the targets of the violent repression”.1031 
Democracy, he believes, offers ways of resolving conflict in a civil manner “in which 
popular protest can win concessions from economic and political elites”.1032 Finally, 
John Schwartzmantel suggests that a campaign of violence within a democratic state 
may not be an attempt to subvert the political process, but a method of “gaining 
membership in a political community for those who are denied a voice”.1033 It is his 
belief that “violence occurs as a response to exclusion and lack of recognition”.1034 
 
Whilst it would be reductionist to equate democracy with reduced political violence, 
there is a large body of scholarly literature that suggests that viable non-violent means 
of social conflict resolution will have that effect. In my discussion of the development 
of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland and the lead-up to the Troubles, I 
alluded to the misuse of political power by the Unionist community following the 
establishment of Northern Ireland and the creation of the Stormont Assembly. The 
breakdown of the civil rights movement was the latest in a line of thwarted non-																																																								
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violent political campaigns, the most notable of which was postponement of Irish 
home rule before the outbreak of the First World War.  
 
This narrative may fail to take into account the victories that were achieved through 
non-violent methods: the Relief Act of 1829 extended the franchise to include 
Catholics; the home rule bill had been agreed before its implementation was 
prevented by the outbreak of war; and the civil rights movement in the North was able 
to achieve reform on issues such as housing and the gerrymandering of constituency 
boundaries. Yet equally, these successes should not be overstated; the Catholic 
population were the overwhelming majority in Ireland, but political progress on 
achieving equality for this community was blocked by intransigent political 
opponents, preventing progress by any means possible.  
 
The nationalists’ political opponents were not the only ones disinclined to cooperate 
with constitutional nationalism in Ireland, for they also had to deal with a militant 
Republican tendency for whom political negotiations with Britain, and the tacit 
acceptance of British authority that this entailed, were unacceptable. Whilst the two 
should not be treated as distinct entities, as we have to accept that the home rule 
movement “united constitutional politicians with those whose faith lay in violence, 
but who were willing to suspend their disbelief in the efficacy of parliament”,1035 the 
events of Easter 1916 are evidence that not all were convinced of the merits of 
parliamentary democracy. Thus, constitutional nationalists faced an opponent 
steadfastly refusing to acquiesce to any sort of reform externally, and internally, an 
extreme flank calling on a tradition of armed insurrection that would take any 
blockage as the sign that politics had failed, and this made nationalist progress 
through parliamentary democracy far less likely.  
 
By comparison, I believe that in the case of Scotland and Wales, political nationalists 
have not faced these problems to the same extent as their counterpart in Ireland did; 
for nationalists in Scotland and Wales, progress was relative to the scale of the groups 
involved and could just mean recognition, reform or token victories, and non-violent 
alternatives have been sufficiently viable to render violent methods unnecessary. That 																																																								
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the methods were viable did not mean they would instantly reap success, but simply 
that they presented a realistic opportunity of nationalist progress; the influence that 
Scottish and Welsh nationalism had on British politics in the period between their first 
electoral successes in 1966/7 and the advent of Margaret Thatcher’s government in 
1979 - with the establishment of a Royal Commission on devolution, and the Labour-
supported referendums that followed - was evidence of the progress that could be 
made through constitutional methods. Furthermore, the success of direct action Welsh 
language campaigns in relation to local government paperwork and broadcasting 
demonstrated that when political action was unsuccessful, non-violent alternatives 
could succeed where politicians failed.  
 
The integration of the Scots and Welsh into the British political system was aided by 
the strength of the Labour and Liberal parties in both countries. Additionally, the 
upper echelons of British government were open to the Scots and Welsh, and the likes 
of Ramsay MacDonald and David Lloyd George demonstrated that political 
progression to the top was possible. These factors meant that for the vast majority of 
Scottish and Welsh voters, the British government and the political process had 
legitimacy, and for most nationalists, politics was a viable means of achieving change. 
The legitimacy and viability of the political process is highly prohibitive to the 
emergence of terrorist groups for two reasons: it limits support for political violence, 
and it denies violent actors of legitimacy in the eyes of the group’s potential 
constituency. 
 
Chenoweth and Stephan’s work on non-violent alternatives demonstrates this first 
point clearly. They contend that non-violent movements will be able to attract a far 
larger and far broader level of support than violent groups,1036 as the clandestine 
nature of terrorist organisations requires a tremendous individual commitment to the 
cause. Furthermore, the use of violence raises moral objections and the vast majority 
of the general public react negatively to the use of violence, regardless of the context. 
Political violence, especially when there is loss of life, is widely abhorred and the 
perpetrators are viewed as criminals or murderers. For those involved in violent 
campaigns, their actions are intended to create fear and anger amongst the general 																																																								
1036 Chenoweth & Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works.  
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public, but also to elicit support and raise morale in their constituent community. 
However, when non-violent methods are perceived to be viable, the vast majority of 
the target community would reject the need for political violence, and would see the 
use of violence as inappropriate or damaging. Accordingly, they would be more likely 
to turn against the perpetrators than praise them.  In Scotland and Wales, the viability 
of non-violent alternatives, to which the barriers for participation and support were far 
lower, starved violent groups of the potential support of the nationalist community.  
 
I believe that in Wales and Scotland, the existence of (relatively) successful non-
violent nationalist movements was sufficient to persuade all but the most fundamental 
nationalists that violence was unnecessary in the pursuit of political change. There 
was less incentive to involve oneself in violent actions when non-violence could 
succeed, even if progress was slow. It is interesting to note that there were spikes in 
violent nationalist activity in Scotland and Wales in the immediate aftermath of 
blocked nationalist political progress. In Wales, the failure of non-violent methods to 
prevent the flooding of Capel Celyn led to the resurrection of MAC, and the failure of 
British government to implement Scottish devolution in 1979 was cited as one of the 
primary motivations by the SNLA for their actions. In both situations, neither group 
was able to gain mainstream support, but the commission of violent acts was evidence 
that the exhaustion of non-violent alternatives could lead individuals within the 
national movements to turn to violence.  
 
Martha Crenshaw argues that the existence of a dissatisfied minority or majority is not 
a necessary precursor or sufficient cause of terrorism, but the lack of opportunity for 
political participation will create conditions that motivate individuals to adopt 
terrorism.1037 In Northern Ireland, political progress was impeded and direct action 
campaigns were violently suppressed by intransigent elements of a unionist 
community who mistook the redress of the power balance in Northern Ireland in 
favour of the Catholic community as an attempt to subjugate of the Protestant 
community, or unify Ulster with the Republic of Ireland.  In Scotland and Wales, the 
unionist parties were less fearful of nationalist gains, and in the case of the Liberals 
and Labour, willing to accept a moderate form of devolution. Thus political progress 																																																								
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in Wales and Scotland was possible because the opponents of the national movement 
were willing to allow it to make progress, demonstrative of the less emotionally-
charged nature of the national question in these countries, and not leading to the sort 
of communal polarisation that occurred in Ireland. 
 
It has been suggested that engaging in a political process with parties supportive of 
terrorist groups, or even the groups themselves, can help in efforts to eradicate 
terrorism, by encouraging splits in the groups, undermining their message and 
eliminating the need for their actions.1038 One of the simplest ways to prevent the 
emergence or spread of a terrorist group is to establish a political process through 
which the concerns of their community can be heard and through which progress can 
be achieved.  Nothing is more damaging to a terrorist group than denying it popular 
support, and offering a non-violent alternative can achieve this.  
 
 
Historical Precedence 
 
The physical force tradition of Irish nationalism is well covered in the literature of 
that topic; Whelehan opines, “rebellion in Ireland is often viewed as something 
handed down through generations, part of an unbroken tradition”,1039 and Charles 
Townshend adds that “the tradition of violence is unmistakably important… violent 
acts or threats continued for so long to be an acceptable supplement to, if not an actual 
substitute for, political change”.1040 Thus instances of political violence have been 
portrayed as a regular feature in the history of Irish nationalism - in the Proclamation 
read out by Patrick Pearse at the Easter Rising he reminded his audience that “in every 
generation the Irish people have asserted their right to national freedom and 
sovereignty; six times during the past three hundred years they have asserted it in 
arms.”1041 So established was this tradition, nurtured by the IRB and other like-
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minded organisations, that Rose asks, “whether electoral politics or the politics of 
coercion has been ‘normal’ in Ireland”.1042 
 
Republicans have built on this tradition what Alonso describes as a “martyrology”, an 
attempt to obtain the support and sympathy on the nationalist community by drawing 
on the memories of the glorious dead.1043 The IRA, he argues, made use of the 
“continued legacy of sacrifice and martyrdom” for recruitment purposes and to justify 
their actions.1044 Most notable of the Republican martyrs were the leaders of the 
Easter Rising, whose execution ensured their prominent place in Irish Republican 
history, and more recently the hunger strikers, of whom Bobby Sands received the 
most attention. The IRA, Alonso argues, made use of the “continued legacy of 
sacrifice and martyrdom” for recruitment purposes and to justify their actions.1045 The 
comparative ‘normality’ of violent revolution in Ireland made the adoption of violent 
methods far less unusual than it would be in other societies, and furnished violent 
nationalists with a collection of historical figures to draw inspiration from.  
 
Wales and Scotland do not have the same physical force tradition as Ireland. If one 
was to look far back into the history of both countries, one could, of course, find 
examples of the demonstration of Scottish and Welsh nationhood in arms - the Battle 
of Bannockburn, and the heroic figure of William Wallace being celebrated examples, 
as is Owain Glyndŵr, who proclaimed himself Prince of Wales and led a revolt 
against English rule, but both historical episodes took place far too long ago to be 
considered part of recent tradition.  
 
A more recent example is the 1745 Jacobite Rising, led by Charles Edward Stuart, 
which sought to reclaim the British throne with the support of Highland clans. 
However, this too is unsuitable to cast as historical precedent for Scottish nationalist 
violence, as the close connection between support for the Stuarts and Catholicism in 
the United Kingdom, meant drawing on the legacy of Bonnie Prince Charlie (who 
didn’t even have the decency to die as a martyr) would have been uncomfortable for 
the vast majority of Presbyterian Scots. Additionally, in the aftermath of the Jacobite 																																																								
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defeat at Culloden, the British state took a number of steps to co-opt Highland culture 
and imagery - everything that had been antithetical to the British state during the 
revolt – and repurpose it in favour of the union. Devine notes that Sir Walter Scott 
was central to the process of making Jacobitism “acceptable... romantic and 
appealing”,1046 and this image was solidified by the association created between the 
Scottish Highlands and the British Monarchy by Queen Victoria. Those who found 
themselves on the wrong side of history were allowed to retain important aspects of 
their culture in the service of the British Army, and this persuaded many to join up.1047 
In these ways, the memory of the Jacobites and the rebellious Highlands, potential 
building blocks for a revolutionary Scottish nationalism, were harnessed to the union. 
Scottish regiments, such as the Black Watch made a “remarkable impact on Scottish 
consciousness” and helped sustain “a martial national tradition”, albeit one that 
emphasised the benefits of union.1048   
 
The ability to draw on a historical precedent and a pantheon of martyrs allowed 
political violence in Ireland to be presented as a continuation of the past, and as 
traditional and honourable. Equally, the use of violence was, to some extent, 
normalised in a way that it never was in Scotland or Wales. The tradition, or 
precedent, of militant nationalism in Ireland became self-sustaining, as each 
generation drew on the example set by previous generations. Whilst this can help us 
explain why political violence was a feature of Irish nationalism, it does not by itself 
explain why it was far less common in Scotland and Wales; the absence of a similar 
tradition represents the different relationships the Scots and Welsh had with the 
British state. However, similarly to the differences in state response, the absence of a 
physical force tradition may help to explain why there were fewer prepared to take up 
arms for Scottish and Welsh freedom (or support those who did) to begin with.  
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Conclusion 
 
I have argued that societal conditions in Scotland and Wales were ill-suited to the 
emergence of a sustained campaign of political violence in support of a national 
minority. When taken in isolation, a number of these factors fail to fully explain this 
discrepancy; for one, the existence of societal cleavages by themselves has not 
impacted the emergence of violent nationalism: it is only when these cleavages have 
corresponded to a power imbalance, leading to the polarisation of the community on 
the issue of sovereignty, that this has been a factor. I argue that this polarisation did 
not occur in Scotland or Wales until very recently, and even when it has in Scotland, 
it has not been as binary as in Ireland. Secondly, the more measured response to 
violent nationalism in Scotland and Wales ensured that the state did not unwittingly 
fan the flames of nationalist rebellion, although we must understand that the British 
state was confronted with a far more chaotic situations in Ireland than they ever faced 
in Scotland or Wales 
 
Finally, the precedent for political violence - the existence of a Republican physical 
force tradition - may help to explain the violence in Ireland, but its absence by itself 
cannot account for the lack of violence in Scotland or Wales. The existence of this 
tradition and the overreactions of the British state in Ireland could both be described 
as precipitants rather than preconditions, in Crenshaw’s typology of the causes of 
terrorism,1049 generating sympathy and support for militant Irish nationalists. The 
absence of a similar enabling factor in Scotland and Wales undoubtedly contributed to 
the failure of militant Scottish and Welsh nationalism to get off the ground, but does 
not in isolation explain why political violence was less of a feature of these national 
movements.  
 
I believe that the success of Britishness as a unifying national identity in Scotland and 
Wales has been a greater contributing factor to this phenomenon. The successful 
dissemination of a shared identity in Scotland and Wales meant that the peoples of 
both countries could express a dual loyalty, to their nation, and to wider state. This 
lent the British state the legitimacy it could not fully achieve in Ireland due to the 																																																								
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exclusion and discrimination of the Irish Catholic population. Finally, and just as 
importantly, I believe the viability of the political process, making direct nationalist 
progress - or indirect progress with the support of rival unionist parties - possible, as 
well as the political utility of non-violent direct action campaigns, made political 
violence unnecessary. Both of these factors made it vastly more difficult for violent 
nationalists in Scotland and Wales to gain public support, without which terrorist 
groups cannot fully operate.  
 
That Britishness failed in Catholic Ireland, associated with a minority community 
empowered by a foreign power that the vast majority of the natives perceived as 
illegitimate, helps to explain why political violence was a feature of nationalism in 
Ireland, and could - along with the absence of political progress - be described as a 
“precondition” of political violence - “factors that set the stage for terrorism over the 
long run”, if we return to Crenshaw’s terminology.1050 I believe that the two most 
important factors in the absence of political violence from nationalist campaigns in 
Scotland and Wales were the legitimacy of the British state and the viability of the 
political process. Central to both of these factors was the successful integration of the 
national minorities in Scotland and Wales into a pan-British identity, a process that 
can be traced back to the success of the Protestant Reformation and the utility of the 
British Empire in these two countries, preventing communal polarisation along 
national lines.  
 
Taken together, these factors meant that militant members of the nationalist 
movements in Scotland and Wales were operating in highly unfavorable conditions in 
which their opponents had political legitimacy amongst the vast majority of their 
potential constituency; the viability of non-violent alternatives further restricted their 
ability to draw support from the nationalist community, and there was no tradition of 
armed rebellion against the state. Considering the evidence, it is clear that political 
violence was not well-suited as a form of nationalist protest in Scotland and Wales, 
and those individuals who attempted to do so anyway were severely constrained by 
their inability to gain public support or sympathy.  
 																																																								
1050 ibid. 
	 209 
************ 
 
When this research project was first proposed, the intention was to provide an answer 
to the question “why has there been no violent Scottish, English or Welsh 
nationalism?”. To some extent this is evidence of the comparative invisibility of the 
Scottish and Welsh terrorist groups that did emerge, but equally it is evidence of the 
insignificance of political violence in Scotland and Wales, and the inability of those 
who did adopt violent tactics to achieve lasting renown. As a result, the research 
question was modified to examine why political violence was such a marginal feature 
of these national movements. 
 
The cases studied - Ireland, England, Scotland and Wales - were chosen primarily for 
geographic reasons, but they complement each other well, as there have been varying 
degrees of political violence in these countries: Ireland has witnessed the most 
nationalist political violence, fuelled by the sectarian divide that has directed national 
identity there for centuries; by contrast, nationalist political violence has been far less 
prevalent in Scotland and Wales, but it has not been entirely absent; finally, the 
absence of English militant nationalism results from the lack of English nationalism 
generally.  Furthermore, the nationalist movements that have emerged in Scotland, 
Wales and Ireland have all drawn on different energies and have taken on different 
forms: nationalism in Ireland has been inextricably bound with Catholicism; Welsh 
nationalism has concentrated on culture and language at the expense of territorial 
demands; and Scottish nationalism has been advocated by a civic nationalist party 
appealing as much to the head (and the wallet), as the heart. Finally, they have all 
reaped differing degrees of success, although they would be unlikely to agree on a 
definition of “success”.  
 
The violent nationalist groups that did emerge in Scotland and Wales were small, 
primarily used unsophisticated methods, and were usually short-lived. Even the 
periods of greatest activity (the prolonged campaign of MAC and the cottage arson 
campaign, as well as the early-1980s actions of the SNLA) relied on the ‘expertise’ of 
a small number of individuals. Yet in comparison to the actions of the IRA, these 
actions were minor - a nuisance rather than a real threat - and it is for this reason these 
terrorist campaigns consistently received little publicity. Instead, the media have often 
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treated violent nationalists in Scotland and Wales as a parody: I mentioned earlier the 
dismissive descriptions of the Free Wales Army as “a Dad’s Army farce”1051 and a 
“comic opera affair”.1052 During the trial of the Army of the Provisional Government, 
the lawyer for the defence played on an alleged connection between the group and Idi 
Amin to “conjure up a spectacle of co-accused Major Frederick Boothby and General 
Idi Amin of Uganda marching side by side at the head of a piebald army of ebony 
Highlanders in tartan tiger skins to the sound of jungle drums and bagpipes to capture 
Achnashellach”.1053 The comic ineptitude of some of these groups reinforced the 
belief that they were not to be taken seriously.  
 
To journalists covering their court cases, and readers learning about the trials in the 
newspapers, the japes of the FWA and the APG were amusing. It would not have been 
difficult to construct a narrative of the two as ‘comedy terrorists’. It is important, 
however, to remember that there is often only a small step between farce and tragedy; 
as Jackson reminds us, at the beginning of the Easter Rising it “looked like an 
extremely foolhardy, not to say comic, venture”. 1054  It is not unimaginable that one 
of these groups could have carried out a far more deadly campaign. If we return to the 
sort of counterfactual history discussed in the introduction, it does not bear thinking 
about what could have happened if the violent elements in the Scottish and Welsh 
national movements had had the capabilities of the Provisional IRA. Additionally, it 
should not be forgotten that two men lost their lives in Wales as the direct result of 
their involvement in political violence, and others had their lives changed by the 
injuries they suffered. As tempting as it is to laughably dismiss these groups as 
misguided charlatans, we should be relieved that the violent nationalist campaigns in 
Scotland and Wales did not escalate further.   
 
So why was political violence such a marginal feature of the nationalist campaigns in 
Scotland and Wales? The truth is that there is no simple answer. It is impossible to be 
certain about why something so substantial does not happen, and nor it is viable to 
speculate about every potential factor. Nevertheless it would seem that two factors are 
the most pertinent: the process of identity formation in Scotland and Wales, and the 																																																								
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viability of non-violent alternatives. I have argued that these campaigns did not 
escalate because the groups involved were unable to gain popular support, without 
which a terrorist campaign simply cannot hope to succeed. Without financial support, 
Scottish nationalists were forced to turn to crime, instantly raising their visibility to 
the security services and often ending campaigns before they had even begun. They 
were denied this support because the British state they were attacking had legitimacy 
with the vast majority in Scotland and Wales. This legitimacy is, as I have discussed, 
the direct consequence of the successful integration of the Scots and Welsh into a 
shared British identity.  
 
Additionally, the lack of communal polarisation in Scotland and Wales on the issue of 
the national question allowed a dual loyalty to both one’s nation and the British state. 
Whilst it would be wrong to suggest that there are not those in Scotland and Wales 
who reject a British identity (although the majority of people in Scotland and Wales 
now prioritise their national identity1055), Britishness has been widely accepted in 
Scotland and Wales, although the proportion of those who do so is now in decline. 
Central to the longevity of the British identity in Scotland and Wales have been pan-
British institutions such as the Labour Party, the welfare state, the military, and the 
monarchy all of which have played a part in advertising the benefits of continued 
union. As the pan-British nature of these institutions is called into question, the 
unifying potential of these institutions declines, but until recently, the success of these 
institutions in integrating the Scots and Welsh restricted the development of the 
national movements in both countries, meaning that when they did emerge they were 
in the minority, and presently remain so.  
 
Despite being in the minority, both national movements have been able to achieve 
progress. The supposed viability of political alternatives could be somewhat 
contentious; after all, Scottish nationalists failed to achieve independence in 2014 
despite their political endeavours. Additionally, Plaid Cymru has struggled to break 
through in Wales in the way the SNP have in Scotland, but I do not believe the 
absence of political violence is the direct result of the success of constitutional 
methods, merely the viability of these methods: the attainment of nationalist demands 																																																								
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does not have to be immediate; it simply needs to be achievable. Furthermore, this 
progress does not have to be achieved by nationalist parties alone; it can be and has 
been the result of collaboration with other non-nationalist parties or social 
movements.  
 
As long as there was evidence of progress - whether that be legislation to protect and 
encourage the Welsh language, or the prospect of devolution of further power to the 
Scottish and Welsh devolved assemblies - it was sufficient to dissuade the vast 
majority of nationalists of the need for violent methods to advance their cause. I have 
argued that the most intensive periods of nationalist violence in Scotland and Wales 
followed the failure of non-violent methods to address nationalist concerns, such as 
the construction of the Tryweryn reservoir and the failure of Westminster to 
implement Scottish devolution in 1979.  
 
I have also highlighted other factors that were unique to Ireland and Northern Ireland, 
such as the existence of a physical force tradition in Irish Republicanism and the 
heavy-handed treatment of nationalists by representatives of the British state in 
Ireland. These precipitant factors help us understand why political violence became a 
feature of the national movement in Ireland, eroding the legitimacy of the British state 
and ensuring a wider array of support for those who would adopt violent methods. 
However, their absence does not directly explain the lack of an equivalent violent 
campaign elsewhere. The social and political conditions in Scotland and Wales were 
less hospitable to nationalist political violence, but they did not preclude the use of 
violence entirely. There will always be intransigent members of the nationalist 
community for whom non-violent methods are too slow or insufficient, or who 
believe that the nation needs to be ‘awakened’ through a revolutionary uprising, but 
those who attempted such an endeavour in Scotland and Wales found a population 
overwhelmingly unreceptive to their message and methods, and this was a barrier that 
they could not overcome.  
 
What does the future hold for nationalism in the United Kingdom? In Scotland, the 
division between nationalist and unionist has definitely hardened as a result of the 
referendum, but this can partly be attributed to the lack of any clear unionist 
constituency before the campaign. If this division is reinforced, it is possible that this 
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could lead to a more bitter form of Scottish politics. The independence referendum 
campaign has had a knock-on effect in the rest of the United Kingdom, and if further 
devolution is delivered, it is likely that the issue of English governance will become 
increasingly salient. In Wales, Plaid Cymru remain a minor party, but fifteen years of 
devolution have demonstrably increased support1056 for devolved government that was 
only supported by 24% of Welsh voters in 1997.1057 The declining utility of the 
British identity in the United Kingdom has had the effect of making national identity 
more politically relevant, but this has not translated directly into a rise in support for 
nationalist parties, as the pan-British parties have adjusted their message to take 
advantage of the increased salience of national identity.  
 
It is difficult to assess the extent to which these findings are applicable to other 
conflicts, but I believe that these cases provide further evidence to the burgeoning 
literature on the efficacy of non-violent protest, and the ability of democracy to limit 
the utility of political violence. In terms of further research, I believe that the cases of 
violent nationalism in Welsh and Scottish raise two further research areas worthy of 
consideration: the first is the study of negative cases - the ‘why not’ questions. As I 
stated in my introduction, the growth of counterfactual history allows us to consider 
the utility (or disutility) of certain behaviour or choices, and I believe that studying 
events or phenomena that realistically could have happened, whilst difficult, offers 
immense potential benefits. From such research we can begin to develop remedies or 
policies that prevent negative outcomes. This study will never be a perfect science - it 
is not easily testable, and the findings may not be transferrable - but these drawbacks 
do not mean that it is not beneficial.  
 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, is the study of failed terrorist groups. There 
are numerous monographs and journal articles about the IRA, the Basque separatist 
group ETA, and Al Qaeda, yet the Global Terrorism Database lists a wide variety of 
groups responsible for a small number of attacks: these include the Caribbean 
Revolutionary Alliance, responsible for 25 attacks in the 1980s; the Breton Liberation 
Front responsible for 30 attacks over 30 years; and the National Front for the 
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Liberation of Belgium - responsible for one attack (that killed one) in 1983.1058 These 
groups, and the reasons their campaigns were (relatively) limited, have yet to be 
adequately examined. Studying the absence of noise is far more difficult than studying 
noise itself, but it is the study of failed cases, and the reasons behind these failures 
that will help us uncover further ways in which the outbreak of political violence can 
be prevented.  
 
I introduced this thesis by examining three dates in the late 1960s and I shall conclude 
with two further important dates in the history of nationalism in Scotland, Ireland and 
Wales. On the 7th of May 2015, voters across the United Kingdom voted in a general 
election for the Westminster Parliament, and following on from the momentum they 
gained in the aftermath of the referendum on independence in 2014, the SNP were 
able to win 56 of Scotland’s 59 seats, achieving exactly 50% of the popular vote.  
This was the first time that the Nationalists had ‘won’ a Westminster election in 
Scotland, and clearly established the SNP as the main party in Scotland. In Wales, 
nationalism remains a secondary political force, and Plaid Cymru were unable to draw 
from the energy and vitality of the SNP, holding their three seats without making any 
gains, polling 12.1% of the total votes cast. These two vastly different results 
demonstrate the different paths the nationalist parties have taken in Scotland and 
Wales since those first victories one year apart in the late 1960s.  
 
In Northern Ireland, less than two weeks after the election, on the 19th of May 2015 
an equally momentous event took place. During the visit of Prince Charles, heir to the 
British throne, to the National University of Ireland Galway, the Prince shook hands 
with Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Féin. This relatively benign interaction was an 
historic moment in the peace process and came the day before Prince Charles visited 
Mullaghmore, on Ireland’s west coast, where the Provisional IRA had killed his 
beloved great-uncle Lord Mountbatten, in August 1979. For both parties this 
represented another important step on the path to reconciliation.  
 
The political violence that wrought Ireland asunder is a lesson in what can go wrong. 
During the Troubles, more than half the population of Northern Ireland knew 																																																								
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someone who had been killed or injured as a result,1059 and for many in the province, 
dealing with the threat of terrorism was a daily fact of life. I have argued that the 
reason violence has been such a marginal feature of nationalist campaigns in both 
Scotland and Wales was that conditions were never conducive to prolonged violent 
campaigns of the type seen in Northern Ireland, and while we must be thankful, we 
must also remember that this was in large part a result of good fortune stemming from 
decisions taken long ago, that others have not been so lucky and, that continued 
careful study of these matters can be the difference between life and death.  
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